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Abstract 
Countries enter into double tax agreements with the 
economic objective of preventing double taxation of cross-
border transactions. To achieve this objective, the 
contracting states agree reciprocally to restrict their 
substantive tax law. That is, a major policy of double tax 
agreements is to reduce double taxation of residents of 
states that are parties to the agreement. Residents of third 
states sometimes contrive to obtain treaty benefits 
typically by interposing a person or a conduit entity in one 
of the contracting states. In order to ensure that a resident 
of a contracting state who claims treaty benefits is entitled 
to them in substance, double tax agreements should be 
interpreted according to their substantive economic effect. 
Generally, double tax agreements follow the pattern of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention.  
The OECD Model Convention addresses the double 
taxation of dividends, interest and royalties, commonly 
collectively known as ―passive income‖, in Articles 10, 11 
and 12 respectively. These provisions usually operate by 
reducing withholding tax imposed by a source state on 
passive income that flows from the source state to a 
resident state. In order to prevent a resident of a third state 
from obtaining a source state withholding tax reduction by 
interposing a person or a conduit entity in the resident 
state, the OECD Model Convention requires the immediate 
recipient of passive income to be the ―beneficial owner‖ of 
that income. That is, the OECD Model Convention requires 
the immediate recipient to be an owner in a substantive 
economic sense. 
Courts and commentators have difficulty in interpreting 
and applying the concept of beneficial ownership to 
conduit entities that are corporations, commonly referred 
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to as ―conduit companies‖. They have attributed the cause 
of the difficulty to the absence of a definition of the term 
―beneficial owner‖ in the OECD Model Convention. This 
thesis argues that the difficulty in applying the beneficial 
ownership concept to conduit companies has arisen not 
because of the absence of the meaning of the concept, but 
because logically and from an economic perspective the 
concept cannot be applied to companies in general, not to 
conduit companies in particular.  
The beneficial ownership test was meant to be a test of 
economic substance. From an economic perspective, the 
benefit or the burden of a contract entered by a company is 
economically enjoyed or borne by its shareholders. That 
is, in substance a company cannot be considered as 
owning income beneficially. From this consideration, it 
follows that conduit companies can never be considered 
entitled to treaty benefits. Nevertheless, the OECD Model 
Convention applies the beneficial ownership test to 
conduit companies pursuant to an assumption that at least 
in some cases conduit companies can be the beneficial 
owners of passive income. The Model Convention‘s 
assumption is based on the legal perspective that courts 
conventionally adopt. According to this legal perspective, 
companies hold income beneficially because they exist as 
separate legal entities from their shareholders.  
Courts find themselves battling these opposing 
perspectives when applying the beneficial ownership test 
to conduit companies. In order to make income tax law 
work efficiently, courts that are obliged to determine 
whether to honour claims to treaty benefits made by 
conduit companies have preferred to employ the legal 
perspective. Courts have justified this approach by 
adopting surrogate tests for the actual beneficial 
5 
 
ownership test. Most of the surrogate tests do not relate to 
the concept of ownership at all. This thesis categorises the 
surrogate tests as ―substantive business activity‖ and 
―dominion‖. By analysing reported cases, the thesis 
identifies deficiencies in these tests. 
One of the proposed outcomes of the thesis is to 
suggest an alternative approach for deciding conduit 
company cases. The thesis suggests that courts should 
consider an arrangement as a whole and investigate 
reasons for the existence of an immediate recipient of 
passive income in the specific corporate structure. The 
thesis also recommends amendments in the official 
commentary on Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the OECD Model 
convention in order to address the conceptual 
shortcomings inherent in those Articles. 
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1.1. Background 
Most countries tax income on the basis of both residence 
and source. As a result, cross-border transactions may be 
taxed twice, both in the source country and in the country 
of residence. This phenomenon is known as ―double 
taxation‖. Countries may avoid this problem either 
unilaterally by legislation that relieves certain income 
from tax or bi-laterally (or multi-laterally) by entering 
double taxation treaties
1
 with countries with which they 
have trading or investment relationships. Such treaties 
almost invariably contain articles that address the taxation 
of dividends, interest, and royalties (commonly 
collectively known as ―passive income‖), which flow from 
a source in one treaty partner to a resident in the other 
treaty partner. Tax treaties usually operate by partially, or 
fully, exempting passive income from withholding tax 
imposed by the source country. Treaty partners intend that 
treaty benefits should be granted to their residents, not to 
residents of non-contracting states. Moreover, they intend 
benefits to be granted to persons who enjoy the benefits, 
                                               
1 Double tax treaties are also referred as ―double taxation agreements‖ 
or ―double tax conventions‖ and simply as ―tax treaties‖. 
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not to an artificial entity that is interposed in a stream of 
income. A question that arises from this framework is do 
residents of treaty partners who receive passive income 
qualify for this reduction in withholding tax. 
Most countries that negotiate double taxation 
agreements follow the pattern of the model tax convention 
on income and on capital formulated by the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development
2
 (which will 
be referred to as ―the OECD Model Convention‖) or a 
similar pattern.
3
 The provisions of the OECD Model 
Convention that apply to dividends, interest, and royalties 
are respectively Articles 10, 11, and 12. Articles 10(2), 
11(2), and 12(1) address the question of the qualification 
for benefits under the treaty. The test that each of these 
articles applies is ―beneficial ownership‖. Treaties 
sometimes use terms such as ―beneficial owner‖,4 
―beneficially entitled‖,5 ―beneficially owned‖6 and 
―beneficial interest‖.7 These terms are all variations of the 
notion of beneficial ownership. 
                                               
2 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs Model Tax Convention on Income 
and on Capital (OECD, Paris, 2010). 
3 For example, United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs ―United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries‖ ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E/21 
(2001). 
4 For example, Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, the 
Netherlands–Indonesia (29 January 2002, entered into force 1 January 
2004), art 10(2). 
5 For example, Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and 
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, 
Canada–Australia (21 May 1980), art 10(1). 
6 For example, Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and 
Capital Gains, the United Kingdom–the Netherlands (7 November 
1980), art 10(1). 
7 For example, Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and 
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and 
Capital, United States–France (31 August 1994), art 30(4)(c). 
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The OECD Model Convention does not define the term 
―beneficial owner‖. Ever since the introduction of the term 
in the Model Convention of 1977, its meaning has been a 
topic of debate. For instance, at the 1998 International 
Fiscal Association Congress in London, the topic of 
discussion in one of the seminars was ―The Concept of 
Beneficial Ownership in Tax Treaties‖.8 The first question 
raised in that seminar was, ―Should the domestic law of 
the contracting state be referred to under Article 3(2) of 
the OECD Model Convention to understand beneficial 
ownership, or does the context of Articles 10, 11, and 12 
of the OECD Model Convention require that beneficial 
ownership be interpreted as a concept of international tax 
language, which is separate from domestic law?‖ The 
second issue was, ―If the concept of beneficial ownership 
is not seen as a reference to domestic law, then how 
should the concept be interpreted? What then is beneficial 
ownership?‖9 
The 2002 OECD report on restricting the entitlement of 
treaty benefits
10
 discusses the background of the 
amendments in the commentary on Articles 10, 11 and 12 
of the Model Convention adopted on 28 January 2003. In 
this report, the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs 
expressed the opinion that the difficulties in interpreting 
and applying the concept of beneficial ownership had 
arisen because of the absence of an extensive clarification 
                                               
8 Klaus Vogel The OECD Model Convention, 1998 and Beyond: the 
Concept of Beneficial Ownership in Tax Treaties: Proceedings of a 
Seminar held in London in 1998 during the 52nd Congress of the 
International Fiscal Association (Kluwer Law International, London, 
2000). 
9 See also Charl P du Toit Beneficial Ownership of Royalties in 
Bilateral Tax Treaties (IBFD, Amsterdam, 1999) at 17. 
10 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Restricting the Entitlement to 
Treaty Benefits‖ in OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs 2002 Reports 
Related to the OECD Model Tax Convention (OECD, Paris, 2003) at 9. 
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of the concept.
11
 On 29 April 2011, the OECD Committee 
on Fiscal Affairs published a discussion draft that 
proposed changes in the official commentary on Articles 
10, 11 and 12 with an aim of clarifying the meaning of the 
term ―beneficial owner‖.12 Similarly, many other studies 
on the concept have expressed a need to define the term 
beneficial ownership.
13
 
Thus, the general view is that the term beneficial 
ownership needs to be clarified. However, this view 
overlooks an important issue, which is whether the 
concept of beneficial ownership is logically capable of 
being applied to the problem that it is meant to solve. This 
thesis addresses that issue and argues that the difficulty in 
the application of the concept has arisen not because of the 
absence of a meaning of the concept in international tax 
law, but because logically and from an economic 
perspective the concept is incapable of being applied as a 
test to many of the circumstances where it is required to 
operate, most notably where the recipient of income is a 
corporation, shareholders of which reside in a non-
contracting state. This chapter will refer to such 
corporations as ―interposed companies‖. 
1.2. Problem in applying the beneficial ownership test 
As indicated earlier, double tax agreements operate to 
mitigate double taxation of transactions only between 
residents of contracting states. In the light of this policy, 
                                               
11 The Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits Report, at para 
23. 
12 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs Clarification of the Meaning of 
“Beneficial Owner” in the OECD Model Tax Convention: Discussion 
Draft (OECD, Paris, 2011) 
13
 Du Toit above n 9. J David B Oliver and others ―Beneficial 
Ownership‖ (2000) 54 Bulletin for International Taxation 310. John F 
Avery Jones and others ―The Origin of Concepts and Expressions 
Used in the OECD Model and their Adoption by States‖ (2006) 60 
Bulletin for International Taxation 220, at 246. 
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the term ―beneficial owner‖ should logically mean owner 
in a substantive economic sense. English trust law also 
uses the concept of beneficial ownership to distinguish 
someone who has the substantive right to enjoy the 
property from someone who looks after it. It follows that 
the concept of beneficial ownership is to be used as an 
economic principle rather than applying a narrower 
inappropriate meaning. 
The concept of beneficial ownership emphasises the 
economic reality of the relationship between corporations 
and shareholders, according to which a corporation is 
merely a legal fiction that cannot be considered separately 
from its shareholders. It is, therefore, not capable of 
holding property substantively. An economic perspective 
suggests that tax levied on a corporation‘s income should 
be integrated with any tax levied on its shareholders.  
That is, it should never be entitled to treaty benefits 
applicable to passive income because beneficial ownership 
requires determination of who is ultimately better off as a 
result of the payment of income, regardless of who or 
what is the immediate recipient. Thus, there is no 
connection between the concept of beneficial ownership 
and the notion of companies.  
This lack of connection is problematic particularly in 
situations involving interposed companies. Nevertheless, 
the OECD and courts apply the beneficial ownership test to 
such companies with the view that, at least in some cases, 
companies are entitled to treaty benefits because they are 
the beneficial owners of the income in question.  
The approach adopted by the OECD and courts 
corresponds to the conventional legal point of view, 
according to which a corporation exists as a legal 
personality separately from its shareholders. It can own 
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assets and derive income from them. From the legal 
perspective, therefore, income tax should be levied on a 
corporation, not on its shareholders.  
Applying beneficial ownership test to interposed 
companies from the legal perspective may result in treaty 
benefits being passed on to residents of a non-contracting 
state. That is, double tax treaties tend to operate in a 
manner that contradicts their own policy, which is to limit 
tax benefits to residents of contracting states. In other 
words, interposed companies distort the general 
application of the tax treaty policy. 
1.3. Surrogate tests: an imaginary connection 
The OECD and courts have drawn an imaginary connection 
in determining whether the limitation on a source 
country‘s taxing rights, embodied in a double tax treaty, 
can be used effectively by an interposed company to 
mitigate the effects of the source state‘s domestic tax law. 
In order to justify their view, they have adopted surrogate 
tests of the actual beneficial ownership test when applying 
it to interposed companies, which are substantive business 
activity and dominion.  
These surrogate tests do not indicate the presence of 
beneficial ownership. For example, the business activity 
test investigates whether a conduit company has a business 
activity of its own. Logically, however the simple 
presence of a business activity does not indicate the 
presence of ownership, let alone beneficial ownership. 
Moreover, these tests are inappropriate for determining the 
correct tax treatment of passive income (in the form of 
dividends, interest, or royalties) derived by interposed 
companies because they were originally meant to counter 
different kinds of tax planning strategies. Nevertheless, 
courts have inappropriately applied them as the beneficial 
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ownership test referred to in Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the 
OECD Model Convention. That is, they do not distinguish 
surrogate tests from the beneficial ownership test. Instead 
of clarifying the definition of beneficial ownership, their 
interpretation has led to the opinion that the concept needs 
clarification. 
1.4. Solution 
The most radical solution may be to redraft the relevant 
provisions of the OECD Model Convention. Another 
possibility may be to insert limitation of benefits clauses, 
which certain countries such as the United States use to 
overcome confusion in interpreting and applying the 
concept of beneficial ownership. Implementing these 
changes would take a long time because renegotiating and 
redrafting double tax treaties is a lengthy process, but until 
they are amended confusion prevails.  
This thesis tries to find short- and medium-term 
solutions. It highlights an alternative approach adopted by 
Dutch and Swiss courts for deciding certain conduit 
company cases. These courts determined whether an 
intermediary was interposed to act as a conduit by 
investigating reasons for the existence of the intermediary 
in the corporate structure. Their approach resembles the 
―predication test‖ adopted by Lord Denning in Newton v 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation.
14
 According to this 
test courts should examine what was really done, not 
simply look at documents. As a result, if it could be 
predicated that the arrangement was implemented to 
reduce the withholding tax imposed in the source state, the 
source state‘s domestic withholding tax rate would apply 
to the relevant passive income. 
                                               
14 Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1958) 98 CLR 1. 
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1.5. Methodology 
This thesis is a doctrinal study of relevant case law in 
various jurisdictions. It analyses the problem of 
interpreting the term ―beneficial owner‖. This problem has 
arisen because of the difficulty of applying the tax treaty 
policy to interposed companies. The difficulty in applying 
the policy can be analysed by examining the reasoning by 
which law applies to different facts. The reasoning is 
found in courts‘ judgments; hence, the thesis is based on 
case analysis. This thesis examines lapses in logic, which 
have led courts to interpret the term improperly. The 
analysis leads to new insights that provide effective 
suggestions for the operation of the beneficial ownership 
test. 
The thesis steps from the doctrinal analysis to policy 
analysis when it draws its conclusions. It examines the 
official commentary on Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the OECD 
Model Convention in the light of the intention of the OECD 
Committee of Fiscal Affairs to use the term ―beneficial 
owner‖. In examines the work of the committee before the 
insertion of the term. It suggests appropriate amendments 
to relevant parts of the official commentary on the 
convention.  
1.6. Scope of the study 
The investigation is international and applies the 
principles of international tax law, although refers to 
relevant domestic tax law of specific states when 
necessary. This thesis refers to the OECD Model 
Convention and its provisions for the purposes of 
interpreting the term ―beneficial owner‖.15 The United 
                                               
15 The OECD Model Convention, above n 2. 
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Nations Model Tax Convention
16
 also uses the term. In 
respect of the term beneficial owner the language and 
context of the provisions of both the OECD Model 
Convention and the United Nations Model Convention is 
the same.
17
 Thus, the conclusions drawn from the analysis 
of the concept of beneficial ownership given in the OECD 
Model Convention can also be applied to the United 
Nations Model Convention.  
This thesis concentrates on the OECD Model 
Convention. It focuses on bilateral tax treaties and does 
not consider multi-lateral tax agreements. 
Articles 10(2), 11(2) and 12(1) of the OECD Model 
Convention use the term ―beneficial owner‖ as a 
countermeasure against tax planning schemes in which 
residents of a third state interpose an entity in a 
contracting state to obtain benefit of a withholding tax 
reduction provided by the convention. The entity can be a 
corporation, a partnership, or a trust. This thesis 
concentrates on corporations, which are commonly 
referred to as conduit companies, and analyses conduit 
company cases from different jurisdictions, the most 
recent being Her Majesty the Queen v Prévost Car Inc,
18
 
which was decided by the Canadian Federal Court of 
Appeal on 17 February 2009. Although there are other tax 
planning arrangements that use interposed companies in 
order to obtain treaty benefits,
19
 the thesis focuses on the 
                                               
16 The United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention, above n 3. 
17 Ibid, at 144-198. The United Nations Model Convention follows the 
OECD Model Convention and reproduces parts of the commentary on 
the provisions of the OECD Model Convention.  
18
 Her Majesty the Queen v Prévost Car Inc 2009 FCA 57. 
19 For example, ―Artiste companies‖, which are dealt with under 
Article 17 of the OECD Model Convention. ―Typical triangular‖ cases 
as defined in OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Triangular Cases‖ in 
OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs Model Tax Convention: Four 
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improper use of the convention through conduit 
companies.  
1.7. Conduit companies strategies 
Broadly, a conduit company can be described as a 
company interposed between a company that pays 
(passive) income from a source state with which the 
country of the residence of the conduit company has a 
double tax agreement, and a company (or owner) resident 
in another state which cannot avail itself of benefits of the 
treaty.  
To illustrate, a company that is resident in State R 
derives passive income in the form of dividends, interest, 
or royalties from the assets and rights (for example, 
respectively, shares in, loans to, or the use of intellectual 
property rights given to) in a source company, which is a 
resident in State S. If there is no tax treaty between States 
R and S, State S imposes withholding tax under its 
domestic law on the passive income paid by the source 
company to the resident company. However, suppose that 
State S has a treaty with State C, which reduces 
withholding tax on the passive income paid by companies 
that are resident in State S to companies that are resident 
in State C. In addition, assume for the convenience of this 
illustration that foreign sourced passive income is tax-
exempt in State C.
20
  
                                                                                            
Related Studies, Issues in International Taxation, No 4 (OECD, Paris, 
1992) 28, at para 2. 
20 For example, State C might include the dividends, interest or 
royalties within its residents‘ gross taxable income but allow a 
deduction for dividends, interest, or royalties, when paid by the 
intermediary to the resident company. Sometimes in practice the 
intermediary must request an exemption from State C or tax relief 
from State S. 
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Resident Company
Intermediary 
(Conduit Company)
Source Company
Passive income 
after withholding tax 
deduction in State S
100%
Ownership
State R
State C
State S
Interest, royalties, 
management fees , 
commissions, 
service fees and 
similar expenses
deductible in State C
A loan, or services
provided
Passive income (gross) 
taxable in State C
100%
 
Figure 1.1: Direct conduit 
To take advantage of the withholding tax reduction, the 
resident company incorporates a wholly owned 
intermediary company in State C and transfers ownership 
of all its assets and rights in the source company to the 
intermediary. As the legal owner of the passive income, 
the intermediary claims relief from the domestic 
withholding taxes of State S. The intermediary then passes 
on the income to the resident company. That is, the 
intermediary based in State C acts as a conduit company 
for channelling income from State S to the ultimate owner 
in State R to reduce withholding tax impost in State S. The 
OECD report on double tax conventions and conduit 
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companies
21
 refers to such type of tax planning structures 
as a ―direct conduit‖. 
Often in conduit company strategies, tax savings do not 
rely on tax exemptions in the intermediary state alone. Tax 
savings can be obtained from the combined effect of the 
withholding tax reduction under a double tax treaty and 
the domestic law tax provisions of the intermediary state. 
The Conduit Companies Report refers to such strategies as 
―stepping stone conduits‖.22 
Resident Company
Intermediary 
(Conduit Company)
Source Company
Passive income 
after withholding tax 
deduction in State S
100%
Ownership
State R
State C
State S
Interest, royalties, 
management fees , 
commissions, 
service fees and 
similar expenses
deductable in State C
A loan, or services
provided
Passive income (gross) 
taxable in State C
100%
 
Figure 1.2: Stepping stone conduit 
                                               
21 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Double Taxation Conventions 
and the Use of Conduit Companies‖ in OECD Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs International Tax Avoidance and Evasion: Four Related 
Studies, Issues in International Taxation No 1 (OECD, Paris, 1987) 
87, at para 4(1). See Figure 1.1. 
22 The Conduit Companies Report, at para 4(2). See Figure 1.2. 
Introduction 
29 
 
In a stepping stone conduit strategy, the basic structure 
is identical to the direct conduit scheme. The main 
difference is that in the stepping stone conduit strategy, 
State C includes the passive income received by the 
intermediary from the source company in the 
intermediary‘s gross taxable income. Under the general 
tax provisions of State C the intermediary is then allowed 
a full deduction for the income that it passes on to the 
resident company. The income that the intermediary 
passes on to the resident company may be a (high) interest 
payment in a case of back-to-back loan structure, or in the 
form of royalties, commissions, or management or service 
fees. In effect, the intermediary does not bear any tax in 
State C. 
While the tax avoidance strategies in most of the 
decisions that this thesis analyses essentially correspond to 
either direct conduit or stepping stone conduit schemes, 
the thesis also analyses cases in which the conduit 
companies are totally unrelated to the corporations in the 
residence and source countries.
23
 
Thus, a conduit company is interposed between the 
source state and the resident state with the purposes of: 
1. avoiding or reducing source state withholding 
tax by obtaining the benefit of the (partial or 
full) withholding tax exemption under the treaty 
between the source state and the state where the 
conduit company is located; and 
2. passing on the income subject to the source 
state withholding tax concession to the taxpayer 
in the residence state. 
                                               
23 For example, Ministre de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie 
v Société Bank of Scotland (2006) 9 ITLR 683 (Conseil d‘État, France), 
and Royal Dutch Shell (6 April 1994) Case no 28 638, BNB 1994/217 
(the Hoge Raad, the Netherlands). 
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1.8. Structure 
The thesis begins by analysing the term ―beneficial 
owner‖ in the context of the object and purpose of the 
OECD Model Convention. The analysis explains the reason 
for the difficulty of applying the term to conduit 
companies. The thesis proposes that the concept of 
beneficial ownership  does not apply logically to conduit 
companies because it does not apply to any company in a 
substantive economic sense. It also delineates certain tests 
that courts have substituted for the actual beneficial 
ownership test and applied to conduit company cases.  
Subsequently, the thesis highlights a substance based 
approach for dealing with conduit company cases. 
Applying this approach as a benchmark, it examines the 
effectiveness of surrogate tests by analysing judgments of 
courts of different countries. Case analysis highlights 
deficiencies of the surrogate tests. The thesis concludes by 
suggesting appropriate amendments in the relevant parts 
of the official commentary on the OECD Model 
Convention. 
1.9. Original contribution 
As discussed earlier, the thesis analyses the reasoning of 
courts of various countries. It consolidates and categorises 
cases and material according to the surrogate tests courts 
apply for the actual beneficial ownership test. It translates 
and reviews extracts of judgements that have been 
overlooked. It highlights subtle differences in reasoning, 
which can change the outcome of a case. 
The thesis challenges certain sources generally 
regarded as yardsticks for interpreting the term ―beneficial 
owner‖. For example, it analyses paragraph 14(b) of the 
Conduit Companies Report and the Royal Dutch Shell 
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case, which are referred to widely for determining the 
meaning of the term. 
The thesis suggests new perspectives and insights. For 
example, contrary to general opinion, it shows that courts 
in common and civil law jurisdictions have adopted 
similar reasoning in the interpretation of the term 
―beneficial owner‖. 
1.10. Economic and political implications 
The term ―beneficial owner‖ has enormous political and 
economic implications. Political impact is apparent from 
the national positions that certain countries have 
developed in terms of their tax treaty policy, in order to 
attract multinational investments. Widespread tax 
avoidance shows the scale of the economic impact of these 
policies. 
For example, in December 1998, the Danish Ministry 
of Taxation abolished limited tax liability on dividends 
distributed by Danish subsidiaries to all foreign parent 
companies.
24
 As a result, Denmark turned into a tax haven 
for intermediary holding companies. When the European 
Union criticised Denmark for unfair tax competition, the 
Ministry limited the application of the exemption of the 
limited tax liability to companies within the European 
Union and to companies in countries with which Denmark 
had double tax treaties.
25
 However, in the interpretive 
notes to the amending Act, the ministry directed that 
Danish withholding tax could be avoided by interposing a 
holding company in another member state of the European 
Union or in a contracting state of Danish double tax 
                                               
24 Act No 1026 of 23 December 1998. 
25 Act No 282 of 25 April 2001. 
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treaties. Many multinationals, therefore, followed the 
direction and established holding companies in Denmark.  
Denmark underestimated the significance of the 
beneficial owner test in its double tax treaties. As a 
consequence, it not only lost tax revenue, but also caused 
other countries to lose theirs. 
In 2005, Denmark changed its policy retrospectively. It 
has since clarified that it intends to grant the exemption 
from limited tax liability only in cases in which a foreign 
company receiving passive income is the beneficial owner. 
According to a press release by the Ministry in April 2011, 
the Danish Tax and Custom Administration had by that 
time raised 31 cases. In 16 of the cases, the Administration 
had levied total withholding tax of DKK 19 billion.
26
 
Another example is the position that the Indian Central 
Board of Direct Taxation adopted with respect to the 
India-Mauritius double tax treaty of 24 August 1982.
27
 In 
2000, it issued a circular stating that treaty benefits should 
be allowed based on a tax residency certificate issued by 
the Mauritian Revenue Authority.
28
  
In Union of India v Azadi Bachao Andolan,
29
 the 
Supreme Court of India upheld the validity of the circular 
and observed that, in the absence of specific anti-abuse 
provisions in a tax treaty, the benefit of the tax treaty 
                                               
26 See Hans Severin Hansen ―The Great Hypocrisy - the "Beneficial 
Owner" cases‖ Danish Journal for Taxes and Duties (Tidsskrift for 
Skatter og Afgifter) -TfS 2011, 537. 
27 Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, 
India–Mauritius (24 August 1982, entered into force 6 December 
1983). 
28 Circular No 789 of 2000. 
29 Union of India v Azadi Bachao Andolan (2003) 263 ITR 706 (SC) 
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cannot be denied to persons qualifying as residents of the 
other contracting state. The court explained:
30
 
The developing countries allow treaty shopping to 
encourage capital and technology inflows, which 
developed countries are keen to provide to them. The 
loss of tax revenues could be insignificant compared to 
the other non-tax benefits to their economy. Many of 
them do not appear to be too concerned unless the 
revenue losses are significant compared to the other tax 
and non-tax benefits from the treaty, or the treaty 
shopping leads to other tax abuses.  
There are many principles in fiscal economy which, 
though at first blush might appear to be evil, are 
tolerated in a developing economy, in the interest of 
long-term development. Deficit financing, for example, 
is one; treaty shopping, in our view, is another. Despite 
the sound and fury of the respondents over the so-called 
―abuse‖ of ―treaty shopping‖, perhaps, it may have been 
intended at the time when the [India-Mauritius double 
tax agreement] was entered into. Whether it should 
continue, and, if so, for how long, is a matter which is 
best left to the discretion of the executive as it is 
dependent upon several economic and political 
considerations. This court cannot judge the legality of 
treaty shopping merely because one section of thought 
considers it improper. A holistic view has to be taken to 
adjudge what is perhaps regarded in contemporary 
thinking as a necessary evil in a developing economy.  
This observation implies that the object and purpose of 
limiting benefits of the India-Mauritius double tax treaty is 
insignificant in the light of national economic policy. 
Although Azadi Bachao Andolan did not concern 
beneficial ownership, court‘s reasoning has implications 
for the application of the beneficial ownership requirement 
in Indian double tax treaties.  
The circular and the decision of Azadi Bachao Andolan 
has allowed residents of non-contracting states to obtain 
tax benefits by interposing companies in Mauritius. 
According to several estimates, 42 per cent of foreign 
direct investments in India are made from Mauritius, and 
                                               
30 Ibid, 753. 
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India loses $100 million to $500 million of revenue per 
year.
31
 
Further, software and pharmaceutical companies have 
been able to avoid the United States tax on their foreign 
income by adopting an arrangement that includes schemes 
commonly referred to as the ―double Irish‖ and ―Dutch 
sandwich‖. Essentially, the arrangement involves 
channelling foreign income of subsidiaries in tax havens 
via affiliated companies located in Ireland and the 
Netherlands. For example, from 2007 to 2009, Google 
saved tax totalling $3.1 billion.
32
 
Although the arrangement is an aggressive tax 
avoidance strategy, it does not constitute a conduit 
company strategy by itself. Thus, it is out of the scope of 
this thesis. However, with regard to Ireland, certain 
royalty payments are not subject to withholding tax, and 
the Netherlands does not impose withholding tax on 
royalties at all. This zero withholding tax rate policy has 
allowed Irish and Dutch companies to pass on royalties to 
the subsidiaries in tax havens virtually free of tax. 
Although the zero withholding tax rates on royalties in 
these countries may have been driven by their economic 
policies, it has caused them as well as other countries to 
lose huge sums of revenue.   
 
                                               
31 ―FIIs Play Havoc Every Time Government Mentions Mauritius‖ 
The Economic Times (online ed, New Delhi, 21 June 2011). 
32 ―‗Dutch Sandwich‘ Saves Google Billions in Taxes‖ Bloomberg 
Businessweek (online ed, 22 October 2010). 
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2.1. Introduction 
Double tax conventions are diplomatic agreements of a 
fiscal nature. They should be construed in a substantive 
economic sense, in order to ensure that treaty benefits are 
available only to residents of the contracting states. From a 
substantive economic point of view, companies are legal 
fictions that shareholders use in order to derive income. It 
follows that theoretically from an economic perspective, 
income tax should be imposed at the level of shareholders, 
not at the level of corporations. Contrary to this 
implication, the OECD has decided to recognise companies 
for treaty purposes. The OECD‘s decision seems pragmatic 
because it is hard to operate income tax treaties unless 
companies are recognised. This decision causes the OECD 
Model Convention to operate simultaneously in two 
contradictory manners. On one hand, the Model 
Convention operates in a substantive economic sense to 
ensure that its benefits are limited to residents of the 
contracting states. On the other, it recognises companies 
for tax purposes, which is impossible from the substantive 
economic point of view. 
The contradictory manner of functioning of the OECD 
Model Convention cause problems in the interpretation 
and application of Articles 10, 11 and 12, which provide 
for a reduction in withholding tax on passive income. 
Residents of a non-contracting state can improperly obtain 
benefits of the reduction by interposing a company as the 
recipient of passive income in a contracting state. As 
discussed in section 1.7, such companies are commonly 
known as ―conduit companies‖. Articles 10(2), 11(2), and 
12(1) of the OECD Model Convention require the recipient 
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of passive income to be the beneficial owner of that 
income. 
Theoretically, conduit companies should never be 
entitled to treaty benefits because their shareholders, who 
enjoy passive income in an economic sense, are residents 
of a non-contracting state. However, the OECD‘s Conduit 
Companies Report and the official commentary on the 
Model Convention assume that at least in some situations 
conduit companies can be considered beneficial owners of 
passive income. The assumption is a logical impossibility 
that makes it difficult to interpret and apply the beneficial 
ownership concept. 
This chapter examines in detail the point mentioned in 
chapter 1, which is that it is inherently illogical to apply 
the beneficial ownership concept as a test to conduit 
company cases. To illustrate the point, it explains the 
application of the beneficial ownership concept in trust 
law and in the OECD Model Convention. It also discusses 
the legal and economic perspectives of the application of 
income tax law to corporations. 
2.2. Interpretation of double tax conventions 
Treaties should be construed liberally rather than in the 
strict legalistic manner by which domestic statutes are 
generally interpreted.
33
 As an international treaty, a double 
tax convention should also be subjected to liberal 
interpretation.
34
 The interpretation of a double tax 
convention is governed by public international law and 
specifically by Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on 
                                               
33 See generally Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd (1980) AC 251. 
34 Gladden Estate v Minister of National Revenue (1985) 1 CTC 163, 
166. 
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the Law of Treaties,
35
 which provides that treaties should 
be interpreted in the context of their object and purpose.
36
 
Double tax conventions are bilateral agreements 
entered with the general economic objective of mitigating 
double taxation. To achieve this objective, the contracting 
states agree to restrict their substantive tax law 
reciprocally. That is, a double tax convention forms an 
independent mechanism to avoid double taxation only 
between its contracting states.
37
  
A resident of a third state can improperly obtain 
benefits that a double tax agreement provides to residents 
of its contracting states, by interposing a person or a 
conduit entity in one of the contracting states. For this 
reason, another purpose of a double tax convention is to 
prevent its improper use by limiting its benefits to 
residents of its contracting states. The Swiss Federal 
Commission of Appeal in Tax Matters in Re V SA,
38
 
explained:
39
 
… double taxation conventions … are primarily 
intended to avoid international double taxation … 
                                               
35 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969, entered 
into force 27 January 1980), Art 31(1). Indofood International 
Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, London Branch [2006] 
EWCA Civ 158, at para 24. Re V SA (2001) 4 ITLR 191 (The Federal 
Commission of Appeal in Tax Matters, Switzerland), at 208. See 
Philip Baker Double Taxation Conventions and International Tax Law 
(2 ed, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1994) at 21. 
36 The Vienna Convention, above n 35, art 31(1). It states: ―A treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in 
the light of its object and purpose.‖ 
37 Klaus Vogel Double Taxation Conventions: a Commentary to the 
OECD-, UN-, US-Model Conventions for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation of Income and Capital with particular reference to German 
Treaty Practice (Kluwer, Deventer, 1990) at 19. See David A Ward 
―Principles to be Applied in Interpreting Tax Treaties‖ (1977) 25 
Canadian Tax Journal 263 at 265. 
38 Re V SA (2001) 4 ITLR 191 (The Federal Commission of Appeal in 
Tax Matters, Switzerland). 
39 Ibid, at 210. 
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However, only international double taxation of residents 
of a contracting state are covered by these conventions 
... double taxation conventions do not have as their 
object to permit persons who are not residents of a 
contracting state to benefit from the advantages of the 
convention … 
The context of the object and purpose of limiting the 
benefits requires double tax agreements to be interpreted 
in an economic sense. The Austrian Supreme 
Administrative Court in N AG v Regional Tax Officer for 
Upper Austria
40
 expressed the same opinion. As will be 
discussed in section 2.7, the N AG case concerned the 
Austria-Switzerland double tax treaty of 30 January 
1974,
41
 which did not have an anti-abuse clause. The court 
observed:
42
  
If a double taxation convention contains provisions 
which bear on the economic aspects of tax questions 
and the attribution of assets, these provisions must be 
applied. The absence of such provisions in a convention 
– as in the case of this [double tax convention] – does 
not, however, justify the conclusion that the convention 
permits the use of nominee arrangements to obtain 
treaty benefits or the abuse of the forms and institutions 
of civil law. Such a conclusion would be incompatible 
with the goal and purpose of the convention, to assign 
taxing rights between the two states according to 
objective criteria. Where a treaty does not contain 
specific provisions on an economic approach and 
attribution of economic interests a state accordingly has 
the right to protect itself against an unjustified 
exploitation of the tax benefits provided for in the 
convention. 
The observation confirms that because a double tax 
convention is an agreement between two countries, one of 
its objects and purposes is to limit its benefits to residents 
of the contracting states. For this reason, regardless of 
                                               
40 N AG v Regional Tax Officer for Upper Austria (2000) 2 ITLR 884 
(The Supreme Administrative Court, Austria). 
41 Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital 
Gains, Switzerland–Austria (30 January 1974, entered into force 4 
December 1974). 
42 N AG v Regional Tax Officer for Upper Austria, above n 40, at 900 
(emphasis added). 
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whether its provisions contain specific anti-abuse clauses, 
a treaty should be interpreted in a substantive economic 
sense in order to prevent residents of non-contracting 
states from improperly obtaining tax benefits it provides.  
As discussed earlier, this thesis concerns provisions 
that deal with the double taxation of passive income, 
which are generally based on Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the 
OECD Model Convention. They mitigate double taxation 
by limiting the right to tax of the state where passive 
income originates, which will be referred to as the source 
state. In order to ensure that the benefit of the withholding 
tax reduction is limited to residents of the contracting 
states, Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the OECD Model 
Convention require the recipient to be the ―beneficial 
owner‖ of income. In the context of the object and purpose 
of double tax agreements, the term ―beneficial owner‖ 
should logically connote that the immediate recipient must 
be the owner in a substantive economic sense. The official 
commentary on Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the OECD Model 
Convention supports this argument. 
2.3. Beneficial ownership test in the OECD Model 
Convention 
In 1977, the OECD Model Convention adopted the notion 
of beneficial ownership as a test to determine whether a 
party is entitled to treaty benefits. The official 
commentary on Articles 10, 11, and 12 of the OECD Model 
Convention states that the object of introducing the 
beneficial ownership requirement was ―to clarify‖: 
1. the meaning of the words ―paid….to a resident of 
a contracting state‖ in Articles 10(1)43 and 
11(1);
44
 and, 
                                               
43 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Commentary on Article 10 
concerning the Taxation of Dividends‖ (OECD, Paris, 2010) in OECD 
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2. how article 12 applies in relation to payments 
made to intermediaries.
45
 
According to the official commentary, the 
requirement:
46
  
makes it plain that the state of source is not obliged to 
give up taxing rights over passive income merely 
because that income was immediately received by a 
resident of the other contracting state.  
This statement is essentially a reiteration of the policy of 
limiting benefits of the convention to residents of 
contracting states. The use of phrases ―to clarify‖ and 
―makes it plain‖ shows that the term ―beneficial owner‖ 
simply emphasises the policy. Because the purpose is 
entrenched in double tax treaties, it would have produced 
the same result in the absence of the term ―beneficial 
owner‖.47 Aiken Industries Inc v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue
48
 helps to illustrate this point. That case was 
decided before the term ―beneficial owner‖ was 
introduced to the OECD Model Convention. 
2.4. Aiken Industries Inc v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue 
Ecuadorian Corp Ltd, a resident of the Bahamas, which 
will be referred to as Ecuadorian Ltd, wholly owned Aiken 
                                                                                            
Committee on Fiscal Affairs Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital (OECD, Paris, 2010) 187 at para 12. 
44 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Commentary on Article 11 
concerning the Taxation of Interest‖ (OECD, Paris, 2010) in OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital (OECD, Paris, 2010) 211 at para 9. 
45 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Commentary on Article 12 
concerning the Taxation of Royalties‖ (OECD, Paris, 2010) in OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital (OECD, Paris, 2010) 220 at para 4. 
46 Commentary on Article 10, above n 43 at para 12. Commentary on 
Article 11, above n 44 at para 9. Commentary on Article 12, above n 
45 at para 4 (emphasis added). 
47 See also Vogel above n 37, at 459. 
48 Aiken Industries Inc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 56 TC 925 
(1971). 
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Industries, a United States resident corporation. Aiken 
Industries took over the ownership as well as the relevant 
rights and obligations of Mechanical Products Inc, another 
United States resident corporation, which will be referred 
to as Mechanical Inc. Mechanical Inc was initially 
involved in the disputed transaction. Aiken Industries 
became the party in this action as a consequence of its 
takeover of Mechanical Inc. Ecuadorian Ltd also held all 
the shares of CCN, a resident of Ecuador, which, in turn, 
wholly owned Industrias, a Honduran corporation. 
Ecuadorian Ltd
Aiken Industries
CCN
Industrias
100%
Mechanical Inc
100%
100%
100%
Pre-transfer
promissory
notes
Loan
transaction
Interest
Interest
Ownership
Bahamas
Ecuador
Honduras
USA
Transfer 
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promissory
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Figure 2.1: Aiken Industries 
Ecuadorian Ltd made a loan to Mechanical Inc on a 
promissory note. Since there was no double tax treaty 
between the United States and the Bahamas, Mechanical 
Inc would have to deduct United States domestic 
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withholding tax on interest payments to Ecuadorian Ltd. 
Ecuadorian Ltd interposed Industrias in the transaction 
and transferred Mechanical Inc‘s promissory note to 
Industrias in consideration of a debt outstanding. The 
effect of the transaction was as if back-to-back loans were 
made from Ecuadorian Ltd to Industrias and subsequently 
from Industrias to Mechanical Inc. 
The transaction was designed to take advantage of the 
United States withholding tax exemption under Article IX 
of the United States-Honduras double tax treaty of 26 June 
1956.
49
 Accordingly, Mechanical Inc withheld no tax on 
the interest payments. The Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue determined deficiencies in withholding tax.  
The Commissioner alleged before the United States 
Tax Court that the existence of Industrias as a corporation 
should be disregarded for tax purposes because 
Ecuadorian Ltd was the true owner and the recipient of the 
interest. Aiken Industries responded that Industrias 
complied with the definition of a corporation under Article 
II of the treaty,
50
 and therefore could not be disregarded. It 
contended that Industrias received the income as a 
―Honduran enterprise‖, and therefore the interest 
payments should be exempt from withholding tax under 
the treaty. 
                                               
49 Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, the United 
States–Honduras (25 June 1956, entered into force 6 February 1957). 
The convention was terminated on 31 December 1966. 
50 The United States-Honduras double tax treaty of 25 June 1959, 
above n 49, art II. Art II(g) stated: The term ―Honduran enterprise‖ 
means an industrial or commercial or agricultural enterprise or 
undertaking carried on by a resident of Honduras (including an 
individual in his individual capacity or as a member of a partnership) 
or a fiduciary of Honduras or by a Honduran corporation or other 
entity; the term ―Honduran corporation or other entity‖ means a 
corporation or other entity formed or organized in Honduras or under 
the laws of Honduras. 
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The court had to decide whether the treaty was 
applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case in 
order to exempt Mechanical Inc from the requirement to 
deduct withholding tax from its interest payment to 
Industrias. The court held that the interest payments were 
not exempt from the United States withholding tax. 
2.5. Aiken Industries: the interpretation of the term 
“beneficial owner” 
When the United States Tax Court decided the Aiken 
Industries case neither Article IX of the United State-
Honduras double tax treaty nor Article 11 of the OECD 
Model Convention used the term ―beneficial owner‖. The 
relevant part of Article IX of the United State-Honduras 
double tax treaty stated:
51
  
Interest on … notes … from sources within one of the 
contracting States received by a resident, corporation or 
other entity of the other contracting State not having a 
permanent establishment … shall be exempt from tax by 
such former State. 
The court interpreted the words ―received by‖ in 
Article IX according to the language and context of the 
treaty, and observed:
52
 
As [utilised] in the context of article IX, we interpret the 
terms ―received by‖ to mean interest received by a 
corporation of either of the contracting States as its own 
and not with the obligation to transmit it to another. The 
words ―received by‖ refer not merely to the obtaining of 
physical possession on a temporary basis of funds 
representing interest payments from a corporation of a 
contracting State, but contemplate complete dominion 
and control over the funds. 
The words ―received by a resident … of the other 
contracting State‖ in the United States-Honduras double 
tax treaty and ―paid … to a resident of a Contract State‖ in 
the OECD Model Convention point to the same person, 
                                               
51 The United States-Honduras double tax treaty of 25 June 1959, 
above n 50, art IX. 
52 Ibid, at 933 (emphasis added). 
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who is the immediate recipient of the passive income.
53
 In 
this context, the foregoing interpretation becomes relevant 
to the approach that, according to the official commentary, 
the term ―beneficial owner‖ was introduced to clarify.54 
The foregoing observation of the court, in fact, illuminates 
the approach. The court essentially followed the object 
and purpose of the treaty to limit its benefits to the 
contracting states.  
Because the court used the phrase ―complete dominion 
and control‖, the observation implies that in order to 
qualify for the reduction of withholding tax, the recipient 
of passive income should be a person who owns passive 
income in a substantive economic sense. Following the 
object and purpose of limiting treaty benefit, it found:
55
   
Industrias was merely a conduit for the passage of 
interest payments from [Mechanical Inc] to [Ecuadorian 
Ltd]. Industrias had no actual beneficial interest in the 
interest payments it received, and in substance, 
[Mechanical Inc] was paying the interest to [Ecuadorian 
Ltd.] which ―received‖ the interest within the meaning 
of article IX. 
The court used the term ―beneficial interest‖, which is 
simply a linguistic variation of the concept of beneficial 
ownership. Thus, the observation shows that the court read 
the beneficial ownership requirement into the provision. 
The court‘s use of the term ―beneficial interest‖ suggests 
substantive economic ownership.  
The Austrian Supreme Administrative Court in N AG v 
Regional Tax Officer for Upper Austria
56
 adopted a 
                                               
53 See also Stef van Weeghel The Improper Use of Tax Treaties: with 
Particular Reference to the Netherlands and the United States 
(Kluwer, London, 1998) at 89. 
54 The commentary on Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the OECD Model 
Convention, above n 46. 
55 Aiken Industries Inc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, above n 
48, at 934 (emphasis added). 
56 N AG v Regional Tax Officer for Upper Austria (2000) 2 ITLR 884 
(The Supreme Administrative Court, Austria). 
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similar approach. The N AG case was decided after the 
term ―beneficial owner‖ was introduced to the OECD 
Model Convention. 
2.6. N AG v Regional Tax Officer for Upper Austria 
N AG, a Swiss corporation, was one of the shareholders of 
W Ltd, an Austrian company. W Ltd paid a dividend to N 
AG and deducted Austrian withholding tax from the 
payment. N AG applied to the Austrian tax authorities for a 
refund of withholding tax under Article 28(2) of the 
Austria-Switzerland double tax treaty of 30 January 
1974.
57
 The Austrian tax authority refused the refund to N 
AG. The tax authority had evidence that the shareholders 
of N AG, Dr T and Dr L, who were Swiss residents, were 
merely nominees for the ultimate owners, who were not 
resident in Switzerland. Thus, according to the tax 
authority N AG was a conduit company. N AG produced a 
resident certificate from the Swiss Tax Administration that 
certified that N AG did not pass on the treaty-favoured 
profits to others who were not entitled to the benefit of the 
Austria-Switzerland double tax treaty. However, the 
Austrian tax authority did not regard the certificate as 
conclusive. 
 
                                               
57 The Austria-Switzerland double tax treaty, above n 41, art 28(2). It 
states: ―… the tax withheld by way of deduction (at the source) shall 
be refunded upon request, providing this Agreement restricts the 
levying of such tax …‖ 
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Figure 2.2: N AG v Regional Tax Office for Upper Austria 
The issue before the Austrian Supreme Administrative 
Court was whether the Austrian tax authority was entitled 
to investigate whether N AG had been interposed only to 
extract benefits under the treaty because the ―real 
economic owners‖58 of the income would not have been 
able to claim tax relief. The court decided in favour of the 
tax authority.  
                                               
58 N AG v Regional Tax Officer for Upper Austria, above n 56, at 900. 
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2.7. The N AG case: the interpretation of the term 
“beneficial owner” 
Although Article 28(2) of the Austria-Switzerland double 
tax treaty of 30 January 1974
59
 did not use the word 
―beneficial owner‖, the court observed:60  
… the pre-requisite for the repayment of withholding 
tax was inter alia that the recipient of the dividends 
should be the beneficial owner of the investments which 
gave rise to the dividends.  
It is clear that as with the United States Tax Court in Aiken 
Industries,
61
 the Austrian Supreme Administrative Court 
read the beneficial ownership requirement into a provision 
that did not use the term ―beneficial owner‖.  
In the light of the court‘s observation quoted in section 
2.2, it is obvious that the court considered Article 28(2) to 
be a ―provision on an economic approach and attribution 
of economic interests‖.62 That is, it accorded an economic 
effect to the term ―beneficial owner‖.  
Aiken Industries and the N AG case confirm that in the 
language and context of double tax treaties in general, and 
the OECD Model Convention in particular, the term 
―beneficial owner‖ means a person who has the 
substantive economic ownership of passive income. 
2.8. “Beneficial owner”: ordinary meaning 
The documents concerning the work of the OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs with respect to Articles 10, 
                                               
59 Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital 
Gains, Switzerland–Austria (30 January 1974, entered into force 4 
December 1974), art 28(2). It states: ―… the tax withheld by way of 
deduction (at the source) shall be refunded upon request, providing 
this Agreement restricts the levying of such tax …‖ 
60 N AG v Regional Tax Officer for Upper Austria, above n 57, at 899 
(emphasis added). 
61 Aiken Industries Inc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, above n 
48 , at 934 (emphasis added). 
62 N AG v Regional Tax Officer for Upper Austria, above n 56, at 900 
(emphasis added). 
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11 and 12 before the insertion of the term ―beneficial 
owner‖ show that according to the United Kingdom 
delegation:
63
 
… Articles 10, 11 and 12 were defective in that they 
would apply to dividends, interest and royalties paid to 
an agent or a nominee with a legal right to the income. 
A remedy that the delegation suggested was that the 
Articles should be applied only to passive income paid to 
the ―beneficial owner‖. Delegates for Switzerland and the 
United States supported the suggestion. The committee 
was of the opinion that it was evident that relief in a 
source state was available only if the recipient of passive 
income was ―actually resident in the other contracting 
state‖64 and was the ―true recipient‖65 of the income. 
Nevertheless, it decided to insert the term ―beneficial 
owner‖ in Articles 10, 11 and 12.  
In the light of the United Kingdom delegation‘s 
concern, the committee‘s decision suggests that it 
acknowledged that sometimes courts tend to interpret tax 
treaties in a strict legalistic manner. A legalistic 
interpretation would lead them to base their decisions on 
formal ownership. However, because this approach would 
contradict the object and purpose of double tax 
                                               
63 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Note on the Discussion of the 
First Report of Working Party No 27 of the Fiscal Committee on 
Interest and Royalties during the 31st Session of the Fiscal Committee 
held from 10th to 13th June, 1969‖ DAF/FC/69.10, 4 July 1969, at 6 
<www.taxtreatieshistory.org>. OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs 
―Preliminary Report on Suggested Amendments to Articles 11 and 12 
of the Draft Convention, relating to Interest and Royalties 
Respectively‖ FC/WP27 (68) 1, 30 December 1968, at 14 
<www.taxtreatieshistory.org>. 
64 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Preliminary Report on 
Suggested Amendments to Articles 11 and 12 of the Draft 
Convention, relating to Interest and Royalties Respectively‖ FC/WP27 
(68) 1, 30 December 1968, at 14 <www.taxtreatieshistory.org>. 
65 Ibid. 
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conventions, the committee decided to insert an expression 
that calls for an economic approach. 
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention states:
66
 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose. 
A possible reason why the Committee adopted the term 
―beneficial owner‖ is that the ordinary meaning of the 
word ―beneficial‖ accurately captures the economic 
approach. In the term ―beneficial owner‖ the use of 
―beneficial‖ means that the owner is entitled to enjoy the 
property. Words such as ―real‖, ―ultimate‖ or ―true‖ might 
have been alternatives; however, they do not necessarily 
express their economic consequences. 
In the Re V SA case,
67
 the Swiss Federal Commission of 
Appeal in Tax Matters also referred to the ordinary 
meaning of the terms ―bénéficiare effectif‖ and 
―bénéficiare‖ and interpreted them in an economic sense. 
When translated from French they mean ―effective 
beneficiary‖ or ―beneficial owner‖, and ―beneficiary‖ 
respectively. 
2.9. The Re V SA case 
Two British companies incorporated V SA in Luxembourg. 
V SA acquired all the capital in I SA, a Swiss company, 
with the help of a loan from the British companies. I SA 
made separate dividend payments to V SA in the first and 
second year of its incorporation. It deducted Swiss 
withholding tax on the payments.  
  
                                               
66   Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969, entered 
into force 27 January 1980), art 31(1) (emphasis added). 
67 Re V SA 4 ITLR 191 (The Federal Commission of Appeal in Tax 
Matters, Switzerland). 
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Figure 2.3: Re V SA 
Article 10(2)(a) of the Switzerland-Luxembourg double 
tax treaty of 21 January 1993 states:
68
 
a) … dividends may also be taxed in the Contracting 
State of which the company paying the dividends is a 
resident and according to the laws of that State, but if 
the recipient is the effective beneficiary of the dividends 
the tax so charged shall not exceed: 
i) 5 percent of the gross amount of the dividends if the 
effective beneficiary is a company (other than a 
partnership) which holds directly at least 25 percent of 
the capital of the company paying the dividends; 
Whereas, Article 10(2)(b) states:
69
 
                                               
68 Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Switzerland–
Luxembourg (21 January 1993, entered into force 19 February 1994), 
art 10(2)(a) (emphasis added). 
69 Ibid, art 10(2)(b) (emphasis added). 
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Notwithstanding the provisions of [clause] (i) of sub-
paragraph a), the dividends are exempt in the 
Contracting State of which the company paying the 
dividends is a resident, if the beneficiary is a company 
(other than a partnership) which is a resident of the 
other Contracting State and which holds, directly for an 
uninterrupted period of two years preceding the date of 
payment of such dividends, at least 25 percent of the 
capital of the company paying the dividends …. 
Accordingly, V SA applied to the Swiss Tax 
Administration for partial and full reimbursements of 
withholding tax on the first and second dividend payments 
respectively. 
On the demand of the Swiss Tax Administration, V SA 
submitted its statutory documents and annual accounts 
only for the year it received the first dividend payment. It 
did not reply to the question of whether it received the 
benefit of dividend payments. The administration denied 
refunds. The Federal Commission of Appeal in Tax 
Matters confirmed the administration‘s decision. 
2.10. Re V SA: ordinary meaning of “beneficial 
ownership” 
The word ―effective‖ did not accompany ―beneficiary‖ in 
sub-paragraph (b), as it did in sub-paragraph (a). For this 
reason, the Swiss Federal Commission determined 
―whether the term ―beneficiary‖ must be interpreted in the 
same sense as ―effective beneficiary [beneficial owner]‖ 
or whether it refers exclusively to the direct formal 
shareholder.‖70 Referring to Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention, the commission observed:
71
 
Double taxation conventions must first be interpreted in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning given to the 
terms employed … 
A beneficiary is the person ‗who receives a benefit, 
an advantage, etc‘ … The beneficiary is thus the person 
who can actually benefit from a payment, and not one 
who receives it subject to an obligation to transfer it to a 
                                               
70 Re V SA, above n 67, at 208. 
71 Ibid, at 209. 
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third person. Thus, a company which transferred to a 
third person dividends received without being able 
actually to dispose of them cannot be considered as the 
‗beneficiary‘. The notion of ‗beneficiary‘ envisages, 
therefore, according to the ordinary meaning to be 
attributed to this term, one who effectively receives a 
payment and can dispose of it. This definition overlaps 
with that of the ‗effective beneficiary [beneficial 
owner]‘ which envisages the person who profits 
economically from income, and does not apply to 
conduit companies placed as intermediaries between the 
payer of income and the person who ultimately receives 
it … 
… the requirement of an effective beneficiary is 
implicit in double taxation conventions and does not 
require an express reference … 
… it follows from the sense of the word beneficiary 
that one cannot stop at the purely formal shareholder of 
a company, but rather it is necessary to research who is 
the person who can in reality and effectively benefit 
from the payment of income. 
The Swiss Federal Commission noted that V SA 
provided incomplete information. V SA‘s annual accounts 
showed that it paid the entire income it received as 
dividends from I SA by way of interest and other charges 
to the British companies. The commission also pointed out 
that V SA‘s only significant asset was its holding in I SA. 
Considering these facts in the light of the ordinary 
meaning of the term ―beneficiary‖, the commission found 
that V SA was ―manifestly only a conduit company‖72 that 
could not be considered as the beneficiary of the 
dividends. 
The commission‘s approach corresponds to the line of 
the argument in section 2.8. The ordinary meaning of the 
terms ―bénéficiare‖ and ―bénéficiare effectif‖ led the 
commission to interpret them in an economic sense. 
Because the term ―bénéficiare effectif‖ is the French 
equivalent of the term ―beneficial owner‖, the observation 
also shows that the ordinary meaning of the term 
―beneficial owner‖ reflects economic consequences. 
                                               
72 Re V SA, above n 67, at 210. 
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As with Aiken Industries
73
 and the N AG case,
74
 the 
commission considered the beneficial ownership 
requirement inherent in double tax treaties. In the context 
of the ordinary meaning of the terms ―effective 
beneficiary‖ and ―beneficial owner‖, the role played by 
words ―effective‖ and ―beneficial‖ are comparable. As 
with the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, the 
negotiators of the Swiss-Luxembourg double tax treaty 
used ―effective‖ to show that the immediate recipient 
should own passive income in a substantive economic 
sense. This may be the reason for using the word 
―effective‖ with ―beneficiary‖ in sub-paragraph (a) so that 
the word ―beneficial‖ could be read in the same light. 
2.11. “Beneficial owner”: legal meaning 
The discipline of trust in English law also uses the concept 
of beneficial ownership. ―Beneficial owner‖ is a term of 
art under English law.
75
 The concept of beneficial 
ownership originated in equity, a branch of English law 
separate from common law. Equity uses the concept of 
beneficial owner in the context of the trust. Whereas 
common law adopts the position that ownership cannot be 
divided,
76
 equity allows the division of ownership into 
legal ownership of the trustee and equitable or beneficial 
ownership of the beneficiary. Other common law countries 
follow English law and use the term ―beneficial owner‖ in 
                                               
73 Aiken Industries Inc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 56 TC 925 
(1971). 
74 N AG v Regional Tax Officer for Upper Austria (2000) 2 ITLR 884 
(The Supreme Administrative Court, Austria). 
75 Ayrest (Inspector of Taxes) v C & K (Construction) Ltd [1975] 2 All 
ER 537 at 540. See Philip Baker Double Taxation Conventions and 
International Tax Law (2 ed, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1994) at 
229. 
76 See John F Avery Jones and others ―The Origins of Concepts and 
Expressions Used in the OECD Model and their Adoption by States‖ 
(2006) 60 Bulletin for International Taxation 220 at 246. 
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the same sense in their domestic law. The English law 
meaning strongly influences the meaning of the concept in 
the OECD Model Convention. 
Because most of the civil law countries
77
 do not use the 
term beneficial owner in their domestic tax law, the debate 
over the meaning of the term in the OECD Model 
convention essentially revolves around two questions. 
First, whether contracting states should refer to their 
domestic law under Article 3(2) of the OECD Model 
Convention for interpreting the term ―beneficial owner‖ or 
whether the context of Articles 10, 11, 12 of the OECD 
Model Convention require beneficial ownership to be 
interpreted as a concept of international tax language, 
independent of domestic tax law. Second, if the concept of 
beneficial ownership is not seen as a reference to domestic 
law, how then should it be interpreted?
78
 
These questions, however, are not significant because 
the English trust law meaning of the term corresponds to 
its ordinary meaning in the context of double tax treaties. 
The following section discusses the beneficial ownership 
concept in English law. 
                                               
77 Belgium and the Netherlands use terms equivalent to beneficial 
owner. In the Netherlands, Article 1(1) of the Dividend Tax Act of 
1969 uses the term ―uiteindelijik gerechtigde‖, which means 
ultimately entitled. Art 198(1)(11) of the Belgian Income Tax Code 
use terms ―uiteindelijik gerechtigde‖ or ―bénéficiare effectif‖. See 
Hans Pijl ―The Definition of ―Beneficial Ownership‖ under Dutch 
Law‖ (2000) 54 Bulletin for International Taxation 256 at 258. See 
Wim Eynatten and others ―The Concept of ‗Beneficial Ownership‘ 
under Belgian Tax Law: Legal Interpretation is Maintained‖ (2003) 31 
Intertax 523 at 524. 
78
 Klaus Vogel The OECD Model Convention, 1998 and Beyond: the 
Concept of Beneficial Ownership in Tax Treaties: Proceedings of a 
Seminar held in London in 1998 during the 52nd Congress of the 
International Fiscal Association (Kluwer Law International, London, 
2000). 
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2.12. “Beneficial ownership”: English law meaning 
English law uses the concept of beneficial ownership 
primarily to differentiate between the ownership rights of 
trustees and ownership rights of beneficiaries over trust 
property. In a trust, legal ownership is vested in trustees 
and beneficial ownership is typically vested in 
beneficiaries. Although the trustees as ―legal owners‖ 
administer the trust property, they hold it for the benefit of 
the beneficiaries. Only the beneficiaries as ―beneficial 
owners‖ have the right to appropriate the benefits of the 
subject matter of the trust.
79
 The point is that beneficial 
ownership can be distinguished from legal ownership 
mainly on the basis of the right to enjoy the benefits of a 
property. 
English law also recognises the concept of beneficial 
ownership in tax and other legislation. When a tax 
provision depends on the nature of income, a taxpayer 
may find it advantageous to interpose a trust between 
himself and the source of the income merely to change the 
nature of the income.  
Trust law distinguishes between income distributed to 
beneficiaries in the year it was derived by trustees and a 
distribution of trustees‘ income accumulated from past 
year. In the former case, income retains its nature in 
beneficiaries‘ hands, whereas in the latter, trust law 
considers income to be capital in the hands of 
beneficiaries.
80
 A taxpayer may take advantage of this 
trust law principle by allowing income to accumulate in a 
trust of which he is a beneficiary. Consequently, when the 
                                               
79 Keech v Sandford (1726) EWHC Ch J76. 
80 Irvine v Houston (1802) Paton sc App 521. Paris v Paris (1804) 10 
Ves 185. Witts v Steere (1807) 13 Ves 363. 
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trust distributes the past-accumulated income to the 
taxpayer, he receives it as a capital distribution.  
In contrast, the tax law in United Kingdom does not 
make such a distinction. For tax purposes, courts have 
refused to treat the distribution of past-accumulated 
income to beneficiaries as capital, on the basis that the 
accumulation of income within a trust does not change 
anything as far as the underlying beneficial ownership in 
concerned.
81
 It, therefore, could be inferred that a 
beneficiary is usually the beneficial owner of the 
underlying income.
82
 
Tax statutes have used the term beneficial owner 
outside the field of trusts.
83
 Courts have applied these 
statutes to many cases; for example, in the liquidation of 
companies,
84
 in a case of a purchaser under a contract that 
is subjected to a condition precedent,
85
 and in the case of 
an owner who granted put and call options.
86
 Even though 
these cases did not involve trusts, judges drew analogies 
between the circumstances in these cases and trusts. For 
instance, in Ayerst (Inspector of Taxes) v C & K 
(Construction) Ltd,
87
 the issue was whether the legal title 
to a company‘s property that remains in the company after 
the commencement of its winding-up still carries with it 
                                               
81 Baker v Archer-Shee (1927) AC 844. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue v Nevius 76 F2d 109 (2d Cir 1935). 
82 But see Kenneth A Williams v The Queen (2005) DTC 1228 (Tax 
Court of Canada, Canada) and Gartside v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners (1968) AC 553. The right or interest of a beneficiary in 
a discretionary trust does not amount to beneficial ownership.  
83 For example, the Finance Act 1954 (UK), s 17, the Finance Act of 
1973 (UK), s 28(2), and, the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970 
(UK), s 258. 
84 Ayerst (Inspector of Taxes) v C & K (Construction) Ltd, above n 75. 
85 Wood Preservation Ltd v Prior (Inspector of Taxes) [1969] All ER 
364. 
86 J Sainsbury Plc v O’Connor (Inspector of Taxes) (1991) STC 318. 
87 Ayerst (Inspector of Taxes) v C & K (Construction) Ltd, above n 75. 
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any beneficial interest. Lord Diplock compared the rights 
of the company that was in the process of winding-up to 
the rights of a trustee and observed:
88
 
… the concept of legal ownership of property, which 
did not carry with it the right of the owner to enjoy the 
fruits of it or dispose of it for his own benefit, owed its 
origin to the Court of Chancery. The archetype is the 
trust. The ‗legal ownership‘ of the trust property is in 
the trustee, but he holds it not for his own benefit but for 
the benefit of the cestui que trustent or beneficiaries. On 
the creation of a trust in the strict sense as it was 
developed by equity the full ownership in the trust 
property was split into two constituent elements, which 
became vested in different persons: the ‗legal 
ownership‘ in the trustee, and what came to be called 
the ‗beneficial ownership‘ in the cestui que trust. 
Similarly, in J Sainsbury Plc v O’Connor (Inspector of 
Taxes),
89
 the issue was whether Sainsbury was the 
beneficial owner of the shares over which Sainsbury had 
granted a put and call option to its partner in a joint 
venture. Lord Justice Nourse described beneficial 
ownership as:
90
 
… ownership for your own benefit as opposed to 
ownership as trustee for another. It exists either where 
there is no division of legal and beneficial ownership or 
where legal ownership is vested in one person and 
beneficial ownership or, which is the same thing, the 
equitable interest in the property in another. 
Lord Justice Nourse also defined beneficial ownership in 
the context of a trust. This observation further shows that 
in the context of trust law, courts have often used the term 
―equitable owner‖ in conjunction with beneficial owner.91 
Two points emerge from the discussion so far. First, the 
beneficial ownership concept in domestic tax law is 
mainly related to questions of the difference between legal 
                                               
88 Ayerst (Inspector of Taxes) v C & K (Construction) Ltd, above n 75, 
at 541. 
89
 J Sainsbury Plc v O’Connor (Inspector of Taxes), above n 86. 
90 Ibid, at 330. 
91 See also Wood Preservation Ltd v Prior (Inspector of Taxes) [1969] 
All ER 364 at 368.  
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and equitable ownership in the context of a trust.
92
 
Second, the main difference between a legal owner and a 
beneficial owner is that the legal owner is one who looks 
after the asset legally and the beneficial owner is one who 
has the substantive right to enjoy the asset and the income 
from it. 
2.13. Analogy between the ordinary and legal meaning 
of the term “beneficial owner” 
The discussion in section 2.12 shows that as with its 
ordinary meaning, the term ―beneficial owner‖ in English 
law means a person able to enjoy a property for his or her 
own benefit. Applying the English law meaning to the 
term in the OECD Model Convention would lead to the 
same conclusion as the ordinary meaning. Further, 
because the OECD working party that introduced the term 
to the Model Convention included the United Kingdom 
and other common law jurisdictions, it is hard to imagine 
that other members were unaware of its English law 
meaning. If the working party intended the term to differ 
from the meaning in English law, it would have expressed 
so. 
The fact that civil law countries do not recognise the 
concept in their domestic law does not seem to be a major 
cause of difficulty in interpreting and applying the 
beneficial ownership test. As indicated in section 1.1, the 
problem is that beneficial ownership cannot be applied 
logically as a test to corporations. 
                                               
92 Contrast Charl P du Toit Beneficial Ownership of Royalties in 
Bilateral Tax Treaties (IBFD, Amsterdam, 1999) at 116. 
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2.14. To what extent can the beneficial ownership 
concept be incorporated in double tax 
conventions? 
Prima facie, the interposed recipient may be a trustee, a 
nominee or agent, or a conduit company that is not acting 
as a trustee. In the context of double tax treaties, the 
beneficial ownership concept seems appropriate as a test 
for a situation in which the recipient of passive income is a 
trustee. Because the person who owns the income 
beneficially is a resident of a third country, a trustee is not 
considered to be entitled to a withholding tax reduction on 
passive income. This situation has been the subject of 
many studies.
93
 It is, however, outside the scope of this 
thesis. This thesis focuses on a situation where the 
ownership of a company is in a third country and that 
company does not act as a trustee. Such a situation will be 
referred to as a ―conduit company case‖.  
The beneficial ownership concept does not seem 
appropriate for deciding a conduit company case. In a 
substantive economic sense, a company is not capable of 
beneficially owning passive income. Since shareholders, 
who would in reality enjoy the benefit of the passive 
income (either because they in turn recover it or because if 
it is retained in the conduit company the values of their 
shares inherently increases), are residents of a third state, 
theoretically a conduit company should never be 
considered entitled to treaty benefits. 
                                               
93 For example, International Fiscal Association Congress 
International Tax Treatment of Common Law Trusts: Proceedings of 
a Seminar held in New York in 1986 during the 40th Congress of the 
International Fiscal Association (Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, New York, 1998). John F. Avery Jones and others ―The 
Treatment of Trusts under the OECD Model Convention‖ (1989) ET 
379; and John Prebble ―Trust and Double Taxation Agreements‖ 
(2004) 2 eJournal of Tax Research 192. 
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Nevertheless, in practice courts and the OECD apply the 
beneficial ownership concept to conduit company cases as 
a test. They base their position on the conventional legal 
view according to which companies are both legal and 
beneficial owners of their assets. The problem is that, by 
adopting the conventional view, they tend to interpret the 
treaty provisions in a formal legalistic sense.  
This approach is not troublesome in situations in which 
shareholders of a company are residents in the jurisdiction 
where the company is located. It is a matter of concern in 
conduit company cases in which shareholders are residents 
of a country other than a contracting state. By adopting 
this approach in conduit company cases, courts abandon 
the basic substantive economic approach with which a 
double tax treaty should be interpreted. 
This chapter will return to this argument in section 
2.22. However, before the argument can be illustrated, it is 
helpful to discuss the legal and economic views. 
2.15. The conventional legal view 
The application of income tax to corporations depends on 
the perspective from which the relationship between 
corporations and their shareholders is viewed. The legal 
perspective of the relationship between corporations and 
their shareholders suggests that profits should be taxed at 
the level of corporations and not at the level of their 
shareholders. 
From a legal perspective, corporations are legal persons 
with rights equivalent to individuals. Their legal 
personality results in what is conventionally referred to as 
the ―separate entity theory‖, according to which 
corporations are economically independent of their 
shareholders. As separate legal persons, corporations can 
own property, pursue legal actions, be sued and enter into 
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contracts in their own name. While shareholders own 
corporations, they have no propriety interest in a property 
held by corporations. Thus, from the legal perspective, 
corporations are beneficial owners of their assets and 
income derived from these assets merely by virtue of 
being separate legal entities.  
Justice Pitney‘s opinion in Eisner v Macomber94 clearly 
reflects this view. Although the Macomber case was not a 
conduit company case, his observation is relevant in the 
present context.   
2.16. Eisner v Macomber 
The Macomber case involved Mrs. Macomber who was a 
shareholder in Standard Oil, which declared a stock 
dividend. As a result, she received bonus shares instead of 
a cash. 
The Sixteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution empowered the Congress to tax income 
without regard to its source and without regard to a state‘s 
population. At the same time, the Revenue Act 1913 
expressly included stock dividends under the definition of 
income.
95
 Accordingly, the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue treated the bonus shares as income and taxed 
Mrs. Macomber. Mrs. Macomber sued the Commissioner 
for a refund and the United States Supreme Court decided 
in favour of Mrs. Macomber.  
The court was concerned with the issue of whether, in 
accounting and legal terms, the stock dividend was to be 
                                               
94 Eisner v Macomber 252 US 189 (1920). 
95 Revenue Act 1916 Ch 463, 39 Stat 756 (1916), §2(a). The relevant 
part of s. 2(a) provided: ―… the term ―dividends‖ as used in this title 
shall be held to mean any distribution made or ordered to be made by 
a corporation … out of its earnings or profits accrued … and payable 
to its shareholders, whether in cash or in stock of the corporation … 
which stock dividend shall be considered income, to the amount of its 
cash value.‖  
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regarded as a taxable event, rather than, whether the 
shareholder had gained in an economic sense.
96
  Ruling for 
the majority, Justice Pitney was of the opinion that the 
declaration of a stock dividend was not different 
economically from a cash dividend. Even when the 
company distributed dividends in cash, shareholders were 
no better off because they already owned the cash 
economically.
97
  
Justice Pitney held, however, that unlike a cash 
dividend, the distribution of a stock dividend was not a 
taxable event because a company did not actually sever 
profits from the capital. The profits formed part of the 
capital and remained within the company.
98
  He based his 
decision on the separate entity theory and observed:
99
 
We have no doubt of the power or duty of a court to 
look through the form of the corporation and determine 
the question of the stockholder‘s right, in order to 
ascertain whether he has received income taxable by 
Congress without apportionment. But, looking through 
the form, we cannot disregard the essential truth 
disclosed; ignore the substantial difference between 
corporation and stockholder; treat the entire 
organization as unreal; look upon stockholders as 
partners, when they are not such; treat them as having in 
equity a right to a partition of the corporate assets, when 
they have none; and indulge the fiction that they have 
received and realized a share of the profits of the 
company which in truth they have neither received nor 
realized. We must treat the corporation as a substantial 
entity separate from the stockholder, not only because 
such is the practical fact but because it is only by 
recognizing such separateness that any dividend – even 
one paid in money or property – can be regarded as 
income of the stockholder. 
                                               
96 See Marvin Chirelstein Federal Income Taxation A Law Student's 
Guide to the Leading Cases and Concepts (9th ed, Foundation Press, 
New York, 2002) at 80. See also Kevin Holmes The Concept of 
Income A Multi-disciplinary Analysis (IBFD, Amsterdam, 2000) at 
225.  
97 Eisner v Macomber, above n 94, at 209. 
98 Ibid, at 213. 
99 Ibid, at 213. 
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Consequently, he analysed the facts from a legal 
perspective. 
2.17. The Macomber case: interpretation of beneficial 
ownership 
In the light of the legal perspective, Justice Pitney 
observed:
100
 
… the interest of the stockholder is a capital interest, 
and his certificates of stock are but the evidence of it … 
Short of liquidation, or until dividend declared, he has 
no right to withdraw any part of either capital or profits 
from the common enterprise; on the contrary, his 
interest pertains not to any part, divisible or indivisible, 
but to the entire assets, business, and affairs of the 
company. Nor is it the interest of an owner in the assets 
themselves, since the corporation has full title, legal and 
equitable, to the whole. 
As discussed in section 2.12, courts have used the terms 
―equitable owner‖ and ―beneficial owner‖ 
interchangeably. Justice Pitney was referring to beneficial 
ownership when he mentioned the equitable title of a 
corporation over assets, business and affairs. The 
observation confirms that from a legal perspective a 
corporation is regarded as the beneficial owner of its 
assets simply because it exists as a legal entity separate 
from its shareholders. 
2.18. The “separate entity theory” and conduit 
companies 
The separate entity theory applies equally to corporations 
with a multitude of shareholders and to closely-held 
corporations; that is, corporations in which one 
shareholder, or a few shareholders, hold all of the 
shares.
101
 It follows that, chains of corporate holdings 
result in the interposition of a separate legal person at each 
link.  
                                               
100 Eisner v Macomber, above n 94, at 206 (emphasis added).  
101 See generally Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22. 
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Conduit structures often involve chains of companies 
that are wholly owned subsidiaries of their parent 
companies.
102
 In the context of the separate entity theory, 
such subsidiaries would be the beneficial owners of 
passive income, even if they act as mere conduits.  
It is hard to imagine, however, that negotiators of a 
double tax agreement would admit that anybody who 
wanted to take advantage of the agreement might do so 
merely by establishing a company in the jurisdiction of 
one of the contracting states. As early as 1925, the League 
of Nations Committee of Experts expressed concern that a 
foreigner could maintain that he was the owner of a share 
and would in fact become so, but only for the period 
necessary to ensure that the company concerned could 
obtain a partial or a full exemption from a source 
country‘s (withholding) tax import.103 Further, in Re V SA 
the Swiss Federal Commission of Appeal in Tax Matters 
observed:
104
 ―The notion of ‗effective beneficiary‘ 
[usually translated as beneficial owner] clearly envisages 
the person who in reality receives the dividend [that was] 
paid rather than the formal direct shareholder …‖. For this 
reason, it does not make sense to decide conduit company 
cases from a legal perspective. 
2.19. The economic perspective 
The economic perspective of the relationship between 
corporations and their shareholders suggests that tax 
                                               
102 See OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Double Taxation 
Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies‖ in OECD Committee 
on Fiscal Affairs International Tax Avoidance and Evasion: Four 
Related Studies, Issues in International Taxation No 1 (OECD, Paris, 
1987) 87 at para 4. 
103 Shadtai Rosenne (ed) League of Nations Committee of Experts for 
the Progressive Codification of International Law [1925-1928] 
(Oceana Publications, New York, 1972). 
104 Re V SA 4 ITLR 191, 208 (The Federal Commission of Appeal in 
Tax Matters, Switzerland). 
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levied on a corporation‘s income should be integrated with 
any tax levied on its shareholders with respect to such 
income. According to this perspective, the dominating 
aspects of the relationship are the economic ownership of 
the assets and the profits that the corporation passes on to 
its shareholders or accumulates for their ultimate claim.
105
 
Essentially, it considers who is ultimately better off as a 
result of the receipt of income. 
In the context of the economic perspective, 
corporations are not viewed as economically independent 
of their shareholders. The perspective indicates that in a 
true sense corporations cannot be considered separate 
from the individuals who ultimately own them. A 
corporation is merely a vehicle through which 
shareholders derive income. That is, in substance, a 
corporation is no more capable of beneficially owning 
anything than it is capable of having a blood group.
106
 
As indicated earlier, to adopt Thuronyi‘s analogy, 
conduit company schemes often involve chains of 
companies established as subsidiaries that have no 
economic reality separate from their controlling individual 
or corporation. Such corporations seek to obtain treaty 
benefits by taking advantage of the separate entity theory. 
They are not economic entities independent of their 
owners. 
As discussed in section 2.3, the OECD Model 
Convention applies the notion of beneficial ownership to 
determine whether the recipient of passive income is its 
                                               
105 See also Peter A Harris Corporate Shareholder Income Taxation 
and Allocating Taxing Rights between Countries (IBFD, Amsterdam, 
1996) at 45. Compare R A Musgrave ―The Carter Commission 
Report‖ (1968) 1 The Canadian Journal of Economics 159 at 163. 
106 Victor Thuronyi ―The Concept of Income‖ (1990) 46 Tax Law 
Review 45 at 78. 
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substantive economic owner. Logically, therefore, the 
application of the beneficial ownership test requires an 
analysis of facts from an economic perspective. The 
reasoning in Aiken Industries and the N AG case illustrates 
the argument. 
2.20. Aiken Industries: an economic approach 
As discussed in section 2.4, Aiken contended that 
Industrias received the income as a Honduran corporation 
under Article II of the United States-Honduras double tax 
treaty 26 June 1956,
107
 and therefore the interest payments 
should be exempt from withholding tax under the treaty. 
Rejecting the argument, the United States Tax Court 
observed:
108
 
… while we agree with [Aiken Industries] that 
Industrias was a ―corporation‖ … , and that it therefore 
cannot be disregarded, we do not agree with  [Aiken 
Industries‘] conclusion that this factor alone was 
sufficient to qualify the interest in question for the 
exemption from taxation granted by article IX. 
The observation reflects an economic analysis of facts. 
Contrary to the legal perspective, it imports that the mere 
existence of a corporation as a separate legal personality 
does not make the corporation the substantive owner of its 
income.  
2.21. The N AG case: an economic approach  
As discussed in section 2.6, the issue before the Austrian 
Supreme Administrative Court was whether the Austrian 
tax authority was entitled to investigate whether N AG had 
been interposed only to extract benefits under the treaty 
                                               
107 Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, the United 
States–Honduras (25 June 1956, entered into force 6 February 1957). 
The convention was terminated on 31 December 1966.  
108 Aiken Industries Inc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, above n 
48, at 932. 
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because the ―real economic owners‖109 of the income 
would not have been able to claim tax relief.  
If the Austrian tax authority had investigated the facts 
from a purely legal perspective, it could have allowed 
treaty benefits to N AG simply by virtue of the fact that the 
shareholders were Swiss residents. However, tax authority 
investigated the arrangement beyond the shareholders of N 
AG. That is, it assessed the situation from an economic 
point of view. By deciding in favour of the tax authority, 
the court supported an economic approach. 
The courts in Aiken Industries and the N AG case 
interpreted beneficial ownership for treaty purposes. The 
approach adopted by these courts in the absence of the 
term ―beneficial owner‖ strongly implies that, in the 
context of the object and purpose of double tax treaties, 
the notion of beneficial ownership exists as a test of 
substance, a test that logically requires an economic 
analysis of the facts. 
2.22. Economic perspective: companies can never be 
entitled to treaty benefits 
The context of the object and purpose of double tax 
treaties requires courts to analyse facts from an economic 
perspective; and from the economic perspective, a 
company cannot logically be the beneficial owner of its 
assets and income that the assets generate. It follows that 
the answer to the question whether the corporation that has 
immediately received passive income is the beneficial 
owner of that income should always be in negative. That 
is, the notion of beneficial ownership in the OECD Model 
Convention is logically not capable of being applied as a 
test for deciding conduit company cases.  
                                               
109 N AG v Regional Tax Officer for Upper Austria (2000) 2 ITLR 884 
(The Supreme Administrative Court, Austria), at 900. 
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This lack of logical connection between the beneficial 
ownership concept and conduit companies should result in 
a dead end. The Authority for Advance Rulings of India 
reached a dead end in its NatWest Ruling.
110
 
2.23. The NatWest Ruling 
NatWest Bank, a resident of the United Kingdom, 
intended to invest in Housing Development Finance 
Corporation Bank Limited, a resident of India, which will 
be referred to as Housing Bank. In order to acquire shares 
in Housing Bank, NatWest Bank incorporated two wholly 
owned subsidiary companies in Mauritius. 
NatWest Bank
Mauritian Subsidiary 1 Mauritius Subsidiary 2
Housing Bank
100%
Dividends
Dividends
Shareholding Shareholding
Ownership
The United Kingdom
Mauritius
India
 
Figure 2.4: The NatWest Ruling 
                                               
110 In Re XYZ (1996) 220 ITR 377 (AAR) (The Authority for Advance 
Rulings, India). 
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If NatWest Bank had directly received dividends from 
Housing Bank, it would have suffered a 15 per cent 
withholding tax in India under the double tax treaty 
between India and the United Kingdom.
111
 The India-
Mauritius double tax treaty of 24 August 1982,
112
 on the 
other hand, imposed a five per cent withholding tax on 
dividends paid by Indian companies to Mauritian 
companies. Since Mauritius imposed no withholding tax 
on out-going dividend payments, NatWest would have 
made significant tax savings.  
The Mauritian subsidiaries applied to the Authority for 
Advance Rulings of India for a confirmation that 
dividends paid by Housing Bank to the Mauritian 
subsidiaries would enjoy partial relief from withholding 
tax in accordance with the India-Mauritius double tax 
treaty. 
In order to benefit from withholding tax reduction, 
Article 10 of the India-Mauritius double tax treaty 
required the recipient of dividends to be the beneficial 
owner of the dividends. Therefore, one of the issues before 
the Authority was whether the Mauritius subsidiaries 
qualified as the beneficial owners of the dividends paid by 
Housing Bank. Although the Authority considered the 
meaning of the term ―beneficial owner‖, it refused to 
deliver a ruling on the issue of beneficial ownership.  
The Authority applied section 245R(2)(c) of the Indian 
Income Tax Act 1961 and determined whether the 
                                               
111 Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, 
the United Kingdom–India (25 January 1993, entered into force 25 
October 1993), art 11(3). 
112 Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, 
India–Mauritius (24 August 1982, entered into force 6 December 
1983), art 10(2). 
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transaction was designed prima facie for tax avoidance.
113
 
It considered chronological events in the case and ruled 
against the Mauritius subsidiaries.  
In the view of the Authority, there was insufficient 
factual data to determine whether the Mauritian 
subsidiaries were the beneficial owners of the shares in 
Housing Bank.
114
 However, it seems that the Authority 
was unable to resolve the issue because it could not 
reconcile two paradoxical perspectives. 
2.24. The NatWest Ruling: paradoxical perspectives 
The Authority was inclined towards the economic 
perspective, but somehow it found itself influenced and 
even restricted by the conventional view, which is based 
on the legal perspective. For instance, it observed:
115
 
It is true that under Company Law, a corporation is an 
independent entity and cannot be said to be holding its 
assets or profits in trust for the shareholders. However, 
in view of the categorical admission that all the shares 
of the [Mauritian subsidiaries] are held by [NatWest 
Bank] and consequently, the entire funds of the 
[Mauritian subsidiaries] by way of share capital have 
been contributed by that bank, the inevitable inference 
is that it is [NatWest Bank] and not the [Mauritian 
subsidiaries] which is the real and beneficial owner of 
the assets of the [Mauritian subsidiaries] including the 
shares in [Housing Bank]. The shares as well as the 
income arising therefrom are held by the [Mauritian 
subsidiaries] only subject to the control and direction of 
the sole shareholder which can deal with these assets or 
the income therefrom in whatever manner it likes by 
virtue of its sole shareholding in the [Mauritian 
subsidiaries]. 
At the beginning of the observation, the Authority appears 
to respect the separate entity theory. If this theory were to 
be applied to the facts of the case, it would have meant 
                                               
113 The Income Tax Act 1961 (India), s 245R(2)(c). S 245R(2)(c) 
provides that the Authority for Advance Rulings shall not allow an 
application, if after examining it the Authority is of the opinion that 
the application was related to a transaction that was designed prima 
facie for tax avoidance. 
114 The NatWest Ruling, above n 110, at para 16. 
115 Ibid, at para 15. 
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that the Mauritian subsidiaries were the beneficial owners 
merely by virtue of being legal entities independent of 
NatWest Bank. At the same time, however, the Authority 
seems strongly influenced by the economic perspective to 
the extent that
116
 it considered NatWest Bank to be the 
beneficial owner of dividends because NatWest Bank was 
the sole shareholder of the Mauritian subsidiaries. 
Later, the Authority referred with approval to the views 
of the editors of Gore-Brown,
117
 and Klaus Vogel,
118
 
according to which even a 100 per cent interest in a 
subsidiary does not necessarily preclude the subsidiary‘s 
beneficial ownership in the assets it holds. These views 
represented the legal perspective because they are based 
on the separate entity theory. 
The point that emerges is that the Authority was 
battling two paradoxical perspectives that would have led 
it to two opposite conclusions. On one hand, the Authority 
was aware that logically the beneficial ownership test 
required an economic analysis of the situation. On the 
other hand, it was prepared to adopt reluctantly the legal 
perspective because the conventional view is based on that 
perspective. The Authority reached the point where it was 
unable to connect the notion of beneficial ownership with 
conduit companies. Consequently, it was unable to deliver 
a ruling on the issue of beneficial ownership. Although the 
Authority attributed its indecisiveness to the lack of 
                                               
116 Since the Authority assumed that the Mauritian subsidiaries could 
be the beneficial owners of dividends, it could not be inferred that the 
Authority viewed the situation completely from an economic 
perspective. 
117 Francis Gore-Browne, A J Boyle and Richard Sykes Gore-Browne 
on Companies (44 ed, vol 1, Jordans, Bristol, 1986). 
118 Klaus Vogel Double Taxation Convention: a Commentary to the 
OECD-, UN-, US-Model Conventions for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation of Income and Capital with particular reference to German 
Treaty Practice (Kluwer, Deventer, 1990) at 455. 
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factual data, the cause of the confusion seems to be 
something else.  
On one hand, income tax treats a company as a legal 
person separate from its shareholders in order to apply the 
beneficial ownership test. On the other hand, it cannot be 
denied that in a substantive economic sense, a company is 
not capable of owning income. This paradox is a 
consequence of a more general phenomenon of income tax 
law. John Prebble has written widely on this phenomenon, 
which he terms the ―ectopia‖ of income tax law.119 
Prebble‘s ectopia thesis yields helpful insights with 
respect to explaining why the OECD, courts, and 
commentators face difficulty in interpreting and applying 
the beneficial ownership concept. 
2.25. Ectopia: dislocation between the beneficial 
ownership test and conduit companies 
―Ectopia‖ means dislocation. Prebble uses the term to 
represent a fundamental characteristic of income tax law, 
which is that income tax law, by its nature, is dislocated 
from the reality of its subject matter.
120
 In the present 
context, this phenomenon means that the beneficial 
ownership test is dislocated from the reality of its subject 
matter, which is a company. The reality is that a company 
is not capable of being the beneficial owner of passive 
income. 
Income tax law cannot tax economic transactions 
directly. Rather, it taxes the legal forms that are used to 
represent economic transactions. In order to make income 
                                               
119 See John Prebble ―Ectopia, Formalism and Anti-avoidance Rules 
in Income Tax Law‖ in Werner Krawietz, Neil MacCormick, Georg 
Henrik von Wright (eds) Prescriptive formality and normative 
rationality in modern legal systems : festschrift for Robert S. Summers 
(Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1994) 367 at 378. 
120 John Prebble ―Can Income Tax Law be Simplified?‖ (1996) 2 NZ 
Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 187 at 189.  
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tax law work at all, the law must make many assumptions 
as to both the factual and the legal nature of the taxpayer‘s 
income. These assumptions are often not correct. The 
effect of these assumptions is that the base that the law 
taxes becomes disconnected from the facts of the case.
121
 
A corporation is, in effect, a legal form that represents 
economic transactions between individuals who act 
through it and other legal persons. The example given by 
Prebble helps to explain the statement further.
122
 He states 
that when a company contracts to sell goods to a 
purchaser, the company together with company law may 
be seen as a legal matrix that defines the relationship 
between the purchaser and the individual shareholders of 
the company. Even though this matrix is not strictly seen 
as a legal relationship, this generalisation still holds good. 
There is always a factual relationship in that the benefit or 
burden of the contract will, in an economic sense, be 
enjoyed or borne by the company‘s shareholders. 
In contrast to this factual position, income tax law 
treats companies as physical facts. In particular, the 
commentary on the OECD Model Convention and the 
Conduit Companies Report
123
 assumes that conduit 
companies are capable of deriving passive income 
beneficially. This assumption is a logical impossibility and 
causes the beneficial ownership test to be dislocated from 
its subject matter. 
                                               
121 John Prebble ―Fictions of Income Tax Law‖ (2002) Working Paper 
Series No 7 Centre for Accounting, Governance and Taxation 
Research, Wellington. 
122 Prebble above n 120, at 192. 
123
 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Double Taxation Conventions 
and the Use of Conduit Companies‖ in OECD Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs International Tax Avoidance and Evasion: Four Related 
Studies, Issues in International Taxation No 1 (OECD, Paris, 1987) at 
87. 
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2.26. Application of the beneficial ownership test to 
conduit companies by the OECD  
Articles 10, 11, and 12 of the OECD Model Convention 
apply the beneficial ownership test to individuals as well 
as to companies. Furthermore, the Conduit Companies 
Report assumes that the notion of beneficial ownership is 
capable of being applied as a test to conduit companies. 
The report states:
124
 
… a conduit company can normally not be regarded as 
the beneficial owner if, though the formal owner of 
certain assets, it has very narrow powers which render it 
a mere fiduciary or an administrator acting on account 
of the interested parties (most likely the shareholders of 
the conduit company). 
The proposition uses the word ―normally‖, which 
leaves open the possibility that a conduit company could 
be regarded as the beneficial owner of passive income. 
That is, the OECD assumes that, at least in some situations, 
conduit companies can be considered beneficial owners of 
passive income. Thus, the Conduit Companies Report 
allows the beneficial ownership test to be applied to a 
subject matter that in fact has no relationship with the test. 
2.27. Why does the OECD assume that conduit 
companies are capable of being the beneficial 
owners of passive income? 
Generally, there is a symbiosis between law and its subject 
matter. That is, a law naturally relates to what the law is 
about. When legislators draft laws they ensure that laws 
are as closely related to their subject matter as can be 
managed. Prebble points out that this natural relationship 
is so sensible and obvious that legislators take it for 
granted. Lawmakers draft income tax laws under the same 
influence, seemingly unaware of the fact that the ordinary 
symbiosis that exists between law and its subject matter is 
                                               
124 The Conduit Companies Report, above n 123, at para 14(b). 
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absent from the foundations of income tax law.
125
 This 
could be a reason why the OECD Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs in the Model Convention and the Conduit 
Companies Report seemed to assume that a symbiotic 
relationship existed between the beneficial ownership test 
and conduit companies. That is, the committee assumed 
that conduit companies are capable of being the beneficial 
owners of passive income. 
Fuller‘s theory on legal fictions126 offers a more 
informative explanation. According to Fuller, ―the word 
‗fiction‘ ... implies a recognition that the statement under 
discussion, although erroneous, had a utility‖.127 In the 
present context, the assumption that companies are 
capable of being the beneficial owners of passive income 
is a legal fiction.
128
 The description of conduit companies 
in the Conduit Companies Report shows that the OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs was fully aware of the falsity 
of the assumption. The committee, however, adopted it 
because it is useful for trade and commerce at large.  
Prebble‘s theory, however, differ slightly from Fuller‘s 
theory of legal fictions. While Fuller assumes that legal 
fictions are eliminable, Prebble identifies legal fictions 
that for tax purposes are being treated as if they cannot be 
eliminated. The assumption that conduit companies are 
capable of owning passive income beneficially is a legal 
fiction that cannot be eliminated. So much commercial life 
is organised on this very assumption that discarding it 
                                               
125 John Prebble ―Ectopia, Tax Law, and International Taxation‖ 
(1997) BTR 383 at 384. 
126
 Lon L Fuller Legal Fictions (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 
1967). 
127 Ibid, at 9. 
128 See also Prebble above n 125, at 390. 
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would result in discommoding current notions.
129
 
Nevertheless, instead of facilitating the application of the 
beneficial ownership test, this assumption has created 
inconsistencies for courts in applying the test.  
2.28. Application of the beneficial ownership test to 
conduit companies by courts 
When courts are faced with the issue of beneficial 
ownership in the context of double tax treaties, they find 
themselves in a paradox. When interpreting the notion of 
beneficial ownership in the context of the object and the 
language of double tax treaties, courts find that the notion 
exists as a test to determine whether the recipient of 
passive income is in substance the owner. They also 
realise that the question can only be answered by an 
economic analysis, according to which companies cannot 
be considered capable of being beneficial owners of 
passive income. On the other hand, courts find that the 
OECD Model Convention assumes that conduit companies 
are, in some circumstances, capable of being beneficial 
owners of passive income. This assumption can be correct 
only if the facts of a case are evaluated from a legal 
perspective.  
As discussed in section 2.22, this paradox should result 
in a situation in which a court cannot decide a conduit 
company case on the basis of the beneficial ownership 
criterion; generally, however, courts proceed with the 
application of the beneficial ownership test to conduit 
companies. That is, they prefer to assume that conduit 
companies are capable of being beneficial owners of 
passive income.
 
 
                                               
129 Ibid, at 390. See also John Prebble ―Can Income Tax Law be 
Simplified?‖ (1996) 2 NZ Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 187, at 
193. 
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2.29. Why do courts apply the beneficial ownership 
test to conduit companies? 
Fuller‘s theory on legal fictions further helps to understand 
this behaviour of courts. According to Fuller, in some 
cases a fiction seems to be intended to avoid the 
implication of a general principle of jurisprudence, or of 
morals.
130
 As mentioned earlier, in the present context, the 
application of the beneficial ownership test from an 
economic perspective could result in destabilising and 
bringing uncertainty to the conventional view. In Fuller‘s 
opinion, a legal fiction is a judge‘s way of satisfying his 
own craving for certainty and stability.
131
 Courts adopt the 
fiction that conduit companies are capable of beneficially 
owning passive income because it is consistent with the 
conventional view, and therefore it helps to maintain the 
certainty and stability of tax law. As explained in section 
2.15, according to the conventional view, companies are 
both the legal and the equitable owners of their assets and 
income generated from these assets. Consequently, courts 
prefer to interpret double tax agreements in general and 
the beneficial ownership requirement in particular from a 
formal legalistic viewpoint. 
While doing so, courts in a sense impair the way in 
which double tax treaties should work. Courts find 
themselves, therefore, unable to justify their approach 
convincingly. Since courts are expected to systematise 
their decisions in a logically consistent manner, they tend 
to justify their conclusions by adopting forms of reasoning 
that they use as surrogate tests for the beneficial 
ownership test. 
                                               
130 Fuller above n 126, at 53. 
131 Ibid, at 58. 
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2.30. Surrogate tests 
The surrogate tests can be categorised as: 
1. Substantive business activity: In order to determine 
whether a conduit company is entitled to a 
reduction in withholding tax, courts investigate 
whether an interposed company is involved in a 
substantive business activity. Courts do not 
consider a functionless letterbox company to be the 
beneficial owner. Courts have transposed the 
substantive business activity test from domestic tax 
law cases involving ―nominee corporations‖, and 
from base company cases. In such cases, the courts 
apply the substantive business activity test as a 
substance over form rule. 
2. Dominion: Courts determine whether a conduit 
company has dominion over passive income 
derived from the source company. The dominion 
test was transposed from cases involving a nominee 
or agent to conduit company cases. Nominees or 
agents receive income on behalf of a mandator or 
principal respectively, and therefore, they lack 
dominion over it. In the absence of dominion, they 
are under an obligation to hand over the income to 
the mandator or principal. For deciding whether an 
intermediary acts as a conduit to pass on passive 
income to a resident company, courts have 
determined whether the intermediary has dominion 
over the income. 
Before this thesis examines the surrogate tests, it 
highlights in chapter 3 a substance based approach that the 
Swiss and Dutch courts have adopted in certain conduit 
company cases. The thesis advocates the substance based 
approach for interpreting and applying the beneficial 
ownership concept to conduit company cases. The 
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objective of discussing the approach in chapter 3 is to use 
it as a yardstick in order to evaluate the surrogate tests in 
chapters 4 and 5. The comparison of the surrogate test 
with the substance based approach not only emphasises 
the shortcomings of the surrogate tests, but also tests the 
plausibility of the substance based approach itself.  
Chapters 4 and 5 illustrate that criteria by which the 
surrogate tests operate are not capable of applying to the 
concept of beneficial ownership. Consequently, when 
courts try to determine the issue of beneficial ownership 
on the basis of surrogate tests, their reasoning is often 
illogical. This problem may lie behind the increasingly 
widespread opinion that there is a need for clarification of 
the concept of beneficial ownership,
132
 although 
clarification may still not help. 
2.31. Conclusion 
―Beneficial ownership‖ essentially means the right to 
appropriate the benefits of a property. Domestic tax law 
has used the beneficial ownership concept mainly in the 
context of a trust in order to distinguish the rights of 
trustees from those of beneficiaries. 
In double tax treaties, the concept operates in a slightly 
different context. It operates as a substantive economic 
test. Double tax treaties apply the concept as a 
countermeasure to ensure that treaty benefits are limited to 
residents of the contracting states. In the context of double 
tax agreements, the beneficial ownership test determines 
who is economically better off as the result of the payment 
of income. It ensures that a resident who is claiming the 
                                               
132 See OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Restricting the Entitlement 
to Treaty Benefits‖ in OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs 2002 
Reports Related to the OECD Model Tax Convention (OECD, Paris, 
2003) 9 at para 23. 
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withholding tax reduction owns the income in substance 
and that resident is not under some obligation to pass on 
the income to a resident of a third state. 
Companies are not capable of holding assets or income 
derived from the assets in any substantive sense. It follows 
that in the context of double tax agreements it does not 
make sense to determine whether a conduit company is 
entitled to treaty benefits on the basis of the criterion of 
beneficial ownership. Almost by definition in an economic 
sense, a conduit company cannot be an owner of anything. 
Nevertheless, the OECD and courts apply the beneficial 
ownership test on the basis of an assumption, often 
unexpressed, that conduit companies are capable of being 
the beneficial owners of passive income. This assumption 
is a logical impossibility.  
Courts apply the beneficial ownership test within the 
wrong frame of reference. Thus, even when courts 
conclude that a conduit company is not the beneficial 
owner of passive income, their conclusion is based on 
reasons that are completely different from economic 
reality. They ignore the economic reality that a conduit 
company is fundamentally not capable of being the 
beneficial owner of anything, including passive income. 
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3.1. Introduction 
Chapter 2 argued that in the context of double tax 
conventions it is conceptually impossible to apply the 
beneficial ownership test to conduit companies. The test 
can be applied to conduit companies only if the beneficial 
ownership requirement is interpreted from a legalistic 
perspective. In summary, the process of applying the 
essentially substantive test of beneficial ownership by 
using formal, legalistic reasoning is contradictory. 
Apparently appreciating this problem, courts tend to turn 
to surrogate forms of reasoning that do not examine the 
concept of beneficial ownership. Although the surrogate 
tests are based on a substance over form approach, they 
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are not necessarily suitable for deciding conduit company 
cases.  
This chapter highlights a better substantive approach, 
which has been adopted by courts of Switzerland
133
 and 
the Netherlands
134
 for deciding a number of conduit 
company cases. These cases concerned tax treaty 
provisions that did not use the term ―beneficial owner‖. 
The courts analysed the facts with the objective of 
determining reasons for the existence of the intermediary 
in the tax planning structure in question. They referred to 
as ―reasons for the existence‖, ―significance of the 
existence‖ or ―practical significance‖.  
They evaluated the effect of the interposition of the 
intermediary in order to determine reasons for its 
existence. Interestingly, the logic of the approach adopted 
by these courts corresponded to the logic of what is known 
as the ―predication test‖, which was adopted by Lord 
Denning in the Australian case of Newton v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation.
135
 Although the Newton case 
dealt with a domestic tax planning scheme, it helps to 
explain the approach adopted by Swiss courts and the 
Hoge Raad. 
3.2. Solution 
Because the beneficial ownership test is fundamentally not 
capable of effectively deciding conduit company cases, it 
does not make sense to clarify the concept of beneficial 
ownership per se at least in the context of conduit 
companies. Nevertheless, when deciding conduit company 
                                               
133 For example, X-group 1979 (1979) 48 Archives de droit fiscal 
Suisse 271 (The Federal Tax Administration, Switzerland) and 
Arabian-group 1984 1984 (1984) BGE 110 Ib 287 at 288. 
134 For example, Y-group 1990, Case no 25 451, BNB 1990/45 (the 
Hoge Raad, the Netherlands). 
135 L J Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1958) 98 CLR 1. 
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cases, courts tend to address the issue of beneficial 
ownership and the meaning of the concept. One reason is 
the presence of the terms ―beneficial owner‖, ―beneficially 
owned‖, or ―beneficially entitled‖ in double tax treaties. A 
solution would be to replace such terms with an 
appropriate test specifically for conduit company cases. 
However, since many double tax treaties throughout the 
world use the terms, it will take a long time to replace 
them. Until treaties are amended or replaced, there is a 
need for a temporary solution. A temporary solution 
would be to interpret the word ―beneficial‖ in the context 
of conduit company cases, and then, to apply the 
interpretation with the help of reasoning that can lead to a 
conclusion in a logical manner.  
In the context of conduit company cases, the word 
―beneficial‖ determines whether an interposed 
intermediary has been inserted in order to make improper 
use of a double tax treaty. That is, it uses the object and 
purpose of a treaty to limit its benefits to residents of the 
contracting states. Because this principle is rather general, 
courts tend to adopt the surrogate tests.  
The general nature of the object and purpose of limiting 
treaty benefits can be equated to the nature of the 
substance over form doctrine embedded in general anti-
avoidance rules. As with conduit company cases, courts in 
domestic tax avoidance cases tend to apply the doctrine by 
adopting specific tests for general anti-avoidance rules. 
However, in L.J. Newton v Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation,
136
 Lord Denning adopted a different approach.  
The Newton case concerned the interpretation and 
application of section 260 of the Income Tax and Social 
                                               
136 L J Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1958) 98 CLR 1 
(Privy Council, Australia). 
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Services Contribution Assessment Act 1936-1950, which 
was the former Australian general anti-avoidance rule.
137
 
Although the case dealt with a domestic dividend stripping 
scheme, the reasoning of the court is relevant in the 
present context. Lord Denning did not concretise the law 
by basing his decision on the absence or presence of a 
specific criterion. He examined overt acts of the parties in 
order to predicate whether the arrangement is consistent 
with the overall purpose of the Act. That is, he examined 
whether the arrangement resulted in tax avoidance. His 
approach is commonly referred to as the ―predication test‖ 
because his formulation of the test included the verb ―to 
predicate‖. 
3.3. L.J. Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation 
The Newton case involved a series of transactions. The 
underlying tax planning, however, can be summarised 
essentially as follows: Motor Co., a private dealer 
company, derived profits. Its shareholders sold their shares 
to Pactolus Ltd, a share trading company, at a price that 
included the underlying value of the shares and the 
anticipated dividend. Pactolus Ltd received the dividend 
and sold the shares back to the shareholders at the 
underlying value. That is, it sold the shares at a loss. The 
loss was a result of the dividend being stripped out by 
Pactolus Ltd. 
                                               
137 The Income Tax and Social Services Contribution Assessment Act 
1936-1950 (Australia), s 260. The relevant part of s. 260 provided: 
―Every contract, agreement, or arrangement made or entered into, 
orally or in writing …, shall so far as it has or purports to have the 
purpose or effect of in any way, directly or indirectly—(a) altering the 
incidence of any income tax; (b) relieving any person from liability to 
pay income tax or make any return; (c) defeating, evading, or avoiding 
any duty or liability imposed on any person by this Act; or (d) 
preventing the operation of this Act in any respect, be absolutely void 
… .‖ 
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Effectively, the shareholders avoided tax by converting 
an otherwise taxable dividend into a capital gain. Since 
Pactolus Ltd was a share trading company, it set off the 
loss in buying and selling the shares against the payment it 
received from Motor Co. Consequently, Pactolus Ltd. also 
avoided tax on the dividend, which it received from Motor 
Co.  
The parties made all payments by cheque. They 
deposited the cheques simultaneously in a single bank. It 
was undisputed that the transactions were not shams. 
Prima facie, the original shareholders of Motor Co. 
derived no taxable income, and therefore, they were not 
liable to tax. However, the Commissioner assessed the 
shareholders for income tax with respect to the dividends. 
The Commissioner applied section 260 of the Income Tax 
and Social Services Contribution Assessment Act 1936-
1950 and contended that the transactions formed part of an 
initial plan that was carried out successfully to achieve the 
end of avoiding tax. The Privy Council agreed with the 
Commissioner. In the court‘s opinion, section 260 covered 
a ―concerted action to an end—the end of avoiding tax‖.138 
The shareholders argued that if such a wide 
interpretation were accorded to section 260, all 
transactions by which a taxpayer seeks to minimise tax 
would fall under the provision. To clarify the 
interpretation, Lord Denning adopted the predication test 
and observed:
139
 
… the section is not concerned with the motives of 
individuals. It is not concerned with their desire to avoid 
tax, but only the means which they employ to do it. It 
affects every ―contract, agreement or arrangement‖ … 
which has the purpose or effect of avoiding tax. In 
                                               
138 L J Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, above n 136, at 
8. 
139 Ibid. 
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applying the section you must, by the very words of it, 
look at the arrangement itself and see which is its 
effect—which it does—irrespective of the motives of 
the persons who made it … . In order to bring the 
arrangement within the section you must be able to 
predicate—by looking at the overt acts by which it was 
implemented—that it was implemented in that particular 
way so as to avoid tax. 
When the court applied the test to the facts of the case, it 
was of the opinion that the series of transactions was a 
result of a concerted plan that section 260 referred to as an 
―arrangement‖. It found that the facts of the arrangement, 
which involved an exchange of cheques for similar 
amounts in simultaneous transactions, was enough to 
predicate that the arrangement sought to achieve tax 
avoidance as one of its ends. According to the court, the 
Commissioner, therefore, was entitled under section 260 
to ignore all the transactions and look at the end result. 
The court held that the taxpayers were liable to pay tax on 
the dividends.
140
  
In the context of the predication test, it could be 
inferred that taxpayers may plan their transactions with the 
intention of avoiding tax; however, courts should 
determine whether the effect of the arrangement as a 
whole is tax avoidance. That is, courts should examine the 
nature of the arrangement in the context of the purpose of 
the legislation. 
The logic by which the term ―beneficial‖ functions in 
conduit company cases can be equated to the logic of the 
application of the predication test. Before drawing an 
analogy between the logic of the operation of the term 
―beneficial‖ and the predication test, it is helpful to clarify 
the manner in which the term ―beneficial owner‖ should 
be interpreted in conduit company cases. 
                                               
140 L J Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, above n 136, at 
11. 
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3.4. How should the word “beneficial” be 
interpreted? 
The word ―beneficial‖ simply limits the benefit of the 
withholding tax reduction to residents of the contracting 
states. The decision of the Hoge Raad of 28 June 1989,
141
 
which will be referred to as Y-Group 1990, supports the 
argument. The Y-group 1990 case
142
 was concerned with 
Article 11(3) of the 1964 Tax Arrangement for the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands.
143
 The tax arrangement is 
referred to as ―Belastingregeling voor het Koninkrijk‖ in 
Dutch, also abbreviated as the BRK.  
The BRK is a regulation that governs the fiscal relations 
between the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles and 
Aruba.  It is also considered to be a quasi-treaty. The 
judgment in Y-group 1990 shows, however, that at least in 
terms of the taxation of dividends, the BRK works on the 
same principles that apply to double tax agreements.
144
 
Although the case concerned Article 11(3) of the BRK, 
when denying treaty benefits to the taxpayer, the lower 
court of Amsterdam was of the opinion that its decision 
was consistent with Article 10(2) of the OECD Model of 
1977 and in confirmation with the current notions of 
international law.
145
 The Hoge Raad supported the lower 
court‘s view.146  
Although Article 11(3) of the BRK did not use the term 
―beneficial owner‖, the Advocate General, Mr. van Soest, 
                                               
141 Y-group 1990 (28 June 1989) Case no 25 451, BNB 1990/45 (the 
Hoge Raad, the Netherlands). 
142 Ibid. 
143 The Tax Arrangement for the Kingdom of the Netherlands (28 
October 1964, entered into force 12 December 1985), art 11(3). 
144
 See Y-group 1989, above n 141, at para 4.6. 
145 See ―Arrest‖ in Y-group 1990, above n 141, at para 7.2. 
146 See ―Beoordeling van het middel‖ in Y-group 1990, above n 141, 
at para 4.6. 
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presumed that the lower court was ―referring to the 
reservation ‗if the recipient is the beneficial owner of the 
dividends‘‖.147 For this reason, Y-group 1990 is relevant in 
the present context. 
3.5. The Y-group 1990 case 
Initially, Y Canada, a Canadian company, owned all the 
shares of Y Netherlands, a Dutch company. Y Netherlands 
declared dividend. X Canada subsequently incorporated Y 
Antilles in the Netherlands Antilles. While Y Canada was 
the majority shareholder of Y Antilles, a Panamanian 
company, P Panama, held the rest of the shares. Y 
Netherlands paid a part of the dividend to Y Canada. Y 
Canada then divided the shares of Y Netherlands into 
preference shares and ordinary shares. Following the 
division, Y Canada sold the ordinary shares to Y Antilles 
at par value. Afterwards, Y Netherlands paid the 
remaining amount of the dividend to Y Antilles after 
deducting the Dutch withholding tax. Y Antilles claimed a 
refund of the withholding tax under Article 11(3) of the 
BRK.
148
 These events occurred within three months of each 
another. 
 
                                               
147 See ―Conclusie Advocaat-Generaal mr. Van Soest‖ in Y-group 
1990, above n 141, at para 2.7 (emphasis added).  
148 Tax Arrangement for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, above n 
143, art 11(3). 
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Figure 3.1: The Y-group 1990 case 
When Y Antilles received the disputed dividend 
payment, Y Antilles was a letterbox company. The Dutch 
tax inspector asked Y Antilles to provide information 
about the beneficial owners of P Panama. Because Y 
Antilles did not provide the information, the tax inspector 
assumed that there was a contractual arrangement between 
P Panama and Y Canada to pass on the dividend. The tax 
inspector refused to grant the refund on the grounds that Y 
Antilles was interposed solely to avoid Dutch dividend 
withholding tax.  
Before the lower court of Amsterdam, the inspector 
argued that the sequence of events showed that Y Antilles 
had no practical significance in the corporate structure. 
The inspector contended that to allow the refund would be 
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against the object and purpose of Article 11(3) of the BRK. 
The lower court agreed with the tax inspector‘s 
assessment. It held that the totality of the facts showed that 
the interposition of Y Antilles had no practical 
significance for the disputed dividend payment.
149
 Y 
Antilles was interposed solely to avoid Dutch withholding 
tax on the dividend payment in question. The Hoge Raad 
confirmed the decision of the lower court, but placed 
importance on the sequence of the events.
150
 
Since both courts found that Y Antilles had no practical 
significance, they were of the opinion that the arrangement 
should be treated as if Y Canada had received the 
dividend. They held that under such circumstances, a 
refund of the withholding tax would frustrate the object 
and purpose of Article 11(3) of the BRK.
151
 
3.6. Y-group 1990: the word “beneficial” 
Article 11(3) of the BRK stated:
152
 
The [dividend withholding tax] … shall not be levied, or 
if so levied, shall be refunded with respect to dividends 
derived by an entity whose capital is wholly or partly 
divided into shares and which is a resident of the other 
country and holds at least 25 per cent of the paid-up 
capital of the company. 
Explaining the object and purpose of Article 11 of the 
BRK, the Hoge Raad observed (author‘s translation):153  
… Article 11 is intended to prevent double taxation of 
dividends payable by a company resident in the 
Netherlands or the Netherlands Antilles, and enjoyed by 
a resident of one of these countries. 
                                               
149 ―Loop van het geding tot dusverre‖ in Y-group 1990, above n 141, 
at para 7.2. 
150  ―Beoordeling van het middel‖ in Y-group 1990, above n 141, at 
para 4.2. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Tax Arrangement for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, above n 
143, art 11(3) (emphasis added). 
153 ―Beoordeling van het middel‖ in Y-group 1990, above n 141, at 
para 4.6. 
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The Hoge Raad appears to interpret the words ―derived 
by‖ in Article 11(3) as ―enjoyed‖. The approach adopted 
by the Hoge Raad corresponds to that of the court in Aiken 
Industries Inc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
154
 
which concerned Article IX of the United States-Honduras 
double tax treaty of 26 June 1956.
155
 As with the BRK, the 
United States-Honduras double tax treaty did not use the 
term ―beneficial owner‖. Yet, as discussed in section 2.5, 
the United States Tax Court in Aiken Industries explicitly 
read the beneficial ownership requirement into the 
provision. The court found that the words ―received by‖156 
contemplated ―complete dominion and control‖.157 The 
words ―received by a resident … of the other contracting 
State‖ in the United States-Honduras double tax treaty and 
―paid … to a resident of a Contract State‖ in the OECD 
Model Convention point to the same person: the 
immediate recipient of passive income.
158
 The Hoge Raad 
was clearly aware of the presence of the requirement of 
substantive economic ownership.
159
 
The reasoning of the Hoge Raad, however, shows that 
it denied the withholding tax reduction essentially because 
                                               
154 Aiken Industries Inc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 56 TC 
925 (1971). 
155 Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, the United 
States–Honduras (25 June 1956, entered into force 6 February 1957) 
art IX. It stated: ―Interest on … notes … from sources within one of 
the contracting States received by a resident, corporation or other 
entity of the other contracting State not having a permanent 
establishment … shall be exempt from tax by such former State.‖ 
156 The United States double tax treaty of 26 June 1956, above n 155, 
art IX.  
157 Aiken Industries Inc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, above n 
154, at 933. 
158 See also Stef van Weeghel The Improper Use of Tax Treaties: with 
Particular Reference to the Netherlands and the United States 
(Kluwer, London, 1998) at 89. 
159 See ―Conclusie Advocaat-Generaal mr. Van Soest‖ in Y-group 
1990, above n 141, at para 2.7. 
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Y Canada, which enjoyed the dividend, was not a resident 
of a country to which the BRK applied. The court 
emphasised the limitation of the benefit of the withholding 
tax reduction to residents of the contracting states of the 
BRK. It probably appreciated that Y Antilles could not own 
the dividends in a substantive economic sense, or it 
realised that Y Antilles did formally own the dividends as 
a company. Nonetheless, the reasoning for limiting the 
benefit of the withholding tax reduction was in alignment 
with the object and purpose of the OECD Model 
Convention in general and Article 10(2) of the OECD 
Model Convention in particular.
160
 Y-group 1990 confirms 
that in the context of conduit companies, the word 
―beneficial‖ could be assigned the function of limiting the 
benefit of a withholding tax reduction to residents of the 
contracting states. 
3.7. Y-group 1990: operation of the logic of the term 
“beneficial” and the predication test 
The approach adopted by Lord Denning in the Newton 
case to interpret the former Australian general anti-
avoidance rule appears similar to the approach adopted by 
the Hoge Raad. When applying the predication test, Lord 
Denning considered the arrangement as a whole and 
examined its nature in the context of the purpose of the 
Income Tax and Social Services Contribution Assessment 
Act 1936-1950.
161
 As with the predication test, the Hoge 
Raad in Y-group 1990 viewed the facts in their totality and 
investigated whether the interposition of Y Antilles was 
against the object and purpose of the BRK. Although 
                                               
160 See ―Beoordeling van het middel‖ in Y-group 1990, above n 141, 
at para 4.6. 
161 L J Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1958) 98 CLR 1 
(Privy Council, Australia). 
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Article 11(3) of the BRK did not use the term ―beneficial 
owner‖, the object and purpose of the provision was 
consistent with Article 10 of the OECD Model Convention. 
This analogy shows that the same logic applies to the use 
of the word ―beneficial‖ in conduit company cases and the 
predication test in the Newton case. This implication is 
explicit in Re V SA,
162
 concerning Article 10 of the 
Switzerland-Luxembourg double tax treaty of 21 January 
1993, which used the term ―beneficial owner‖.163 
3.8. The Re V SA case 
As discussed in section 2.9, Re V SA involved two British 
companies that incorporated V SA in Luxembourg. V SA 
acquired all the capital in I SA, a Swiss company with the 
help of a loan from the British companies. In the initial 
two years of its incorporation, I SA paid dividends to V SA 
and deducted Swiss withholding tax. 
                                               
162 Re V SA (2001) 4 ITLR 191 (The Federal Commission of Appeal in 
Tax Matters, Switzerland). 
163 Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Switzerland–
Luxembourg (21 January 1993, entered into force 19 February 1994), 
art 10(2). 
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Figure 3.2: The V SA case 
Article 10(2) of the Switzerland-Luxembourg double 
tax treaty of 21 January 1993
164
 allows a full refund of 
Swiss withholding tax on a dividend payment, if a 
Luxembourg company has held at least 25 per cent shares 
of a Swiss company paying dividends for an uninterrupted 
period of at least two years before the date of the payment. 
The provision otherwise provides for a partial refund.  
V SA applied to the Swiss Tax Administration for 
partial and full refunds of the Swiss withholding tax in 
accordance with Article 10(2) of the treaty. It produced 
annual accounts of the year in which it received the first 
dividend payment only, and refused to answer whether it 
                                               
164 The Switzerland–Luxembourg double tax treaty of 21 January 
1993, above n 163, art 10(2). 
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enjoyed the benefits of both dividend payments. 
Consequently, the administration did not allow refunds. 
The Swiss Federal Commission agreed with the 
administration. 
Because Article 10(2) uses the terms ―beneficiary‖ and 
―effective beneficiary‖ simultaneously,165 the commission 
had to determine whether the term ―beneficiary‖ should be 
interpreted in the same sense as ―effective beneficiary‖ or 
whether it referred exclusively to the direct, formal 
shareholder. 
In the light of Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention,
166
 the commission interpreted the term 
―beneficiary‖ in three steps. First, it determined the 
ordinary meaning of the term. Second, it interpreted the 
term in the context of the purpose of the Switzerland-
Luxembourg double tax treaty. Third, it interpreted the 
term in the context of Article 10(2) of the treaty. 
                                               
165 Ibid, art 10(2). The relevant part of Article 10(2) provides: 
(a) … dividends may also be taxed in the Contracting State of 
which the company paying the dividends is a resident and 
according to the laws of that State, but if the recipient is the 
beneficial owner (bénéficiare effectif) of the dividends the 
tax so charged shall not exceed: 
(i) 5 percent of the gross amount of the dividends if the 
beneficial owner is a company (other than a 
partnership) which holds directly at least 25 percent 
of the capital of the company paying the dividends; 
… 
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of letter (i) of sub-paragraph 
a), the dividends are exempt in the Contracting State of 
which the company paying the dividends is a resident, if the 
beneficiary (bénéficiare) is a company (other than a 
partnership) which is a resident of the other Contracting State 
and which holds ... , at least 25 percent of the capital of the 
company paying the dividends … 
166 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969) 1155 
UNTS 331, art 31(1). It states: ―A treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.‖ 
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When determining the ordinary meaning of the word 
―beneficiary‖, the commission found that as with 
―effective beneficiary‖, a ―beneficiary‖ is a person who 
profits economically from income.
167
  The commission 
observed:
168
 
... it follows from the sense of the word beneficiary that 
one cannot stop at the purely formal shareholder of a 
company, but rather it is necessary to research who is 
the person who can in reality and effectively benefit 
from the payment of income. 
The commission did not regard V SA as the beneficiary of 
the dividends.
169
 The Swiss Federal Commission might 
have treated its finding as conclusive; however, as with the 
Hoge Raad in Y-group 1990,
170
  the commission may have 
realised that it was logically not possible to use the word 
―beneficiary‖ as a test for determining whether V SA was 
entitled to treaty benefits, and interpreted the term 
according to the purpose of the treaty. 
3.9. Re V SA: the word “beneficiary” 
To determine the purpose of the Switzerland-Luxembourg 
double tax treaty, the commission examined the intention 
of the contracting states.
171
 It observed that Swiss double 
tax treaties were intended to avoid double taxation of 
residents of the contracting states only.
172
 It noted that the 
companies that incorporated V SA were residents in the 
United Kingdom. Referring to V SA‘s annual accounts, it 
pointed out that V SA‘s only significant asset was its 
participation in I SA, and that charges that V SA paid out 
                                               
167 Re V SA, above n 162, at 209. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid. 
170
 Y-group 1990 (28 June 1989) Case no 25 451, BNB 1990/45 (the 
Hoge Raad, the Netherlands). 
171 Re V SA, above n 162, at 210. 
172 Ibid. 
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exactly covered its income. The commission found that V 
SA acted as a conduit. Consequently, it held:
173
 
In this case, the identity of those who have the 
economic rights over [V SA] is not known. However, 
everything leads one to believe … that it is not a 
Luxembourg resident … there are sufficient indicators 
permitting one to conclude that [V SA] is only a shadow 
company interposed to permit a person who is not a 
resident of Luxembourg to benefit, wrongly, from the 
double taxation convention. 
… As a consequence, if there is any double taxation, 
this can only arise between, on the one hand, the Swiss 
withholding tax and, on the other hand, the taxation of 
the final beneficiary of the dividends of I SA. Thus, 
aside from the fact that this double taxation is 
exclusively economic and not juridical, it is not the 
target of the convention concluded with Luxembourg 
since it is not established that the final beneficiary is a 
Luxembourg resident. 
Thus, the deduction of withholding tax does not 
contravene the purpose of the convention concluded 
with Luxembourg which is to prevent double taxation of 
residents of one of the two contracting states. 
The manner in which the Swiss Federal Commission 
interpreted ―beneficiary‖ in accordance with the purpose 
of the Switzerland-Luxembourg double tax treaty 
corresponds to the approach adopted by the Hoge Raad in 
Y-group 1990.
174
 When interpreting the term 
―beneficiary‖, the commission emphasised the fact that the 
two United Kingdom companies, which had economic 
rights, were not residents in Luxembourg. As with the 
Hoge Raad it accorded the term the function of limiting 
the benefits to the treaty. 
3.10. Re V SA: similarity between the logic of the term 
“beneficial” and the predication test  
The commission subsequently interpreted the term 
―beneficiary‖ in the context of Article 10(2)(b) of the 
Switzerland-Luxembourg double tax treaty. It noted that 
the provision was adopted to permit Switzerland, in its 
                                               
173 Re V SA, above n 162, at 210. 
174 ―Beoordeling van het middel‖ in Y-group 1990, above n 170, at 
para 4.6. 
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relations with Luxembourg, to benefit from Article 5(1) of 
the Parent Subsidiary Directive of the Council of the 
European Community.
175
 It then pointed out that Article 
1(2) of the Directive
176
 allows the operation of anti-
avoidance provisions of national law and double tax 
treaties. It was, therefore, of the opinion that when 
interpreting Article 10(2) in the context of the treaty, it 
could apply rules of Swiss internal law aimed at 
combating abuse of double taxation conventions.
177
 
The commission applied Article 21(2) of the Swiss 
Federal Withholding Tax Law.
178
 Article 21(2) is a 
specific statutory anti-avoidance rule, which embodies the 
abuse of law doctrine. It recognises that tax is avoided 
when:
179
 
1. the legal form chosen by the parties appears to be 
unwarranted, inappropriate or unusual, and in all 
cases is completely inappropriate to the economic 
facts; 
2. there is reason to believe that the choice was made 
abusively with the object of saving tax which 
would otherwise have been due if the legal 
relations had been arranged in an appropriate 
fashion; 
3. the method chosen would lead effectively to a 
substantial reduction in tax if it was accepted by the 
tax authorities. 
                                               
175 Directive 90/435/EEC on the common system of taxation applicable 
in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member 
States [1990] OJ L225, art 5(1). It states: ―Profits which a subsidiary 
distributes to its parent company shall, at least where the latter holds a 
minimum of 25 [per cent] of the capital of the subsidiary, be exempt 
from withholding tax.‖  
176 Ibid, art 1(2). It states: ―This Directive shall not preclude the 
application of domestic or agreement-based provisions required for 
the prevention of fraud or abuse.‖ 
177 Re V SA, above n 162, at 211. Contrast MIL (Investment) SA v 
Canada 2006 TCC 460, at para 87 (Tax Court of Canada, Canada). 
Contrast MIL (Investment) SA v Canada 2007 FCA 236, at para 5 
(Federal Court Of Appeal, Canada). (The MIL case concerns capital 
gains tax). 
178 Verrechnungssteuergesetz [VStG] [Withholding Tax Law], 13 
October 1965, SR 642.21, art 21(2) (Switz.) <www.lexfind.ch>.  
179 Re V SA, above n 162, at 212. 
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The commission considered the facts that V SA was 
established by the British companies, which were not 
entitled to benefits of the Switzerland-Luxembourg double 
tax treaty, and that the only participation that V SA 
acquired was the shares of I SA. Based on these facts the 
court determined that the interposition of V SA lacked 
―serious economic justification‖180 to the extent that the 
structure could be described as unwarranted.  
The commission could not find any non-tax reason for 
interposing V SA. It observed:
181
 
One cannot see, in addition, any reason, if it is not a tax 
reason, that the structure was put in place. It follows that 
one should recognise that the participation was acquired 
by a Luxembourg company, in place of those having the 
economic rights, for purely fiscal motives. 
Further, the commission found that the United 
Kingdom companies were able to save substantial Swiss 
withholding tax. It observed:
182
 
… [V SA] has deducted from its profits, in the form of 
charges, an amount corresponding to the dividend 
received such that this dividend can in its turn exit from 
the Luxembourg company free of taxation. The 
structure put in place by [V SA] permits the recovery of 
the withholding tax without one being able to know 
whom the dividends effectively benefited. 
The commission held that V SA could not be described 
as a ―beneficiary‖ under article 10(2)(b) of the treaty. It 
seems to consider the same findings, when it refused to 
regard V SA as an ―effective beneficiary‖ under Article 
10(2)(a).
183
 
Two points emerge. First, as with the Authority for 
Advance Ruling of India in the NatWest Ruling,
184
 the 
                                               
180 Re V SA, above n 162, at 212. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid. 
184 In Re XYZ (1996) 220 ITR 377 (AAR) (The Authority for Advance 
Rulings, India). 
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Swiss Federal Commission applied a domestic anti-
avoidance rule; however, unlike the Authority for 
Advance Ruling, the commission applied the rule as if it 
were applying the beneficial ownership test. As discussed 
in section 2.23, the Authority for Advance Ruling in the 
NatWest Ruling refused to determine the issue of 
beneficial owner and instead applied section 245R(2)(c) of 
the Indian Income Tax Act.
185
 Second, when applying 
Article 21(2) of the Swiss Federal Withholding Tax 
Law,
186
 the commission referred to the motive of the 
British companies. However, its approach resembles the 
approach adopted by Lord Denning in the Newton case
187
 
to the extent that it essentially decided the case in the 
context of the object and purpose of the treaty and did not 
substitute a particular test for the beneficial ownership 
test.  
3.11. Similarity between the function of the word 
“beneficial” and the predication test 
As discussed in section 3.3, the predication test does not 
require courts to focus on tax avoiding motives of a 
taxpayer. It requires them to determine whether the effect 
of the arrangement, as a whole, is tax avoidance. In the 
context of conduit company cases, the intention of the 
taxpayer is to mitigate the source state withholding tax 
under double tax conventions. Similar to the application of 
the predication test, when interpreting the word 
                                               
185 The Income Tax Act 1961 (India), s 245R(2)(c). S 245R(2)(c) 
provides that the Authority for Advance Rulings shall not allow an 
application, if after examining it the Authority is of the opinion that 
the application was related to a transaction that was designed prima 
facie for tax avoidance. 
186 Verrechnungssteuergesetz [VStG] [Withholding Tax Law], 13 
October 1965, SR 642.21, art 21(2) (Switz.) <www.lexfind.ch>. 
187 L J Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1958) 98 CLR 1 
(Privy Council, Australia). 
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―beneficial‖, courts should determine whether the 
interposition of an intermediary results in the improper use 
of the convention. 
The interposition of an intermediary is an 
―arrangement‖. An examination of the arrangement as a 
whole requires consideration of the existing scheme, in 
addition to the contracting state of the double tax 
agreement, and a third state. The Re V SA case is an 
example of a simple conduit company scheme that 
involved only one intermediary. A conduit company can 
also be interposed in connection with other intermediaries 
located in jurisdictions with favourable tax regimes and 
extensive treaty networks. Terms of the contracts between 
interposed companies are drafted so that income can flow 
from the source to the ultimate owner through a series of 
transactions. In some conduit company cases, interposed 
intermediaries are not related either to the source 
company, or to the ultimate owner. An investigation of an 
arrangement in a conduit company case, therefore, should 
include a consideration of facts concerning the entire 
corporate structure. 
As discussed in section 3.5, the lower court in Y-group 
1990
188
 considered the facts in their totality. However, 
since the Y-group 1990 case does not provide information 
about terms of the contract between Y Canada and P 
Panama, the case may not help to clarify the point. 
The decision of the Swiss Federal Tax Administration 
of 25 April 1979,
189
 which will be referred to as X-group 
1979, is a better example. The conduit company scheme in 
that case involved several intermediaries. The terms of 
                                               
188 Y-group 1990, above n 141, at para 7.2. 
189 X-group 1979 (1979) 48 Archives de droit fiscal Suisse 271 (The 
Federal Tax Administration, Switzerland). 
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contracts between the intermediaries were drafted in order 
to ensure a tax-free flow of dividends from the source 
company to the ultimate owner. 
3.12. The X-group 1979 case 
The X-group 1979 case involved Mr. N, a German 
resident, and the owner of the X-group. He also owned 
four Swiss companies that functioned as letterbox 
companies for sub-agents of the X-group. The Swiss 
companies had accumulated profits. If the Swiss 
companies had distributed dividends directly to Mr. N, he 
would have incurred Swiss withholding tax at the rate of 
15 per cent under the Switzerland-Germany double tax 
treaty of 11 August 1971.
190
 Dividend payments by Swiss 
companies to Dutch companies qualified for a total refund 
under the Article 9(2) of the Switzerland-Netherlands 
double tax treaty of 12 November 1951.
191
 It provided:
192
 
In the case of tax on income from movable capital 
levied by one of the two States by deduction at source, 
the recipient of such income domiciled in the other State 
may, within a period of two years, request 
reimbursement through the State in which he is 
domiciled, subject to the production of an official 
certificate of domicile and of liability to direct taxation 
in the State of domicile: 
a) in case of dividends: 
(i) in the total amount of tax withheld if the recipient 
of such dividends is an entity whose capital wholly 
or partly consist of shares and which owns at least 
25 per cent of the voting stock of the entity paying 
the dividends, provided the relation between the 
two entities has not been constituted or maintained 
                                               
190 Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, 
Switzerland–Germany, (11 August 1971, entered into force 29 
December 1972), art 10(2)(c). 
191 Protocol to the Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and 
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and 
Property, Switzerland–the Netherlands (12 November 1951, entered 
into force 22 December 1966) art 9(2)(a)(i). 
192 Ibid. 
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primarily for purpose of assuring receipt of the total 
fund. 
In order to receive a total refund of the Swiss 
withholding tax under the treaty, Mr. N created the 
following corporate structure: he interposed a Panamanian 
company, which will be referred to as X Panama in which 
he held all of the shares. X Panama in turn held all the 
shares in X Curaçao, a company incorporated in the 
Netherlands Antilles. X Curaçao wholly owned the 
taxpayer, a Dutch company, which will be referred to as X 
Amsterdam. These holding companies were affiliated to 
the X-group. 
Swiss Co
1
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X Panama
Mr. N
100%
100%
100%
100%
Dividends
Loan
repayment
Loan
repayment
Loan
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2
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Figure 3.3: The X-group 1979 case 
Mr. N then transferred the shares that he held in the 
Swiss companies to X Amsterdam through a series of 
transactions. First, X Panama purchased shares of the 
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Swiss companies from Mr. N with the help of a loan from 
him. Similar transactions occurred in the subsequent 
acquisitions of the shares of Swiss companies by X 
Curaçao, and X Amsterdam. All loan contracts provided 
that the repayment of debts would be only out of dividend 
income. 
The Swiss corporations withheld 35 per cent tax on 
dividend distributions to X Amsterdam. X Amsterdam 
applied to the Swiss Federal Tax Administration for a full 
refund of the withholding tax under Article 9(2) of the 
Netherlands-Switzerland double tax treaty.
193
 However, 
the Swiss Federal Tax Administration only allowed a 
partial refund under Article 9(2)(a)(ii) of the treaty.
194
  
At the time the case was decided, Article 9(2)(a)(i) did 
not contain the term ―beneficial owner‖.195 As discussed in 
section 2.10, in Re V SA, the Swiss Federal Commission of 
Appeal in Tax Matters held that the beneficial ownership 
requirement does not require an express reference.
196
 The 
anti-abuse clause in Article 9(2)(a)(i) provided that a 
recipient of dividends who is a resident of the other state 
might claim the refund of the withholding tax, ―provided 
that the relationship between the two companies has not 
been constituted or maintained primarily for the purpose 
of assuring receipt of the total fund‖.197 
                                               
193 The Netherlands-Switzerland double tax treaty of 12 November 
1951, above n 191, art 9(2) 
194 Ibid, art 9(2)(a)(ii). It provides that in all cases other than those 
covered by article 9(2)(a)(i) the amount of withholding tax that 
exceeded 15 per cent of the dividends would be refunded. 
195 It was introduced in the Netherlands-Switzerland double tax treaty 
of 26 February 2010. 
196 Re V SA 4 ITLR 191, 209. 
197 The Netherlands-Switzerland double tax treaty of 12 November 
1951, above n 191, art 9(2)(a)(i). 
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Interpreting Article 9(2)(a)(i) in the light of its anti-
abuse purpose, the Swiss Federal Tax Administration 
observed that it was designed to prevent persons who were 
neither residents of Switzerland nor residents of the 
Netherlands from obtaining a full refund of Swiss 
withholding tax.
198
 The function that the administration 
accorded to the provision corresponded to the function that 
the word ―beneficial‖ seems to perform in conduit 
company cases. 
Further, the logic adopted by the Swiss Federal Tax 
Administration to interpret and apply the anti-abuse clause 
in Article 9(2)(a)(i) corresponded to the approach of the 
Privy Council in the Newton case to interpret Section 260 
of the Income Tax and Social Services Contribution 
Assessment Act 1936-1950.  
3.13. “Means of the arrangement” and not “the motive 
of the taxpayer” 
When applying the Article 9(2)(a)(i), the Administration 
observed (author‘s translation):199 
―Under article 9(2), the convention does not require 
investigating motives for which a Dutch company was 
established or maintained, but it requires examining 
whether the relation between the two companies (Dutch 
and Swiss) was established or maintained primarily for 
the purpose of obtaining the benefit of the total 
reimbursement of withholding tax. Therefore, the 
question that arises in the present case is whether the 
transfer of the shares of the Swiss corporations to X 
Amsterdam via X Curaçao (indirectly via X Panama and 
[Mr. N]) was effected primarily to avoid a tax burden 
that otherwise would have constituted withholding tax.‖ 
Essentially, the Administration clarified that it was 
concerned with the means by which Mr. N implemented 
                                               
198 X-group 1979, above n 189, at 274. 
199 Ibid, at 275. Contrast MIL (Investment) SA v Canada 2006 TCC 460, 
at para 53 (Tax Court of Canada, Canada). Contrast MIL (Investment) 
SA v Canada 2007 FCA 236, at para 5 (Federal Court Of Appeal, 
Canada). 
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the arrangement, not with his motive.
200
 As discussed in 
section 3.3, Lord Denning was of the same opinion, when 
he interpreted the former Australian general anti 
avoidance in the Newton case.
201
 
3.14. “Arrangement”: totality of facts 
In order to determine whether the relationship between the 
Swiss corporations and X Amsterdam was established 
primarily to obtain the refund of the Swiss withholding 
tax, the administration considered the arrangement in its 
entirety.  
The Administration noted that Mr. N had incorporated 
the holding companies in countries where income from 
participations was exempted generally from all taxes, or in 
countries that had an extended network of tax treaties. The 
administration also considered the loan contracts between 
the holding companies. It inferred that interposing X 
Amsterdam ensured that the accumulated income of the 
Swiss companies flowed from Switzerland to Germany via 
the holding companies without being taxed in 
Switzerland.
202
 
The Administration observed that X Amsterdam failed 
to show that its creation served the economic interest of 
the Swiss companies. The Administration did not find any 
economic relationship between the Swiss companies and 
X Amsterdam. Thus, according to the Administration, no 
―serious economic reasons‖203 existed for the 
incorporation of X Amsterdam. X Amsterdam argued that 
                                               
200 See also ―Netherlands-Switzerland Tax Treaty: Full Refund of 
Swiss Withholding Tax Denied‖ (1980) 20 ET 91 at 94. 
201
 L J Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, above n 136, at 
8. 
202 X-group 1979, above n 189, at 277. 
203 Ibid, at 275. 
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it was created in response to economic needs of the X 
group. The Administration found that X Amsterdam had 
performed few financial transactions for affiliated 
companies and ―therefore, the economic role of X 
Amsterdam, in fact was of secondary importance or 
virtually nonexistent.‖204  
Although the Administration considered a wide range 
of facts, its rationale shows that it analysed them in order 
to finding substantive economic reasons for the existence 
of X Amsterdam in the corporate structure. The 
Administration‘s objective can be compared with Lord 
Denning‘s approach in the Newton case. He analysed the 
facts with the objective to predicate whether the effect of 
the arrangement was tax avoidance. Lord Denning‘s 
approach is commonly referred to as the predication test. 
This thesis will refer to the Swiss Federal Tax 
Administration‘s approach as the ―reasons for existence‖ 
approach. 
As with the Swiss Federal Tax Administration in X-
group 1979, the Swiss Federal Court in its decision of 9 
November 1984 considered the arrangement as a whole 
and investigated reasons for the existence of an interposed 
company.
205
 This decision will be referred to as Arabian-
group 1984. It also dealt with Article 9(2)(a)(i) of the 
Netherlands-Switzerland double tax treaty; however, the 
Federal Court applied the provision in a slightly different 
manner. Unlike the Federal Tax Administration, the 
Federal Court placed emphasis on the intention of the 
taxpayer. Nevertheless, Arabian-group 1984 is useful for 
                                               
204 X-group 1979, above n 189, at 278 (emphasis added). 
205 Arabian-group 1984 (1984) BGE 110 Ib 287 at 288. See also 
―Dutch Holding Company not Always Entitled to a Full Refund of the 
Swiss Tax Withheld on Dividends from a Swiss Subsidiary‖ (1986) 26 
ET 57. 
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illustrating the factors that may be considered to constitute 
an arrangement in conduit company cases. 
3.15. The Arabian-group 1984 case 
In the Arabian-group 1984 case, certain Saudi Arabian 
individuals owned all the shares in X Marketing SA, a 
company in Liechtenstein. X Marketing SA wholly owned 
X Holding Co, a company established in the Netherlands 
Antilles. X Holding Co wholly owned X International BV, 
a Dutch company and the taxpayer. X International BV 
held 75 per cent of the shares of K AG, a Swiss company. 
Y Inc, a United States corporation, owned the remaining 
25 per cent of the shares of K AG. 
Saudi Arabian Individuals
X Marketing SA
X Holding Co
X International BV
Y Inc
K AG
100%
100%
100%
75%25%
Saudi Arabia
Liechtenstein
The Netherlands Antilles 
The Netherlands
USA
Switzerland
Dividend
Ownership
Loan Loan repayment
 
Figure 3.4: The Arabian-group case 
X International BV and K AG were incorporated within 
four months of each other. X International BV had no 
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business activity. Two employees of X Marketing SA acted 
as managing directors and sales managers of X 
International BV. They remained employees of X 
Marketing SA. X International BV had borrowed funds 
from X Holding Co to subscribe for the shares of K AG. To 
satisfy the debt, X International BV used the dividends 
distributed by K AG for the first time to fund the loan 
repayment. K AG withheld the Swiss withholding tax on 
the dividend payment. X International BV applied to the 
Swiss Tax Administration for a refund of the withholding 
tax under Article 9(2) of the Netherlands-Switzerland 
double tax treaty of 12 November 1951.
206
 
The Swiss tax authority denied a refund under Article 
9(2)(a)(i) of the treaty on the grounds that the relationship 
between K AG and X International BV had been constituted 
and maintained principally to assure receipt of the Swiss 
withholding tax. The Swiss Federal Court agreed with the 
reason given by the tax authority to deny the full refund of 
the withholding tax. 
Similar to the Swiss Federal Tax Administration in the 
X-group 1979 case,
207
 the Federal Court was in favour of 
interpreting Article 9(2)(a)(i) in order to prevent a resident 
of a third state from obtaining the benefit of  a refund of 
Swiss withholding tax.
208
 However, in contrast to the 
opinion of the Swiss Tax Administration in the X-group 
1979 case, the Swiss Federal Court seemed to focus on the 
intention of the individual taxpayers. 
                                               
206 Protocol to the Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and 
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and 
property, the Netherlands–Switzerland (12 November 1951, entered 
into force 22 December 1966) art 9(2). 
207 X-group 1979 (1979) 48 Archives de droit fiscal Suisse 271 at 274 
(The Federal Tax Administration, Switzerland). 
208 Arabian-group1984, above n 205, 292. 
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3.16. Interpretation of the anti-abuse clause under 
Article 9(2)(a)(i) 
It will be recalled that Article 9(2)(a)(i) provided for a full 
refund of withholding tax to a recipient of dividends, who 
is a resident of the other state, ―provided that the 
relationship between the two companies was not 
established, or is not maintained, primarily in order to 
obtain the benefit of such total reimbursement‖.209 
According to the court, the word ―primarily‖ in the anti-
abuse clause signified that for the clause to apply, the 
taxpayer’s desire to benefit from the full refund of Swiss 
withholding tax should outweigh the other reasons for 
choosing the Netherlands as the place of incorporation.
210
  
In the court‘s opinion, the subjective element of the 
taxpayer‘s intent could only be determined by the 
objective circumstances of the arrangement. Therefore, as 
with the Swiss Tax Administration in the X-group 1979 
case,
211
 the Federal Court investigated the facts with a 
view to determine the ―significance of the existence of X 
International BV in the entire group‖.212 
3.17. Significance of the existence 
The court was of the opinion that in the context of the 
entire group, X International BV was acting as a mere 
conduit.
213
  Using the ―reasons for existence‖ approach, 
the court noted that X International BV did not have an 
office, personnel, or business activity. It found that the two 
managing directors of X International BV, who also acted 
as its sales managers, remained employees of X Marketing 
                                               
209 The Netherlands-Switzerland double tax treaty of 12 November 
1951, above n 206, art 9(2)(a)(ii). 
210 Arabian-group 1984, above n 205, at 292. 
211 X-group 1979, above n 207, at 278. 
212 Arabian-group 1984, above n 205, at 292. 
213 Ibid, at 293. 
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SA. They received their salaries exclusively from X 
Marketing SA. According to the court, X International BV 
failed to show that X International BV rendered any 
substantial services to K AG. 
The court pointed out that K AG and X International BV 
were incorporated within a short time of one another. It 
also considered the fact that, since the capital of X 
International BV was insufficient to subscribe for the 
shares of K AG, it borrowed from within the group. X 
International BV immediately forwarded the first dividend 
payment that it received from K AG to X Holding Co.  
The court, therefore, concluded that the relationship 
between X International BV and K AG was primarily 
established and maintained for obtaining the benefit of the 
full refund of Swiss withholding tax.
214
  
The point that emerges is that in the context of conduit 
companies, the arrangement as a whole may show reasons 
for the existence of an intermediary in the corporate 
structure. That is, the decision as to whether the 
interposition of the intermediary constitutes improper use 
of the convention can be based logically on this criterion.  
3.18. Conclusion 
The adoption of the ―reasons for existence‖ approach as an 
interpretation of the word ―beneficial‖ can be justified 
logically. The logic applied by Lord Denning to adopt the 
predication test seems to provide a foundation for the 
interpretation. The reasoning in Y-group 1990 and X-
group 1979 and corresponds to that of Lord Denning. 
These cases show that, as with the predication test, the 
―reasons for existence‖ approach considers the 
arrangement as a whole and determines whether the effect 
                                               
214  Arabian-group 1984, above n 205, at 295. 
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of the arrangement is consistent with the object and 
purpose of a double tax treaty. X-group 1979 in particular 
illustrates that, similar to the predication test, the ―reasons 
for existence‖ approach examines the means by which a 
taxpayer implements an arrangement, not his motive. 
Although these cases did not refer to the Newton case, 
their reasoning corresponds to that of the Privy Council. 
The reasoning of the Swiss courts in Re V SA and 
Arabian-group 1984 differs from that of Lord Denning for 
the reason that they referred to taxpayers‘ motive to avoid 
tax. However, their reasoning corresponds to that of Lord 
Denning to the extent that they decided the cases in the 
light of the object and purpose of double tax treaties, 
which is to limit tax benefits to residents of contracting 
states. Moreover, they considered the arrangement as a 
whole and did not specify a criterion for the beneficial 
ownership test to work.  
It is unclear from the judgments in Re V SA and 
Arabian-group 1984 whether evidence for the subjective 
intention of the taxpayer was produced. However, a court 
should consider all the available evidence. In some 
circumstances, the available evidence may include 
evidence as to the subjective intention of a taxpayer to 
avoid tax. When such evidence is available, there is no 
reason why a court should not consider it as a part of the 
whole matrix of facts for determining whether the 
arrangement contradicts the object and purpose of law.  
It is interesting, but not surprising, that the reasoning 
adopted by civil law courts in applying the ―reasons for 
existence‖ approach corresponds to that adopted by Lord 
Denning in the Newton case,
215
 which was decided in a 
                                               
215 L J Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1958) 98 CLR 1 
(Privy Council, Australia). 
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common law jurisdiction. The approach of these courts 
was clearly substance based. The point that emerges is that 
courts of both legal systems can validly adopt the ―reasons 
for existence‖ approach to resolve conduit company cases. 
The approach adopted by the Swiss Federal Tax 
Administration in X-group 1979 particularly corresponds 
to the predication test. As indicated earlier, this thesis will 
treat the administration‘s approach as a benchmark against 
which it will compare the surrogate tests in chapters 4 and 
5. These chapters will also test the plausibility of reasons 
for existence as an alternative approach by applying it to 
the analysed conduit company cases. 
Chapter 6 revisits certain cases that this chapter has 
analysed. It discusses the United States step transaction 
doctrine and a similar approach adopted by the Dutch 
courts for deciding conduit company cases. As with the 
application of the reasons for existence approach, when 
applying the step transaction doctrine, courts examine 
overt acts by the arrangement was implemented; however, 
when applying the step transaction doctrine, courts do not 
consider the arrangement in its entirety unlike the reason 
for existence approach. 
As with the surrogate tests the step transaction doctrine 
operates by a criterion; however, this thesis treats it 
differently from the surrogate tests. While surrogate tests 
use their criteria as qualifiers for beneficial ownership, the 
doctrine uses its criterion as a disqualifier. For example, 
when applying the substantive business activity test, courts 
regard the presence of a business activity as an indicator of 
the presence of beneficial ownership; whereas chapter 6 
will illustrate that in the step transaction doctrine courts 
consider the presence of a link between transactions to 
show the absence of beneficial ownership. Because this 
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point can be better understood in the light of the 
discussion of the surrogate tests, this thesis discusses the 
step transaction doctrine in chapter 6. 
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4.1. Introduction 
Section 2.30 categorised two surrogate tests that courts use 
in order to apply the beneficial ownership test. The 
substantive business activity test is one such test. As the 
name suggests, the test considers whether a company is 
involved in a substantive business activity. The test is also 
referred to as ―substantive business operations‖216 or 
simply ―economic activity‖.217 
Originally, courts developed the substantive business 
activity test as a substance over form rule for determining 
whether the law should recognise domestic ―straw 
companies‖ and foreign base companies as taxable entities 
separate from their shareholders. The OECD, courts, and 
the German legislature have extended the application of 
the test to decide cases of improper use of double tax 
conventions through conduit companies. These authorities, 
however, fail to apply the criterion of business activity as 
a test to conduit company cases in a logical manner. A 
conduit company case turns on the issue of whether an 
intermediary is the beneficial owner of passive income, or 
whether it should be classed as merely a conduit that 
                                               
216 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Double Taxation Conventions 
and the Use of Conduit Companies‖ in OECD Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs International Tax Avoidance and Evasion: Four Related 
Studies, Issues in International Taxation No 1 (OECD, Paris, 1987) 87 
at para 42(ii). 
217 Einkommensteuergesetz [EStG] [Income Tax Act], 16 October 1934 
RGBl I at 1005, § 50d, ¶ 3. 
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passes passive income on to persons who are not residents 
of contracting states. This chapter argues that business 
activity cannot be considered to be an indicator of 
beneficial ownership. With the help of case analysis, the 
chapter illustrates that although the absence of business 
activity shows that an interposed company lacks 
substance, its presence does not necessarily mean that a 
company cannot be characterised as a conduit.  
Despite the fundamental error of logic, courts have 
decided conduit company cases on the basis of the 
criterion of business activity. This chapter illustrates that 
in the process of treating business activity as a sufficient 
criterion, in some cases courts have in effect recognised 
tax avoidance as substantive business activity. 
4.2. The OECD on substantive business activity and 
beneficial ownership 
The Conduit Companies Report
218
 and the commentary on 
Article 1 of the OECD Model Convention
219
 refer to 
substantive business operations in terms of ―bona fide‖ 
provisions. Both the Conduit Companies Report and the 
commentary suggest limitation on benefits provisions that 
negotiators may include in double tax conventions as 
safeguards against conduit company schemes. 
In the provisions, the ―look-through approach‖220 uses 
ownership as a criterion, in addition to the criterion of 
                                               
218 The Conduit Companies Report, above n 216 at para 42(ii). 
219 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Commentary on Article 1 
concerning the Persons Covered by the Convention‖ in OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital (OECD, Paris, 2010) 64 at para 19(b). 
220 Ibid, at para 13. The Conduit Companies Report above n 216, at 
para 23. The look-through approach states: ―A company that is a 
resident of a Contracting State shall not be entitled to relief from 
taxation under this Convention with respect to any item of income, 
gains or profits if it is owned or controlled directly or through one or 
more companies, wherever resident, by persons who are not residents 
of a Contracting State.‖ 
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control. The ―subject-to-tax approach‖221 and the ―channel 
approach‖222 apply the concept of ―substantial interest‖. 
Although they do not define the concept, they seem to use 
it in the sense of ownership. The ―exclusion approach‖223 
does not consider the criterion of ownership at all. The 
point is that although the specific provisions do not use the 
term ―beneficial owner‖, most of them deploy the same 
principle that the term does, which is substantive 
economic ownership. 
                                               
221 Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD Model Convention, above n 
219, at para 15. The Conduit Company Companies Report above n 
216, at para 29. The subject-to-tax approach states ―Where income 
arising in a Contracting State is received by a company resident of the 
other Contracting State and one or more persons not resident in that 
other Contracting State 
a) have directly or indirectly or through one or more companies, 
wherever resident, a substantial interest in such company, in 
the form of a participation or otherwise, or 
b) exercise directly or indirectly, alone or together, the 
management or control of such company,  
any provision of this Convention conferring an exemption from, or a 
reduction of, tax shall apply only to income that is subject to tax in the 
last-mentioned State under the ordinary rules of its tax law.‖ 
222 Ibid, para 17. The Conduit Companies Report, above n 1, para 37. 
The channel approach states: ―Where income arising in a Contracting 
State is received by a company that is a resident of the other 
Contracting State and one or more persons who are not residents of 
that other Contracting State 
a) have directly or indirectly or through one or more companies, 
wherever resident, a substantial interest in such company, in 
the form of a participation or otherwise, or 
b) exercise directly or indirectly, alone or together, the 
management or control of such company  
any provision of this Convention conferring an exemption from, or a 
reduction of, tax shall not apply if more than 50 per cent of such 
income is used to satisfy claims by such persons (including interest, 
royalties, development, advertising, initial and travel expenses, and 
depreciation of any kind of business assets including those on 
immaterial goods and processes).‖ 
223
 The Conduit Companies Report, above n 216, at para 26. 
Taxpayers can create conduit structures by using tax-exempt 
companies, which may be distinguished by special legal 
characteristics. The exclusion approach prevents abuse of a treaty by 
denying treaty benefits to such companies.    
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These safeguard provisions against conduit companies 
are general in nature. Therefore, in order to ensure that 
treaty benefits are granted in bona fide cases, the Conduit 
Companies Report
224
 and the commentary
225
 recommend 
that ―bona fide‖ provisions should accompany the 
safeguard provisions. The ―activity provision‖, which is 
one of the bona fide provisions, provides that the 
safeguard provisions:
226
 
shall not apply where the company is engaged in 
substantive business operations in the Contracting State 
of which it is a resident and the relief from taxation 
claimed from the other Contracting State is with respect 
to income that is connected with such operations. 
By overriding the safeguard provisions that apply the 
criterion of substantive economic ownership, the ―activity 
provision‖ effectively overrides the beneficial ownership 
test. That is, by implication it treats the criterion of 
business activity as decisive. 
Moreover, paragraph 119 of the 1998 report of the 
OECD on harmful tax competition
227
 states that companies 
with no economic function incorporated in tax havens can 
be denied treaty benefits because these companies are not 
considered to be beneficial owners of certain income 
formally attributed to them. The statement suggests that 
the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs considers that there 
is a causal relationship between business activity and 
beneficial ownership. However, that cause and effect 
relationship does not make sense. Even if the beneficial 
                                               
224 The Conduit Companies Report, above n 216, at para 42. 
225 Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD Model Convention, above n 
219, at para 19. 
226 The Conduit Companies Report, above n 216, at para 42(ii). See 
also Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD Model Convention, above 
n 219, at para 19(b). 
227 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs International Harmful Tax 
Competition an Emerging Global Issue (OECD, Paris, 1998), at para 
119. 
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ownership test is accorded a legalistic interpretation, the 
mere absence of business activity does not logically 
prevent a person from owning anything any more than its 
presence necessarily implies the existence of ownership. 
The Swiss case of A Holding ApS v Federal Tax 
Administration
228
 illustrates the foregoing points.   
4.3. A Holding ApS v Federal Tax Administration 
This case involved a group of companies that was 
controlled by Mr. E, an individual resident in Bermuda. 
Mr. E was the director of D Ltd, a Bermudan corporation, 
which held all the shares in C Ltd, a subsidiary company 
resident in the Channel Islands. C Ltd wholly owned A 
Holding ApS, a Danish holding company, which will be 
referred to as A Holding. A Holding was the taxpayer. It 
acquired the entire issued share capital of F AG, a Swiss 
company. A Holding did not have its own offices or staff 
in Denmark and had no entries for assets, leasing or 
personnel expenditure in its books. F AG distributed 
dividends to A Holding, which were subjected to 35 per 
cent withholding tax under Swiss domestic tax law. 
 
                                               
228 A Holding ApS v Federal Tax Administration (2005) 8 ITLR 536 
(The Federal Court, Switzerland). 
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Figure 4.1: A Holding ApS v Federal Tax Administration 
A Holding applied for a refund of the withholding tax 
under Article 26(2) of the Switzerland-Denmark double 
tax treaty of 23 November 1973.
229
 The Swiss Federal Tax 
Administration and the Higher Tax Administration 
rejected A Holding‘s application. 
Since the Switzerland-Denmark double tax treaty did 
not have a beneficial ownership provision,
230
 both courts 
applied the abuse of law doctrine. They found that A 
Holding did not carry out a real economic activity. They, 
                                               
229 Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income and 
Capital, Denmark–Switzerland (23 November 1973, entered into force 
1 January 1974), art 26(2). It provides, ―… the tax withheld (at the 
source) shall be reimbursed upon application, in so far as the levying 
thereof is restricted by the Agreement.‖ 
230 The beneficial ownership requirement was introduced to the 
Switzerland-Denmark double tax treaty in August 2009. 
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therefore, held that A Holding was interposed solely for 
the purpose of obtaining benefits of the treaty. The Higher 
Tax Administration, however, considered A Holding to be 
the beneficial owner. The Swiss Federal Court confirmed 
the decision of the Higher Tax Administration and 
explained its reasons for applying the abuse of law 
doctrine and the substantive business activity test. 
4.4. Beneficial ownership and the abuse of law 
doctrine 
In appeal before the Swiss Federal Court, A Holding 
argued that in the absence of an anti-abuse provision from 
the Switzerland-Denmark double tax treaty, the abuse of 
law doctrine could not be construed into the treaty. A 
Holding also contended that the fact that it was the 
beneficial owner of the dividend (as found by the Higher 
Tax Administration) was sufficient to exclude the 
application of the abuse of law doctrine.
231
 A Holding‘s 
submissions seem to accept impliedly that the beneficial 
ownership test and the predication test address the same 
issue. 
The Federal Court rejected A Holding‘s first argument 
and interpreted the Switzerland-Denmark double tax treaty 
in accordance with Articles 26,
232
 and 31(1)
233
 of the 
Vienna Convention. It was of the opinion that prohibition 
of abuse forms part of the principle of good faith.
234
 In 
order to ascertain the aim and purpose of the Switzerland-
                                               
231 A Holding ApS v Federal Tax Administration, above n 228, 554. 
232 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969, entered 
into force 27 January 1980), art 26. It states: ―Every treaty in force is 
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good 
faith.‖ 
233 Ibid, art 31(1). It states: ―A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith 
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.‖ 
234 A Holding ApS v Federal Tax Administration, above n 228, at 557. 
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Denmark double tax treaty, the court referred to the 
official commentary on Article 1 of the OECD Model 
Convention of 2003
235
 and held that states do not have to 
allow treaty benefits if the arrangement chosen by the 
taxpayer constitutes abuse of the convention.
236
 That is, 
the court found the abuse of law doctrine to be consistent 
with the aim and purpose of the OECD Model Convention. 
In essence, the court read the abuse of law doctrine into 
double tax treaties. 
The Federal Court rejected A Holding‘s second 
contention and observed:
237
 
Although the Higher Tax Administration has regarded 
[A Holding] as the beneficial owner of the dividends in 
accordance with art 10 [of the Switzerland-Denmark 
double tax treaty] one can assume an abuse. The 
assumptions of the court of lower instance were based 
on the fact that the distributed dividends are in principle 
attributable to [A Holding] for taxation in Denmark … ; 
this does not answer the question whether the 
convention was invoked abusively … . 
As discussed in section 3.10, the reasoning of the Swiss 
Federal Commission of Appeal in Tax Matters shows that 
the term ―beneficial owner‖ codifies the abuse of law 
doctrine.
238
 The observation suggests, however, that the 
Swiss Federal Court distinguished the meaning if between 
the beneficial ownership test and the domestic anti-abuse 
principle. The court distinguished the meaning of 
beneficial owner for legal purposes from its meaning for 
the purposes of double tax treaties. The Higher Tax 
Administration considered A Holding to be the beneficial 
                                               
235 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Commentary on Article 1 
concerning the Persons Covered by the Convention‖ in OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital (OECD, Paris, 2003) 49 at para 9.4. 
236
 A Holding ApS v Federal Tax Administration, above n 228, at 558. 
237 Ibid, at 559. 
238 Re V SA (2001) 4 ITLR 191 (The Federal Commission of Appeal in 
Tax Matters, Switzerland). 
Effectiveness of the Beneficial Ownership Test in Conduit Company Cases 
126 
 
owner because the dividends were in principle attributable 
to A Holding. The reasoning of the Higher Tax 
Administration corresponds to conventional legal 
perspective on the application of the beneficial ownership 
test to companies. When the Swiss Federal Court agreed 
with the reasoning of the Higher Tax Administration, it 
applied the beneficial ownership test legalistically.  
4.5. Beneficial ownership and the substantive business 
activity test 
Since the treaty had no anti-abuse provision, the Federal 
Court implemented the abuse of law doctrine using the 
―look-through‖ provision,239 which it referred to as the 
―transparency provision‖.240 It noted that the corporate 
structure allowed Mr. E to control not only D Ltd, but also 
A Holding. According to the court, in these circumstances 
allowing a refund to A Holding would have meant 
granting the refund to Mr. E.
241
 
As explained in section 4.2, due to the general nature of 
the limitation on benefits provisions against conduit 
companies, the OECD Model Convention recommends that 
these provisions should be drafted also into double tax 
agreements with ―bona fide‖ provisions. The Federal 
Court relied on the ―activity provision‖ and observed:242 
If the convention does not contain an explicit anti-abuse 
provision-[as] in the present case-an abuse can, based 
on the transparency provision, only be assumed if [A 
Holding] additionally does not carry out a real economic 
activity or an active business activity … 
It follows that the objection of an abuse of a 
convention is unfounded if the company demonstrates 
that its main purpose, its management and the 
acquisition as well as the holding of participations and 
                                               
239 Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD Model Convention of 2003, 
above n 235, at para 13. 
240 A Holding ApS v Federal Tax Administration, above n 228, at 560. 
241 Ibid. 
242 Ibid (emphasis added). 
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other assets from which the income in question arises is 
primarily based on valid economic grounds and not 
aimed at the obtaining of advantages of the applicable 
double tax convention ([the] so called ‗bona-fide‘ 
provision). The same applies if the company pursues 
effectively a commercial activity in its state of residence 
and the tax relief claimed in the other contracting state 
relates to income connected to this activity (so called 
activity-provision). 
The court found that A Holding was not engaged in a 
business activity and held, therefore, that A Holding was 
not entitled to the withholding tax refund under the 
Switzerland-Denmark double tax treaty. In the process of 
applying the abuse of law doctrine, the court chose 
effectively to base its decision on the criterion of business 
activity. That is, the court considered substantive business 
activity to be a surrogate of the abuse of law doctrine. 
As discussed in section 4.4, the court applied the 
beneficial ownership test in a formal legalist sense and 
considered the abuse of law doctrine separately from the 
beneficial ownership test. It follows that the court 
considered beneficial ownership (which it found to be 
present) and substantive business activity (which it found 
independently to be absent) to be two different tests. The 
reasoning supports the point that the criterion of business 
activity does not relate causally to ownership, even if the 
beneficial ownership test is interpreted in a legalistic 
sense.  
4.6. Is business activity a sufficient criterion for 
deciding conduit company cases? 
As discussed earlier, when the court applied the look-
through approach, it used the activity provision as a bona 
fide provision. In the observation quoted in section 4.5, the 
Federal Court used the phrase ―can … only be assumed 
if‖.243 The usage shows that the court treated business 
                                               
243 A Holding ApS v Federal Tax Administration, above n 228, at 560. 
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activity as if it were a sufficient criterion for determining 
whether an intermediary could be considered to function 
as a mere conduit. The observation confirms the point that 
the activity provision implies that substantive business 
activity is a decisive criterion for determining whether an 
interposed company is a conduit.   
The business activity test led the Swiss Federal Court to 
a correct conclusion because A Holding, as a conduit 
company, was not involved in a business activity. It does 
not, however, make sense to base the decision of a conduit 
company case solely on the business activity criterion 
because the presence of business activity does not 
necessarily show that an interposed company should not 
be categorised as a conduit company.  
The point is that, although business activity may be a 
useful element of the substance over form approach 
embodied in the abuse of rights doctrine, in conduit 
company cases it is hard to arrive at a logical conclusion 
on the basis of the presence or absence of this element. 
Notwithstanding this fundamental error of logic, courts 
have considered substantive business activity to be a 
sufficient criterion for deciding conduit company cases. 
For this reason, it becomes important to examine the 
reasoning underlying their decisions. 
4.7. Is substantive business activity originally a test 
for deciding conduit company cases? 
Substantive business activity was originally not a test for 
conduit company cases. Courts in general developed the 
substantive business activity test as a substance over form 
test for deciding cases involving foreign ―base 
companies‖. The United States courts, in particular, have 
also applied the test for determining tax issues that arise in 
cases involving domestic ―straw companies‖. These cases 
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tend to turn on the issue of whether a base company, or a 
straw company, should be treated as a taxable entity 
separate from its shareholders. Courts have decided the 
issue on the basis of the business activity of a company. 
Consequently, they treat business activity as a sufficient 
criterion in both base company cases and straw company 
cases. 
Tax planning schemes involving base companies and 
straw companies specifically could misleadingly resemble 
conduit company cases in the context of company 
structures employed by taxpayers to obtain tax advantages. 
For this reason, courts have transposed the application of 
the substantive business activity test from straw company 
cases and base company cases to conduit company cases. 
However, they have failed to recognise that a conduit 
company case turns on a completely different issue that 
cannot be determined solely on the basis of the substantive 
business activity test. Before explaining the distinction, it 
is helpful to describe straw companies and base 
companies. 
4.8. Straw corporations 
In the United States, the terms ―straw corporations‖ or 
―nominee corporations‖ represent companies that are used 
for non-tax reasons in business transactions usually related 
to real estate. A straw corporation merely holds legal title 
to a property. Its shareholders, or a third party, own the 
property beneficially. 
Non-tax reasons for employing a straw corporation may 
include: avoidance of personal liability for loans obtained 
to acquire, improve or refinance property in real estate 
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ventures;
244
 protection from the claims of creditors of the 
beneficial owners of the property transferred to the 
corporation;
245
 facilitation of management or conveyance 
of property owned by a group of investors;
246
 and 
concealment of the identity of the beneficial owners of 
property.
247
 
In the United States, beneficial owners of the property 
of straw corporations anticipate that courts will ignore the 
existence of the company, or will recognise its agency 
status in order to attribute income, gain or losses. If courts 
treat a straw corporation as a viable separate taxable 
entity, adverse tax consequence may occur. For instance, 
property dealings between the corporation and its 
shareholders may result in taxable gains or losses of 
holding periods, or income and losses from the property 
may be attributed to the corporation during the time it 
holds the property, and the shareholders may not be able 
to deduct those losses when they eventually receive the 
income. 
In an effort to escape adverse tax consequences, 
taxpayers argue that courts should disregard the straw 
corporation for tax purposes on the basis that the 
corporation‘s activities are not sufficient to warrant its 
treatment as a separate taxable entity.
248
 Thus, in order to 
                                               
244 For example Bruce L. Schlosberg v United States of America 
(1981) 81-1 USTC (CCH) P9272. 
245 For example Moline Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue 319 US 436 (1943). 
246 For example Roccaforte v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue  77 
TC 263 (1981). 
247 For example Jones v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 640 F 2d 
745 (5th Cir 1981). 
248 For example National Carbide Corp v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue 336 US 422 (1949). Taxpayers may accept the existence of 
the corporations as a separate tax entity, but argue that the straw 
corporation acts on their behalf as an agent. 
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determine whether a straw corporation should be 
recognised as a separate taxable entity, courts investigate 
the nature of the corporation‘s activities. That is, courts 
apply the substantive business activity test. 
4.9. Difference between straw corporations cases and 
conduit company cases 
Both straw corporations and conduit companies pass on 
their income as legal owners to their shareholders, who are 
generally the beneficial owners. For this reason, the two 
situations may look similar at first glance. They involve, 
however, two very different issues. 
In straw corporation cases, courts are aware that a straw 
corporation is not the beneficial owner of the company‘s 
property. The issue is, rather, whether a corporation exists 
as a taxable entity separate from its shareholder, so that 
the corporation can be regarded as the recipient of the 
income. In contrast, in conduit company cases, courts are 
not concerned with the separate entity of a corporation 
incorporated in a foreign jurisdiction. The issue is whether 
the corporation owns passive income beneficially.  
Since in straw company cases courts apply the 
substantive business activity test to determine whether a 
corporation is the recipient of income, rather than whether 
a corporation is the beneficial owner, it could be inferred 
that they apply the test in a formal legalistic sense.  
Courts in conduit company cases also decide in effect 
either to ignore or to recognise the existence of an 
intermediary corporation for tax purposes; however, this 
decision is a consequence of the application of the 
beneficial ownership test. In straw company cases, on the 
other hand, this decision is a result of the application of 
the substantive business activity test.  
Effectiveness of the Beneficial Ownership Test in Conduit Company Cases 
132 
 
Section 4.16 illustrates these arguments with the help of 
a comparison between Northern Indiana Public Service 
Company v Commissioner of Internal Revenue
249
 and 
Moline Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue.
250
 
The point is that the presence of a substantive business 
activity may be sufficient to treat a corporation as a 
taxable entity separate from its shareholder; however, as 
explained in section 4.2, neither is substantive business 
activity an indicator of beneficial ownership, nor does its 
presence alone suggest that an intermediary is not acting 
as a mere conduit. That is why, although this test may be 
an appropriate determinant for straw company cases, it is 
in fact inappropriate for deciding conduit company cases. 
4.10. Base companies 
Base companies are predominantly situated in a low-tax or 
no-tax country, typically a tax haven. They are used for 
sheltering income that would otherwise accrue directly to 
the taxpayer, thereby reducing taxes in the taxpayer‘s 
home country.
251
 Although the main function of a base 
company is to avoid domestic tax law of the taxpayer‘s 
home country, a base company may also be employed for 
improper use of tax treaties. The taxpayer that establishes 
a base company for the improper use of a tax treaty in a 
contracting state may be the resident of the other 
                                               
249 Northern Indiana Public Service Company v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue  105 TC 341 (1995). 
250 Moline Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 319 US 
436 (1943). 
251 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Double Taxation Conventions 
and the Use of Base Companies‖ in OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs 
International Tax Avoidance and Evasion: Four Related Studies, 
Issues in International Taxation No 1 (OECD, Paris, 1987) 60 at para 1. 
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contracting state,
252
 or may be a resident of a third state. 
The consideration in the latter scheme is the treaty 
network of the tax haven country where the base company 
is located. 
Although most tax havens have either a very limited 
treaty network or none at all, favourable treaties with 
major industrial countries do exist that allow domestic 
withholding tax rates to be reduced or eliminated. This 
partial or full exemption results in substantial tax savings. 
Taxation of this income is then avoided through a 
phenomenon called ―secondary sheltering‖,253 which 
involves changing the character of the income to make use 
of the exemption provided for under tax treaties or 
domestic rules in the taxpayer‘s country of residence. The 
nature of the income can also be changed by the use of 
other techniques, such as ―reploughing‖ the income by 
loans to the shareholder, or alienating a holding in the base 
company to realise the capital gain that may be exempted 
or taxed at a lower rate.
254
 
A base company is able to shelter income from taxation 
in the resident state by virtue of the fact that it exists as a 
legal entity separate from the taxpayer. Thus, income that 
it collects no longer falls under the normal worldwide 
taxation regime of the resident state. The taxpayer, 
                                               
252 See the decision of the Bundesfinanzhof of 5 March 1986, IR 
2001/82, published in the Official Tax Gazette, Part II, 1986 at 496. 
See also Rijkele Betten ―Abuse of Law: Treaty Shopping through the 
Use of Base companies‖ (1986) ET 323. 
253 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Tax Havens: Measures to 
Prevent Abuse by Taxpayers‖ in OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs 
International Tax Avoidance and Evasion: Four Related Studies, 
Issues in International Taxation No 1 (OECD, Paris, 1987) 20 at para 
27. 
254 Ibid. 
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therefore, is not liable to pay tax in its home state on 
income received by the base company.
255
 
4.11. Why is substantive business activity a test for 
base company cases? 
In order to prevent tax avoidance through base companies, 
some countries have enacted controlled foreign company 
legislation. In addition, courts also apply general anti-
avoidance rules, or judicial anti-avoidance doctrines such 
as the abuse of law doctrine in civil law jurisdictions and 
the substance over form approach in common law states. 
Courts in the United States in particular have applied 
judicial doctrines such as the business purpose test and the 
sham transaction doctrine in order to decide base company 
cases.
256
 
As mentioned in section 4.10, a base company is able 
to shelter income from tax in the resident state because the 
base company is an entity in its own right and is 
recognised as such in the resident country.
257
 For this 
reason, taxpayers in base company cases are often taxed 
on the ―piercing of the corporate veil‖ approach.258 Cases 
that involve the application of this approach turn on the 
issue of whether a base company can be disregarded for 
tax purposes so that its activity, or the income derived 
from the activity, may be attributed to the taxpayer. A 
taxpayer often claims that the income that the base 
company receives is derived with respect to a substantive 
business activity and, therefore, cannot be attributed to the 
taxpayer. Courts, therefore, ascertain the nature of the 
                                               
255 The Base Companies Report, above n 251, at para 10. 
256 See also Daniel Sandler Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign 
Company Legislation: Pushing the Boundaries (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 1998) at 8. 
257 The Base Companies Report, above n 251, at para10. 
258 See also ibid, at para 24. 
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activities of the base company by applying the substantive 
business activity test. They attribute income of the base 
company to the taxpayer if they find that the activity of the 
base company is nothing more than simply receipt of 
passive income that would have directly accrued to the 
taxpayer. 
4.12. Difference between base company cases and 
conduit company cases 
Base company cases involving parties from more than two 
jurisdictions may appear to be similar to conduit company 
cases in two respects. First, the company structures are 
similar. Second, in both cases the income accrues in an 
economic sense to the taxpayer in the resident country. 
Therefore, courts in both cases effectively decide the 
question of whether the income of the intermediary can be 
attributed to the taxpayer. These similarities may well be 
the reasons why courts apply the substantive business 
activity test to conduit company cases.  
Notwithstanding the apparent similarities, it is 
inappropriate to draw an analogy between base company 
and conduit company cases because there are subtle but 
crucial differences. 
As mentioned in section 4.10, a base company seeks to 
minimise tax in the country of the residence of a taxpayer 
that is also its shareholder. It shelters income from the 
normal taxation of worldwide income in the taxpayer‘s 
residence state. In the process, it circumvents the domestic 
tax law of the residence state. For this reason, courts of the 
residence state decide a base company case in accordance 
with their domestic tax law. By contrast, a conduit 
company secures tax benefits in the country of the source 
of passive income. It minimises tax by improper use of the 
double tax treaty that limits the source state‘s right to 
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impose withholding tax. That is why courts of the source 
state decide a conduit company case in accordance with 
treaty law. 
Although courts adopt the substance over form 
approach for deciding both kinds of cases, treaty law 
functions in a different context from domestic tax law. 
Treaty law applies the beneficial ownership test in order to 
ensure that an intermediary that is a resident of a 
contracting state by virtue of its incorporation enjoys the 
passive income and does not pass it on to residents of a 
third state. That is, the beneficial ownership test operates 
with the object and purpose of limiting treaty benefits to 
residents of contracting states. However, the application of 
the substantive business activity test to base company 
cases does not have such an object and purpose. 
Thus, although an intermediary that has a business 
activity can satisfy the substantive requirement of the 
domestic tax law applicable to a base company case, such 
an intermediary may not necessarily fulfil the object and 
purpose of a double tax treaty in a conduit company case. 
An intermediary that carries out substantive business 
activity may still act as a conduit to pass on passive 
income to the resident of a third state. 
In other words, just because a base company case has 
been decided in favour of an intermediary on the basis of 
the company‘s business activity, it does not follow that a 
case that involves a conduit company that carries on a 
substantive business activity should also be decided in 
favour of the intermediary. That is, it is illogical to draw 
an analogy between base company cases and conduit 
company cases. 
Nonetheless, courts have taken this quantum leap in 
conduit company cases. Northern Indiana Public Service 
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Company v Commissioner of Internal Revenue is a good 
example.
259
 
4.13. Northern Indiana Public Service Company v 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue  
The Northern Indiana case
260
 involved Northern Indiana, a 
United States company that wished to raise funds on the 
Eurobond market. If Northern Indiana had borrowed funds 
directly from the Eurobond market, it would have to 
withhold United States withholding tax at the statutory 
rate on interest payments to the Eurobond holders. The 
interest payments minus the withholding tax would have 
made Northern Indiana‘s offer less attractive in the 
competitive Eurobond market. 
Article VIII(1) of the United States-Netherlands double 
tax treaty of 29 April 1948,
261
 which extended to the 
Netherlands Antilles, provided for a withholding tax 
exemption on United States sourced interest paid to 
corporations in the Netherlands Antilles. Moreover, the 
Netherlands Antilles charged no tax on interest, whether 
flowing inwards to residents, or out to non-residents. 
Therefore, in order to avoid paying United States 
withholding tax, Northern Indiana established a wholly 
owned Antillean subsidiary, which will be referred to as 
Finance. Subsequently, Northern Indiana issued 
                                               
259 Northern Indiana Public Service Company v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue 105 TC 341 (1995). Northern Indiana Public Service 
Company v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 115 F 3d 506 (7th Cir 
1997). 
260 Northern Indiana Public Service Company v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, above n 259. 
261 Supplementary Convention Modifying and Supplementing the 
Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Certain other 
Taxes, United States–the Netherlands (30 December 1965, entered 
into force 8 July 1966). The relevant part of art VIII(1) provides: 
―Interest on bonds, notes, … paid to a resident or corporation of one 
of the Contracting States shall be exempt from tax by the other 
Contracting State.‖ 
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Eurobonds through Finance. Finance borrowed money 
from Eurobond holders and on-lent the money to Northern 
Indiana. The interest rate at which Finance lent money to 
Northern Indiana was one percent higher than that at 
which Finance borrowed money from Eurobond holders. 
Consequently, Finance earned a profit, which it invested to 
produce more income. Northern Indiana liquidated 
Finance after it repaid the principal amount with the 
interest to Eurobond holders through Finance. 
Northern Indiana
Finance
Bondholders
Loans
Loans
18.25 % 
Interest
17.25%
Interest
100%
Bonds
USA
The Netherlands Antilles
Other Jurisdictions
Ownership
 
Figure 4.2: The Northern Indiana case 
Northern Indiana did not deduct withholding tax from 
interest payments to Finance. The Commissioner issued a 
notice of deficiency to Northern Indiana, making it liable 
to pay the tax that it did not withhold. 
Substantive Business Activity 
139 
 
It was undisputed that Northern Indiana structured its 
transactions with Finance in order to obtain a withholding 
tax exemption under the United States-Netherlands double 
tax treaty.
262
 The Commissioner argued that Finance was a 
mere ―conduit‖ or agent in the borrowing and interest 
paying process, and, therefore, Finance should be ignored 
for tax purposes, and Northern Indiana should be viewed 
as having paid interest directly to the Eurobond holders. 
The United States Tax Court observed: ―Normally, a 
choice to transact business in corporate form will be 
recognized for tax purposes so long as there is a business 
purpose or the corporation engages in business 
activity.‖263 According to the court, since Finance was 
involved in the business activity of borrowing and lending 
money at a profit, it should be recognised as the recipient 
of interest payments from Northern Indiana.
264
 The court, 
therefore, held that the interest payments were exempt 
from United States withholding tax. The Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit agreed with the Tax Court. It could 
be inferred that the Tax Court based its decision on the 
substantive business activity criterion. 
4.14. Northern Indiana: an illogical analogy  
The Tax Court considered substantive business activity as 
a sufficient criterion because it drew an analogy with 
straw company and base company cases that were decided 
on the basis of the substantive business activity test. It 
seemed to have confused the facts of the Northern Indiana 
case for the following two reasons. 
                                               
262 Northern Indiana Public Service Company v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue 115 F 3d 506, 511 (7th Cir 1997). 
263 Northern Indiana Public Service Company v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue 105 TC 341(1995) at 347. 
264 Ibid, at 348. 
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First, according to the Tax Court, similar to a straw 
company, Finance was created for a business purpose, 
namely ―to borrow money in Europe and then lend money 
to [Northern Indiana] in order to comply with the 
requirements of prospective creditors‖.265 This similarity, 
however, did not alter the fact that Eurobond holders, 
rather than Northern Indiana, were the beneficial owners 
of the interest payments. Moreover, the case involved the 
application of the law of a double tax treaty, rather than 
the United States domestic tax law. The court, therefore, 
should have analysed the facts in the light of the object 
and purpose of a double tax agreement.  
Second, as with a taxpayer in a base company scheme, 
Northern Indiana established a foreign subsidiary to avoid 
tax in the United States, the country of its residence. This 
similarity, however, did not change the fact that Northern 
Indiana was a source company and it interposed Finance 
to obtain a reduction of United States withholding tax 
under the United States-Netherlands double tax treaty on 
passive income that flowed out of the United States. 
Moreover, Eurobond holders, rather than Northern 
Indiana, were ultimately better off as the result of the 
being made interest payments without deduction of United 
States withholding tax. This argument applies even though 
Finance was not related to Eurobond holders. For this 
reason, the Northern Indiana case was a conduit company 
case and not a base company case. 
As a result of drawing the analogy, the Tax Court 
analysed the facts within the wrong frame of reference. 
This point can be better illustrated by comparing the 
Northern Indiana case with some of the judgments 
                                               
265 Ibid, at 354. 
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referred to by the court in the case. Moline Properties Inc 
v Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
266
 a straw 
corporation case, and Hospital Corporation of America v 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
267
 a base company 
case were two of those cases. 
The following sections discuss Moline Properties and 
Hospital Corporation of America for the purpose of 
differentiating them from the Northern Indiana case. The 
discussion shows that substantive business activity cannot 
be considered to be a sufficient criterion for deciding 
conduit company cases. 
4.15. Moline Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue 
In the Moline Properties case,
268
 Mr. Thompson 
mortgaged his property to borrow money to make an 
investment. The investment proved unprofitable. 
Thompson‘s creditors advised him to incorporate Moline 
Properties Inc, which will be referred to as Moline, in 
order to serve as a security device for the property. He 
conveyed the property to Moline in return for all of its 
shares. Moline also assumed the outstanding mortgage. 
Thompson then transferred the shares as collateral to a 
trust controlled by his creditors. 
Until Thompson repaid the original loans, Moline‘s 
activity consisted of assuming one of Thompson‘s 
obligations to the original creditors, defending Moline‘s 
proceedings, and instituting a suit to remove prior 
restrictions on the property. After Thompson satisfied the 
                                               
266 Moline Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 319 US 
436 (1943). 
267 Hospital Corporation of America v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue 81 TC 520 (1983). 
268 Moline Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, above 
n 266, at 436. 
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mortgage and gained control over Moline, Moline entered 
into several transactions involving the property, which 
included mortgaging, leasing and finally selling the 
property. Moline kept no books and maintained no bank 
account. Thompson received the proceeds from the sale, 
which he deposited into his bank account. Although 
initially Moline reported the gain on sale of the property 
on its income tax return, Thompson filed a claim for a 
refund on Moline‘s behalf and reported the gain on his 
individual tax return. 
The issue before the United States Supreme Court was 
whether the gain from the sale was attributable to Moline. 
In order to answer the question, the court considered 
whether Moline should be disregarded for tax purposes. 
The court observed:
269
 
The doctrine of corporate entity fills a useful purpose in 
business life. Whether the purpose be to gain an 
advantage under the law of the state of incorporation or 
to avoid or to comply with the demands of creditors or 
to serve the creator's personal or undisclosed 
convenience, so long as that purpose is the equivalent of 
business activity or is followed by the carrying on of 
business by the corporation, the corporation remains a 
separate taxable entity. 
According to the court, Moline‘s activities were sufficient 
to recognise it as a taxable entity separate from Thompson. 
Based on this opinion, it attributed the gain on sales to 
Moline. 
4.16. Difference between Northern Indiana and Moline 
Properties 
It is hard to rely logically on Moline Properties for 
deciding Northern Indiana on the basis of the substantive 
business activity test. The court in Moline Properties was 
aware that Mr. Thompson was the beneficial owner of the 
                                               
269 Moline Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, above 
n 266, at 438. 
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property and of the income from the sale of the property. It 
was concerned with the issue of whether Moline received 
the income as a taxable entity separate from Thompson. 
The presence of business activity, therefore, was sufficient 
to ascertain that Moline existed as a separate taxable 
entity. By contrast, in Northern Indiana, it was clear that 
Finance was the recipient of the interest payments. The 
issue in Northern Indiana should have been whether 
Finance was the beneficial owner of the interest and was 
therefore entitled to treaty benefits, or whether Finance 
was acting as a mere conduit. Nevertheless, the conclusion 
of the Tax Court in Northern Indiana shows that it focused 
on the issue of whether Finance was conducting the 
business of receiving and paying interest payments.
270
  
Northern Indiana dealt with Article VIII(1) of the 
United States-Netherlands double tax treaty. Although the 
provision did not use the term ―beneficial owner‖,271 the 
focal issue should have been whether Finance was the 
substantive economic owner of the interest payments. That 
is, although the context of the double tax treaty required 
the court to interpret the provision from a substantive 
economic perspective, the court in fact interpreted it in a 
formal legalistic sense.  
The Tax Court observed: ―Moline Properties, Inc. v. 
Commissioner … stands for the general proposition that a 
choice to do business in corporate form will result in 
                                               
270 Northern Indiana Public Service Company v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, above n 263, at 348. 
271 Supplementary Convention Modifying and Supplementing the 
Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Certain other Taxes 
(30 December 1965, entered into force 8 July 1966). The relevant part 
of art VIII(1) provides: ―Interest on bonds, notes, … paid to a resident 
or corporation of one of the Contracting States shall be exempt from 
tax by the other Contracting State.‖ 
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taxing business profits at the corporate level.‖272 As 
discussed in section 2.15, according to the legal 
perspective income tax should be levied at the level of the 
corporation and not at the level of shareholders. The 
foregoing observation confirms that the court in Northern 
Indiana interpreted the treaty provision and analysed the 
facts in a formal legalistic sense because it drew an 
analogy with straw company cases.      
4.17. Hospital Corporation of America v Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue
273
 
As mentioned in section 4.14, the Tax Court in Northern 
Indiana also referred to Hospital Corporation of America, 
a base company case. In this case, the Hospital 
Corporation of America, which will be referred to as 
Hospital Corporation, entered into a management contract 
with King Faisal Specialist Hospital in Saudi Arabia. 
Hospital Corporation established the following corporate 
structure. 
Hospital Corporation incorporated Hospital Corp 
International Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary, in the 
Cayman Islands. Hospital Corp International Ltd held all 
the shares in Hospital Corporation of the Middle East Ltd, 
which will be referred to as Middle East Ltd, also a 
resident in the Cayman Islands. Middle East Ltd and 
Hospital Corporation had the same officers and directors. 
Middle East Ltd did not have its own office. It shared the 
office address of a law firm that prepared its incorporation 
documents. Hospital Corporation decided to administer 
                                               
272 Northern Indiana Public Service Company v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, above n 270, at 351. 
273 Hospital Corporation of America v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, above n 267. 
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the management contract through Middle East Ltd, which 
then acted as a base company. 
 
Hospital Corporation
Middle East Ltd
King Faisal Specialist
Hospital
USA
The Cayman Islands
Saudi Arabia
100%
Management
contract
Income
Ownership
Hospital Corp
International Ltd
100%
 
Figure 4.3: The Hospital Corporation of America case 
The issues before the court were whether Middle East 
Ltd was a sham corporation that should not be recognised 
for tax purposes, and whether its income was attributable 
to Hospital Corporation under section 482 of the Internal 
Revenue Code.
274
  
                                               
274
 Internal Revenue Code 26 USC § 482. It provides that the Secretary 
of the Treasury may allocate gross income, deductions and credits 
between or among two or more taxpayers owned or controlled by the 
same interests in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly reflect 
income of a controlled taxpayer. 
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The United States Tax Court found that Middle East 
Ltd ―carried out some minimal amount of business 
activity‖.275 The court observed:276 
[Middle East Ltd] possessed the ―salient features of 
corporate organization.‖…. [Middle East Ltd] was 
properly organized under the Companies Law of the 
Cayman Islands. In 1973, [Middle East Ltd] issued 
stock, elected directors and officers, had regular and 
special meetings of directors, had meetings of 
shareholders, maintained bank accounts and invested 
funds, had at least one non-officer employee, paid some 
expenses, and, with substantial assistance from 
[Hospital Corporation], prepared in 1973 to perform and 
in subsequent years did perform the [King Faisal 
Specialist Hospital] management contract. All of these 
are indicative of business activity. 
The court was of the opinion that the quantum of business 
activity needed for a company to be recognised as a 
separate taxable entity ―may be rather minimal‖.277 It held, 
therefore, that Middle East Ltd was not a sham corporation 
and had to be recognised for the purpose of Federal 
income tax. However, the court held that 75 per cent of the 
net income of Middle East Ltd was allocable to Hospital 
Corporation because Hospital Corporation performed 
substantial services for Middle East Ltd without being 
paid. 
4.18. Difference between Northern Indiana and 
Hospital Corporation of America 
It does not make sense to rely on the reasoning of the 
Hospital Corporation of America case for deciding 
Northern Indiana. In Hospital Corporation of America, 
the court used the substantive business activity criterion to 
determine whether Middle East Ltd existed as a sham, or 
whether the company should be recognised as a separate 
                                               
275 Hospital Corporation of America v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue above n 267, at 584. 
276 Hospital Corporation of America v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue above n 267, at 584. 
277 Ibid, at 579. 
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entity for tax purposes. The activities that the court 
considered to be business activities seemed nothing more 
than those that necessarily preserve the existence of a 
corporation. The court was primarily concerned with the 
existence of Middle East Ltd as a separate taxable entity. 
For this reason, a minimal amount of activity was 
sufficient to satisfy the substantive requirement. By 
contrast, in Northern Indiana, the issue was whether 
Finance received income in principle on its own behalf, or 
whether it functioned as a mere conduit.  
Unlike Northern Indiana, Hospital Corporation of 
America did not concern a double tax treaty, and therefore, 
was not decided in the context of the object and purpose of 
a double tax treaty. The court in Hospital Corporation of 
America applied the sham transaction doctrine in the 
context of the United States domestic tax law and found 
that the presence of business activity indicated sufficiently 
that Middle East Ltd was not a sham. On the other hand, 
Northern Indiana concerned the United States-
Netherlands double tax treaty and should have been 
decided in the context of the object and purpose of that 
treaty. The fact that Finance had a business activity did not 
necessarily show that the arrangement was not contrary to 
the object and purpose of the treaty. Regardless of whether 
Finance was engaged in substantive business activity, it 
was undisputed that Northern Indiana located Finance in 
the Netherlands Antilles in order to obtain treaty benefits. 
The application of the sham transaction doctrine cannot be 
equated to the application of the beneficial ownership test, 
even if it deploys the substance over form approach. 
Nevertheless, in Northern Indiana, the Court of Appeal for 
the Seventh Circuit in particular used the words ―conduit‖ 
and ―sham‖ interchangeably with reference to Hospital 
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Corporation of America.
278
 Thus, the reasoning of the 
courts in Northern Indiana was erroneous and misleading. 
A related point that emerges is that the substantive 
business activity test logically should work as a one-way 
test in conduit company cases. That is, the absence of 
business activity may establish that the interposition of an 
intermediary lacks substance; however, the fact that an 
interposed company has business activity does not 
necessarily show that the interposed company is not a 
conduit. This argument can further be illustrated by 
referring to the reasoning of the Bundesfinanzhof in 
decisions concerning section 50(3) of the German Income 
Tax Act,
279
 as it stood before 19 December 2006.  
Section 50d(3) deals with conduit company situations; 
however, as with the courts in Northern Indiana, the 
German legislature has transposed the substantive business 
activity test from base company cases to conduit company 
cases. For this reason, the application of section 50d(3) 
resulted in inconsistent decisions in similar sets of facts 
before the amendment of December 2006. 
4.19. Section 50d(3) of the German Income Tax Act 
Section 50d of the German Income Tax Act, abbreviated 
as EStG, deals with cases of the reduction of capital gains 
tax and withholding tax under German double tax 
agreements. Section 50d(3) of the EStG is a 
countermeasure against the abuse of treaties and the abuse 
of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive of the Council of the 
                                               
278 Northern Indiana Public Service Company v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue (1997) 115 F 3d 506, 510 (7th Cir). 
279 Einkommensteuergesetz [EStG] [Income Tax Act], 16 October 1934 
RGBl I at 1005, § 50d, ¶ 3. 
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European Communities.
280
 The German legislature 
introduced section 50d(3) of the EStG in 1994. Section 
50d(3), before its amendment in December 2006,
281
 read 
(author‘s translation):282 
A foreign company is not entitled to a full or partial 
relief under sections 1 and 2 if and to the extent persons 
with a holding in it are not entitled to reimbursement or 
exemption had they received income directly and if 
there is no economic or other relevant reasons for 
interposing the foreign company and the foreign 
company does not have a economic activity of its own. 
Although the wording of the provision does not show 
expressly that it is restricted to dividends and withholding 
tax, it could be inferred that the provision also deals with 
conduit company situations.
283
 Further, sections 4.22 and 
4.24 will illustrate with the help of cases that the term 
―economic activity‖ signifies substantive business activity. 
Section 50d(3) of the EStG constitutes a special anti-
avoidance rule. It operates as a supplement to section 42 
of the German General Tax Code,
284
 abbreviated as AO, 
which is the German general anti-avoidance rule. In the 
wording of the provision, the legislature relied heavily on 
                                               
280 Directive 90/435/EEC on the Common System of Taxation 
Applicable in the Case of Parent Companies and Subsidiaries of 
Different Member States [1990] OJ L 225/0006. 
281 Einkommensteuergesetz [EStG] [Income Tax Act], 16 October 1934 
BGBl I at 3366 as amended by Jahressteuergesetzes [Finance Law], 13 
December 2006 BGBl I at 2878, § 50d, ¶ 3. 
282 The German Income Tax Act, Above n 279, § 50d, ¶ 3. 
283 See Rolf Füger and Norbert Rieger ―German Anti-Avoidance 
Rules and Tax Planning of Non-Resident Taxpayers‖ (2000) 54 
Bulletin of International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 434 at 441. 
See also Wilhelm Haarmann and Christoph Knödler ―German 
Supreme Tax Court Limits the Scope of the German Anti-Treaty 
Shopping Rule and Redefines Substance Requirement for Foreign 
Companies (2006) 34 Intertax 260 at 260. 
284 Abgabenordnung [AO] [The General Tax Code] 16 March 1976, 
BGBl I at 3366, as amended, § 42. According to § 42, the legal effects 
of provisions of the tax code may not be avoided by abusive behaviour 
on the part of the taxpayer. In the event of such behaviour, tax will be 
imposed as if the taxpayer had structured the situation using the 
appropriate form. 
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the principle developed in the context of section 42 of the 
AO by case law on the use of foreign base companies by 
German residents.
285
 That is, as with the United States 
courts, the German legislature has also borrowed the 
economic activity test from base company cases. As a 
result, when interpreting and applying section 50d(3), the 
Bundesfinanzhof has drawn an analogy with base 
company cases. A good example is the decision of the 
Bundesfinanzhof of 20 March 2002,
286
 which will be 
referred to as G-group 2002. 
Section 50d(3), as it stood before December 2006, was 
worded in the negative. That is, it provided for conditions 
where a conduit company is not entitled to a reduction of 
German withholding tax. In its decision of 31 May 
2005,
287
 which will be referred to as the G-group 2005, the 
Bundesfinanzhof held that in order to deny tax relief, the 
facts of a case should show that economic or other valid 
reasons for the interposition of a corporation and 
economic activity of the corporation were absent at the 
same time. That is, the court considered the conditions to 
be cumulative, in order to refuse treaty benefits.  
In the context of conduit company cases, the 
cumulative existence of the conditions should not 
necessarily imply that the presence of an economic 
activity qualifies a company for tax relief. However, since 
the Bundesfinanzhof relied on the reasoning of base 
company cases, it regarded the conditions to be alternative 
in order to allow tax relief under section 50d(3).
288
 In 
                                               
285 See Füger and Rieger, above n 283 at 440. 
286 Re a Corporation (2002) 5 ITLR 589 (The Bundesfinanzhof, 
Germany). 
287 G-group 2005 (31 May 2005) IR 74, 88/04, para 27 (The 
Bundesfinanzhof, Germany). 
288 Ibid, at para 31(bb). 
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effect, it regarded economic activity as a sufficient 
criterion. 
G-group 2002 and G-group 2005 concerned the same 
group of companies. The two cases had similar facts and 
the same issues; however, since the Bundesfinanzhof 
relied on the reasoning of base company cases, it came to 
different conclusions. The following sections analyse the 
cases.  
4.20. The G-group 2002 case 
The G-group 2002 case
289
 concerned the G-group of 
companies, which was involved in the television sector. 
The corporate structure of the G-group was as follows. 
Mr. E, a resident of Bermuda, was 85 per cent shareholder 
in G Ltd, a Bermudan corporation. Mr. B, a resident of the 
United States, and Mr. H, a resident of Australia, each 
held 7.5 per cent shares. G Ltd in turn owned Dutch BV, a 
company incorporated in the Netherlands. Dutch BV was 
the taxpayer. It used the business premises and other office 
equipment of another Dutch member of the G-group. 
Dutch BV held all the shares in GmbH, a German 
corporation. 
 
                                               
289 Re a Corporation, above n 286. 
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Figure 4.4: G-group 2002 
GmbH paid dividends to Dutch BV and deducted 
withholding tax from the payment. Dutch BV claimed a 
refund of German withholding tax under the German-
Netherlands double tax treaty of 16 June 1959.
290
 The 
German tax authority granted a partial reimbursement 
corresponding to the participation of Mr. H and Mr. B in 
G Ltd in accordance with the respective German double 
tax treaties with Australia and the United States. The tax 
authority, however, denied any further reimbursement on 
the basis that Mr. E, who was the majority shareholder, 
was a resident of Bermuda, which does not have a double 
                                               
290 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with respect to 
Taxes on Income and Capital and Various other Taxes, and for the 
Regulation of other Questions relating to Taxation, Germany–the 
Netherlands (16 June 1959, entered into force 18 September 1960). 
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tax treaty with Germany. The matter went before the 
Bundesfinanzhof. 
The Bundesfinanzhof held that, because Dutch BV was 
―a base company without real economic function‖,291 the 
withholding tax relief could be refused under section 
50d(3) of the EStG,
292
 as well as under section 42 of the 
AO. Although G-group 2002 involved a conduit company 
scheme, the court referred to Dutch BV as a base company. 
4.21. G-group 2002: another analogy with base 
company cases 
The Bundesfinanzhof was of the opinion that section 
50d(3) had similar requirements and, therefore, a similar 
aim to that of section 42 of the AO.
293
 Although the 
language of section 50d(3) clearly showed that the 
provision applied to conduit company cases, when 
interpreting the provision the court drew an analogy with 
base company cases. It observed:
294
 
According to the jurisprudence of the 
[Bundesfinanzhof] … , intermediary base companies in 
the legal form of a corporation in a low tax regime 
country fulfil the elements of abuse if economic or 
otherwise acceptable reasons are missing. If income 
received in Germany is ‗passed through‘ a foreign 
corporation, this is also true if the state of residence of 
the foreign corporation is not a low tax regime … . The 
court accepts as a principle that tax law respects the 
civil law construction. But there must be an exception 
for such constructions possessing only the aim of 
manipulation. 
Although it was clear from the facts of the case that it 
involved the taxation of out-going income that originated 
in Germany, the court referred to a situation of income 
flowing into Germany. It used phrases such as 
                                               
291 Re a Corporation, above n 286, at 599 (emphasis added). 
292
 § 50d, ¶ 3 of the EStG was § 50d, ¶ 1a EStG at the time of the 
decision. 
293 Re a Corporation, above n 286, at 599. 
294 Ibid, at 600 (emphasis added). 
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―intermediary … in the legal form of corporation‖, ―tax 
law respects the civil law construction‖, and ―exception 
for such constructions‖. The words suggest that the court 
was preoccupied with the issue of when the separate entity 
of an intermediary could be ignored for tax purposes. As 
discussed in section 4.19, the German legislature‘s 
reliance on base company cases in drafting section 50d(3) 
seems to be a reason for the court‘s approach. 
4.22. Is business activity a conclusive criterion for 
deciding conduit company cases? 
In G-group 2002, the Bundesfinanzhof noted that Dutch 
BV had no employees, premises or office equipment. The 
court also considered the fact that the director of Dutch BV 
was serving as the director of other affiliated companies. It 
did not accept the contention of Dutch BV that its 
interposition was for reasons of organisation and co-
ordination, establishment of customer relationships, costs, 
local preferences, and the conception of the enterprise. It 
observed:
295
 
All these aspects make plain the background of the 
construction of the G-group, they make plain why and 
how European engagement of the group was 
concentrated within the Netherlands. But they cannot 
explain convincingly and justify why the foundation of 
[Dutch BV] as a letterbox corporation without economic 
or otherwise acceptable grounds was necessary. 
The court was not convinced that Dutch BV had developed 
its own economic activity.
296
 It held that Dutch BV‘s 
participation in GmbH without any managing function did 
not fulfil the requirement of economic activity under the 
provision. 
Although the Bundesfinanzhof came to a correct 
conclusion, its logic did not make sense. The problem with 
                                               
295 Re a Corporation, above n 286, at 601. 
296 Ibid, at 601. 
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the judgment is that the court analysed the facts in the 
light of the reasoning of base company cases, rather than 
in the context of the object and purpose of the Germany-
Netherlands double tax agreement. Because of the analogy 
with base company cases, the decision implied that 
presence of economic activity would have been sufficient 
under section 50d(3) to allow treaty benefits. The 
judgment in G-group 2002 does not express this 
implication because the court found that activities of 
Dutch BV did not constitute ―economic activity‖ under 
section 50d(3). The inference from G-group 2002, 
however, becomes explicit when the same group returns to 
the Bundesfinanzhof in G-group 2005.
297
 
4.23. The G-group 2005 case 
G-group 2005 concerned the same group of companies 
that was involved in G-group 2002. The corporate 
structure in G-group 2005, however, was slightly 
different. In G-group 2005, G Ltd wholly owned NV, a 
subsidiary incorporated in the Netherlands Antilles. In 
addition, G Ltd wholly owned other Dutch, European and 
non-European subsidiaries. NV, in turn, wholly owned two 
Dutch subsidiaries.  
The main difference between G-group 2002 and G-
group 2005 was that in G-group 2005, each Dutch 
subsidiary also held shares in other European and non-
European corporations in addition to shares in a German 
company. One of these Dutch subsidiaries also held shares 
in another Dutch company. As in the G-group 2002 case, 
the Dutch subsidiaries in G-group 2005 had no employees, 
business premises or equipment. Each Dutch subsidiary 
used the facilities of another affiliated Dutch company. 
                                               
297 G-group 2005 (31 May 2005) IR 74, 88/04 (The Bundesfinanzhof, 
Germany). 
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The German companies paid dividends to the Dutch 
subsidiaries and deducted withholding tax. 
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Figure 4.5: G-group 2005 
As with G-group 2002, the German tax authority in G-
group 2005 granted a partial reimbursement with respect 
to the participation of Mr. H and Mr. B, who were 
residents of Australia and the United States respectively, 
and denied a reimbursement to Mr. E, who was a 
Bermudan resident. The Bundesfinanzhof, however, 
allowed the refund under section 50d(3) of the EStG.  
The court found that neither of the two conditions 
under section 50d(3) was applicable. That is, according to 
the court, there were economic and other relevant reasons 
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for the interposition of the Dutch subsidiaries, and they 
were involved in economic activities of their own. 
4.24. Interpretation of section 50(d) in the light of base 
company cases 
As with G-group 2002, in G-group 2005 the 
Bundesfinanzhof based its reasoning on base company 
cases. When interpreting section 50d(3), the court 
observed (author‘s translation):298 
[Section 50d(3) of the EStG] excludes the right of a 
foreign corporation to be tax exempted or to pay a lower 
tax … according to a double taxation convention, if 
persons participating in that corporation would have no 
right to a reduction of tax had they received the 
dividends directly, and–first–there is no economic or 
otherwise valid reasons for the interposition of the 
corporation and–second–the  corporation does not have 
an economic activity of its own. The latter two 
requirements are cumulative for the tax relief to fail. 
It is clear that the court was of the opinion that the facts of 
a case should satisfy both conditions at the same time, in 
order to refuse withholding tax reduction under section 
50d(3). 
The Bundesfinanzhof noted that the Dutch subsidiaries 
were a part of the G-group along with European and non-
European affiliates engaged in active business.
299
 In the G-
group, the Dutch subsidiary had the function of holding 
the shares of some of these affiliates including the German 
companies. The court regarded the simple holding of 
shares as economic activity.
300
 
According to the Bundesfinanzhof, all affiliates 
outsourced the holding of shares within the group to 
independent corporations, such as the Dutch subsidiaries. 
It found that this strategic outsourcing was a long-term 
activity and therefore concluded that, in the present case, 
                                               
298 G-group 2005, above n 297, at para 27. 
299 Ibid, at para 30(aa). 
300 Ibid, at para 32. 
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the activity could not be considered to exist for the 
purpose of obtaining a withholding tax refund under the 
Germany-Netherlands double tax treaty. It noted that the 
Netherlands was the centre of the business of the 
European corporations of the G-group. Thus, the Dutch 
subsidiaries were located in the Netherlands not solely for 
the purpose of obtaining treaty benefits. The court, 
therefore, was of the opinion that the Dutch subsidiaries 
were entitled to treaty benefits by virtue of being residents 
of the Netherlands.
301
 
Based on these findings the Bundesfinanzhof 
concluded (author‘s translation):302 
… [The Dutch subsidiaries] fulfilled their business 
purpose – holding of shares in foreign corporations – on 
their own account and autonomously. That is, the 
interposition of the Dutch subsidiaries had economic or 
other valid reasons. The absence of such reasons, 
however, is essential to deny a tax relief under [section 
50d(3) of the EStG]. Since [section 50d(3) of the EStG] 
expressly refers to the (alternative) requirement of 
economic and other valid reasons, it is a special rule for 
abuse of law as compared to [section 42 of the AO], and 
may also be applied conclusively without reference to 
[section 42 of the AO]. 
Two points emerge. First, the Bundesfinanzhof considered 
the absence of economic or other valid reasons to be an 
essential requirement, when it referred to section 50d(3) in 
terms of refusing the tax relief. It considered, however, the 
presence of economic or other valid reasons to be an 
alternative requirement when it seemed to refer to section 
50d(3) in terms of allowing treaty benefits. It could be 
inferred that in order to allow treaty benefits, the presence 
of economic activity was the alternative requirement. That 
is, effectively the court considered economic activity to be 
a sufficient criterion to allow treaty relief. 
                                               
301 G-group 2005, above n 297, at para 31(bb). 
302 Ibid, at para 31(bb) (emphasis added). 
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Second, the court equated the presence of ―economic or 
other valid reasons‖ with business purpose. In this respect, 
the reasoning of the Bundesfinanzhof resembles the 
reasoning of the United States Tax Court in the Northern 
Indiana case,
303
 where the court drew an analogy with 
base company cases and was of the opinion that a 
withholding tax reduction was available ―so long as there 
is a business purpose or the corporation engages in 
business activity‖.304 It follows that, as with the court in 
Northern Indiana, the Bundesfinanzhof decided the case 
using the wrong frame of reference. 
Further, the holding of shares of affiliates seems to be a 
weak form of economic activity. Even if it were economic 
activity, there were arguably no strong economic and other 
relevant reasons for interposing the Dutch subsidiaries. 
The considerations that the Bundesfinanzhof regarded as 
―economic and other relevant reasons‖ for their 
interposition seemed to be reasons for the organisation and 
co-ordination of the G-group.
305
 In sharp contrast, the 
court in G-group 2002 rejected such reasons on the basis 
that they merely clarified the corporate structure and 
business engagements.
306
 
The analysis of G-group 2002 and G-group 2005 
confirms that when applying the substantive business 
activity test, courts draw an analogy with base company 
cases. As a result, they decide conduit company cases 
erroneously, treating business activity as a sufficient 
criterion.  
                                               
303 Northern Indiana Public Service Company v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue 105 TC 341 (1995). 
304 Ibid, at 347 (emphasis added). 
305 Ibid, at 347. 
306 Re a Corporation, above n 286, at 601. 
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It seems, however, illogical to base the decision in a 
conduit company case on business activity. The discussion 
so far has shown that business activity works as a one-way 
test in conduit company cases. For instance, judgments in 
G-group 2002 and the A Holding case
307
 show that the 
absence of business activity establishes that the 
interposition of a company lacks substance and, therefore, 
the company can be categorised as a conduit. However, 
judgments in G-group 2005 and the Northern Indiana 
case
308
 fail to show convincingly that the presence of 
business activity necessarily indicates that the 
intermediary company does not act as a conduit. 
4.25. What constitutes substantive business activity? 
Since courts have applied the substantive business activity 
test with reference to base company cases, they have 
accorded such importance to the substantive business 
activity criterion that they seem to recognise mere holding 
of shares and management of passive income as 
substantive business activity. In some of the previous 
decisions, courts have determined that activities of the 
intermediaries had a business purpose. However, on 
examining these activities in the context of conduit 
company cases, it appears evident that the taxpayer‘s 
arrangement had no real purpose apart from obtaining 
treaty benefits improperly.  
The following sections will illustrate the argument by 
investigating the activities that the courts have recognised 
as substantive business activities. The analysis is relevant 
                                               
307 A Holding ApS v Federal Tax Administration (2005) 8 ITLR 536 
(The Federal Court, Switzerland). 
308 Northern Indiana Public Service Company v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue 105 TC 341 (1995). Northern Indiana Public Service 
Company v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 115 F 3d 506 (7th Cir 
1997) at 510. 
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because, although substantive business activity cannot be 
considered a determinant in conduit company cases, it can 
be treated as one of the criteria for determining reasons for 
the existence of an interposed company in a specific 
corporate structure. 
4.26. Does profit spread indicate business activity? 
As discussed in section 4.13, in the Northern Indiana 
case
309
 there was a spread of one per cent between 
Finance‘s inward and outward interest rates. This spread 
yielded a profit to Finance, which it invested to produce 
more income. According to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, these facts showed that 
the transactions carried on by Finance had economic 
substance. Thus, the court recognised Finance‘s activity of 
borrowing and lending money as meaningful business 
activity.  
The United States courts have used, what is known as 
―the two-prong test‖, in order to determine the economic 
substance of a transaction. Applying the test, they have 
examined the economic substance of a transaction against 
two thresholds. First, a court must find that the taxpayer 
subjectively had a non-tax purpose for the transaction. 
That is, a transaction should be related to a useful non-tax 
business purpose that is plausible in the light of the 
taxpayer‘s conduct and economic situation.310 Second, 
there must be an objective showing of a realistic 
possibility of a pre-tax profit. That is, the transaction must 
result in a meaningful and appreciable enhancement in the 
net economic position of the taxpayer (other than to 
                                               
309 Northern Indiana Public Service Company v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue 115 F 3d 506 (7th Cir 1997). 
310 For example  James A Shriver v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
899 F 2d 724 (8th Cir 1990). 
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reduce its tax).
311
 There is no uniform manner of the 
application of the test.
312
 
As discussed in section 4.14, in Northern Indiana the 
United States Tax Court found that Finance was 
established for a business purpose. Regardless of the 
manner of the application of ―the two-prong test‖, it could 
be inferred that the United States Court of Appeals 
referred to the second threshold when it considered the 
profit spread. It observed:
313
 
Here, a profit motive existed from the start. Each time 
an interest transaction occurred, Finance made money 
and [Northern Indiana] lost money. Moreover, Finance 
reinvested the annual … interest income it netted on the 
spread in order to generate additional interest income, 
and none of the profits from these reinvestments are 
related to [Northern Indiana]. 
Finance‘s activity to earn a profit on the inward and 
outward interest flows corresponded to a conventional 
reinvoicing transaction, which is generally regarded as tax 
avoidance. Reinvoicing involves back-to-back transactions 
that manipulate prices to inflate deductions. The 
reinvoicing technique is usually used for buying and 
selling transactions, typically for exporting or importing. It 
involves three parties: a corporation that owns a business; 
an intermediary that can be located either in a foreign low-
tax jurisdiction
314
 or in the country of the business 
                                               
311 Knetsch v United States 364 US 361 (1960). 
312 Courts have applied the two-prong test disjunctively and 
subjunctively. Some courts have not used the two-prong test. These 
courts have viewed business purpose and economic substance as mere 
factors to determine the issue of whether the transaction had any 
practical economic effect rather than the creation of some tax benefits. 
See Transcapital Leasing Assocs 1990-II LP v United States 97 AFTR 
2d 2006-1916 (2006). 
313 Northern Indiana Public Service Company v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, above n 309, at 514 (emphasis added). 
314 For example HIE Holdings Inc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
TC Memo 2009-130. 
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owner;
315
 and customers. Although the intermediary is 
often an affiliate of the business owner, in some situations 
the business owner uses disguised ownership.  
Reinvoicing is considered a tax avoidance practice 
because it involves a deliberate manipulation of prices 
charged between related parties based in different 
jurisdictions with a view to allocating an excessive part of 
the combined profits to the jurisdiction having the lowest 
effective tax rate. The Northern Indiana case seems to be 
a special case of price manipulation in which the interest 
spread was the price that Finance charged. Thus, when the 
court recognised the activity of Finance as a business 
activity, in effect it recognised tax avoidance as a business 
activity. Moreover, since it was undisputed that the 
transaction was structured in order to obtain a tax 
benefit,
316
 the court effectively justified one technique of 
tax avoidance, treaty abuse, with another, reinvoicing. 
Further, although Finance invested its profits in 
unrelated investments to earn additional income, its 
position remained unchanged because it was wholly 
owned by Northern Indiana. It was created for a limited 
purpose and was liquidated after the purpose was 
accomplished. That is, within a predetermined time frame 
the profits reverted to Northern Indiana. 
Even if it is assumed that profit indicates business 
activity, it cannot be regarded as an appropriate factor for 
deciding conduit company cases. As discussed section 4.6, 
business activity cannot be considered sufficient for 
                                               
315 For example Cecil Bros Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation (1964) 111 CLR 430 (FC) and Liggett Group Inc v 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue TC Memo 1990-18. 
316 Northern Indiana Public Service Company v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, above n 309, at 511. 
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determining whether an interposed company can be 
categorised as a conduit company. 
In Revenue Ruling 84-153,
317
 which had similar facts 
and circumstances to Northern Indiana, the United States 
Internal Revenue Service based its ruling on the issue of 
whether a Netherlands Antilles subsidiary was acting as a 
conduit. Unlike the court in Northern Indiana, the IRS did 
not accord importance to the fact that the Antilles 
subsidiary earned a profit. 
4.27. Revenue Ruling 84-153: profit spread is not 
relevant at all 
Revenue Ruling 84-153
318
 involved a United States parent 
corporation that maintained two wholly owned 
subsidiaries: one in the Netherlands Antilles and the other 
in the United States. The United States parent arranged for 
the Antilles subsidiary to raise funds by issuing 
Eurobonds. The Antilles subsidiary then on-lent the 
proceeds to the United States subsidiary at an interest rate 
that was one per cent higher than the rate payable to the 
Eurobond holders. In the process, the Antilles subsidiary 
earned a profit. 
 
                                               
317 Revenue Ruling 84-153 (1984) 2 CB 383. 
318 Ibid, at 383. 
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Figure 4.6: Revenue Ruling 84-153 
The IRS ruled that the interest payments from the 
United States subsidiary to the Antilles subsidiary were 
not exempted from United States withholding tax under 
Article VIII(1) of the United States-Netherlands double tax 
treaty of 29 April 1948.
319
 It pointed out that the use of the 
Antilles subsidiary in the transaction was tax-motivated 
and lacked ―sufficient business or economic purpose to 
overcome the conduit nature of the transaction, even 
though it could be demonstrated that the transaction might 
                                               
319 Convention with respect to Taxes on Income and certain other 
Taxes, the United States–the Netherlands (29 April 1948). The 
relevant part of Article VIII(1) read: ―Interest (on bonds, securities, 
notes, debentures, or on any other form of indebtedness) … derived 
from sources within the United States by a resident or corporation of 
the Netherlands not engaged in trade or business in the United States 
through a permanent establishment, shall be exempt from United 
States tax …‖.  
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serve some business or economic purpose‖.320 That is, 
although the IRS seemed to acknowledge the existence of 
the profit spread, it did not consider the profit spread to be 
relevant.  
The IRS based its ruling on the object and purpose of 
double tax treaties. When interpreting Article VIII(1) of the 
United States-Netherlands double tax treaty, it 
observed:
321
  
The words ―derived ... by‖ refer not merely to [the 
Antilles subsidiary‘s] temporarily obtaining physical 
possession of the interest paid by [the United States 
subsidiary], but to [the Antilles subsidiary] obtaining 
complete dominion and control over such interest 
payments … [F]or purposes of the interest exemption in 
Article VIII(1) of the Convention, the interest payments 
by [the United States subsidiary] will be considered to 
be ―derived ... by‖ the foreign bondholders and not by 
[the Antilles subsidiary]. 
The IRS‘s emphasis on the words ―derived … by‖ shows 
that it focused on the issue of whether the Antilles 
subsidiary was the substantive economic owner of the 
interest payments. It interpreted Article VIII(1) from a 
substantive economic point of view, which was consistent 
with the context in which double tax agreements function. 
That is why its approach seems more appropriate than that 
adopted by the courts in Northern Indiana. 
As discussed in section 4.14, the courts decided 
Northern Indiana in the context of straw company and 
base company cases. They did not decide the case in 
accordance with the object and purpose of double tax 
treaties. Even if it is assumed that the courts in Northern 
Indiana did consider the object and purpose of double tax 
treaties,
322
 they misinterpreted Article VIII(1).
323
  
                                               
320
 Revenue Ruling 84-153, above n 317, 383. 
321 Ibid. 
322 Northern Indiana Public Service Company v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, above n 309, at 510. 
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed: 
―Under the terms of the Treaty, interest on a note that is 
―derived from‖ a United States corporation by a 
Netherlands corporation is exempt from United States 
taxation.‖324 Although the interest payments in questions 
were made from 1982 to 1985, the United States Court of 
Appeals surprisingly chose to refer to Article VIII(1) as it 
stood before its amendment in 1965.
325
 Nevertheless, the 
relevant part of Article VIII(1), before its amendment in 
1965, read: 
Interest … derived from sources within the United 
States by a resident or corporation of the Netherlands 
not engaged in trade or business in the United States 
through a permanent establishment, shall be exempt 
from United States tax … 
The court‘s interpretation of the provision shows that it 
emphasised the words ―derived from‖, rather than the 
words ―derived … by‖ that the IRS emphasised in the 
Revenue Ruling 84-153. The court‘s observation suggests 
that rather than focusing on the issue of whether the 
substantive economic owner of the interest payments was 
resident in the Netherlands, the court was preoccupied 
with the fact that the taxpayer, Northern Indiana, was 
located in the United States. The observation reconfirms 
that the court analysed the facts erroneously. 
4.28. Reasons for the existence of Finance 
On an analysis of the facts of the Northern Indiana case in 
the light of the object and purpose of double tax treaties, it 
                                                                                            
323 The United States-Netherlands double tax treaty of 29 April 1948, 
above n 319. 
324 Northern Indiana Public Service Company v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue 115 F 3d 506, 510 (7th Cir 1997). 
325 The United States–the Netherlands double tax treaty of 29 April 
1948, above n 319, art VIII(1). 
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is hard to conclude logically that there were legitimate 
reasons for the existence of Finance in the whole structure. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit observed:
326
 
The Commissioner has suggested that [Northern 
Indiana‘s] tax-avoidance motive in creating Finance 
might provide one possible basis for disregarding the 
interest transactions between [Northern Indiana] and 
Finance. The parties agree that Taxpayer formed 
Finance to access the Eurobond market because, in the 
early 1980s, prevailing market conditions made the 
overall cost of borrowing abroad less than the cost of 
borrowing domestically. It is also undisputed that 
[Northern Indiana] structured its transactions with 
Finance in order to obtain a tax benefit – specifically, to 
avoid the thirty-percent withholding tax. What is in 
dispute is the legal significance of [Northern Indiana‘s] 
tax-avoidance motive. 
As with the approach of the Swiss Federal Tax 
Administration in the X-group 1979 case,
327
 the court in 
the Northern Indiana case accepted that Northern Indiana 
structured the transaction in order to mitigate tax. Unlike 
the approach of the Swiss Federal Tax Administration, the 
court in Northern Indiana focused on the motive of the 
taxpayer. 
The United States Court of Appeals emphasised that 
Northern Indiana wished to raise money for its business 
and the main purpose for interposing Finance was to 
escape the high domestic interest rate. The court, 
therefore, concluded that the arrangement was related to a 
business purpose. Although it considered the arrangement 
as a whole, it analysed the arrangement in the light of the 
motive of Northern Indiana, which it considered to be 
related to business and approved by law.
328
 The court 
                                               
326 Northern Indiana Public Service Company v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, above n 324, at 510. 
327 X-group 1979 (1979) 48 Archives de droit fiscal Suisse 271 at 275 
(The Federal Tax Administration, Switzerland). 
328 Northern Indiana Public Service Company v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, above n 324, at 512. 
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pointed out that the interposition of finance subsidiaries in 
the Netherlands Antilles was ―not … an uncommon 
practice‖329 and the legislative history of the Deficit 
Reduction Act
330
 acknowledged this practice. The court, 
therefore, seemed to be of the view that domestic tax law 
approved of the practice. 
Although domestic tax law may have approved the 
arrangement, it is hard to imagine that negotiators of 
double tax treaties would permit residents of a third state 
to obtain treaty benefits simply by establishing a company. 
Because the courts in Northern Indiana analysed the facts 
from the wrong frame of reference, they seemed to be so 
concerned with the fact that the taxpayer was a resident of 
the United States that they almost forgot that Eurobond 
holders, who were not residents of states other than 
contracting states, obtained the tax advantage. 
Even if it is assumed that Finance had a business 
activity, its activity seemed uncomplementary to the 
business activity of Northern Indiana, which was a 
domestic utility company. Moreover, as mentioned in 
section 4.13, Finance was liquidated soon after Northern 
Indiana completed the payment of the principal amount 
plus the interest to the Eurobond holders. These facts 
suggest that, in the corporate structure, Finance did not 
have any significance other than as a conduit for passing 
on the interest to Eurobond holders. 
4.29. Can holding shares constitute a business activity? 
As discussed in section 4.22, in G-group 2002,
331
 the only 
business activity of Dutch BV was to hold shares of 
                                               
329
 Northern Indiana Public Service Company v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, above n 324, at 513. 
330 The Deficit Reduction Act (The United States) 1984. 
331 Re a Corporation (2002) 5 ITLR 589 at 602. 
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GmbH. Dutch BV had no personnel or business premises. 
The business director of Dutch BV served as the business 
director of other affiliated companies in the Netherlands. 
According to the Bundesfinanzhof, Dutch BV‘s activity did 
not constitute ―economic activity‖ under section 50d(3) of 
the EStG. It observed:
332
 
Additionally, there is no proof that the plaintiff has 
developed its own economic activity. To hold the 
participation in the German G-GmbH without any 
managing function does not fulfil the requirements that 
can be expected for such an activity. The fact that the 
Parent-Subsidiary directive of the European Union … in 
art 2 uses the wording ‗company of a Member State‘ 
without any requirements of an activity does not change 
the statement. Even if it were conclusive that, according 
to the Directive, to hold one single participation in a 
corporation and, therefore, the existence of a pure 
holding corporation were sufficient …, a simple 
letterbox-company with only formal existence like the 
plaintiff, however, would not correspond to the 
supranational requirements. 
The observation implies that regardless of the number of 
companies in which an intermediary holds shares, this 
activity does not fulfil the requirement of ―economic 
activity‖ unless the intermediary carries out its own 
directorial functions. This approach was followed by the 
Bundesfinanzhof in G-group 2005. 
As discussed in section 4.24, in G-group 2005, the 
affiliates out-sourced the passive shareholding activity to 
the Dutch subsidiaries in the long term. The 
Bundesfinanzhof considered holding of shares to be an 
economic activity. It emphasised two facts. First, the 
Dutch subsidiaries were carrying out the activity on their 
own account and were functioning autonomously. Second, 
in addition to shares in the German companies, the Dutch 
subsidiaries held shares in other foreign companies.
333
  
                                               
332 Re a Corporation, above n 331, at 601 (emphasis added). 
333 Ibid, at para 32. 
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Holding shares should not be regarded as an economic 
activity even if the company manages its own operations. 
This argument applies even if the intermediary holds 
shares in more than one company. Holding shares is a 
weak form of economic activity, and the fact that an 
intermediary that holds shares also has an active board of 
directors does not necessarily add any substance to the 
shareholding activity, at least not in the context of double 
tax treaties.  Such an intermediary can still act as a 
conduit.  
A possible reason why the Bundesfinanzhof in G-group 
2002 accorded importance to management functions could 
be that the court decided the case in the light of the 
reasoning of base company cases. As discussed in section 
4.21, since the court drew an analogy with base company 
cases, it was preoccupied with the issue of the recognition 
of an intermediary for tax purposes. As illustrated by 
Hospital Corporation of America,
334
 courts in base 
company cases tend to consider the presence of an active 
board of directors to indicate that a corporation carries out 
substantive business activity and therefore can be 
recognised for tax purposes.
335
 Nevertheless, G-group 
2002 and G-group 2005 were conduit company cases and 
therefore should have been decided in the light of the 
object and purpose of the Germany-Netherlands double 
tax treaty.
336
  
In G-group 2005 ―managing function‖ acted as a 
misleading label that the Dutch subsidiaries gave to their 
                                               
334 Hospital Corporation of America v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue  81 TC 520 (1983). 
335 Ibid, at 584. 
336 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with respect to 
Taxes on Income and Fortune and Various other Taxes, and for the 
Regulation of other Questions relating to Taxation, Germany–the 
Netherlands (16 June 1959, enter into force 18 September 1960). 
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activity that appears no more than collecting and passing 
on of the dividends from the German companies to NV. 
That is, it hid the conduit nature of the Dutch subsidiaries 
and that helped them to obtain treaty benefits improperly. 
By recognising ―management function‖ as ―economic 
activity‖ under section 50d(3), the Bundesfinanzhof 
effectively recognised the improper use of the tax treaty as 
economic activity. 
4.30. Reasons for the existence of the Dutch 
subsidiaries 
It is hard to find a reason for the existence of the Dutch 
subsidiaries in the G-group apart from obtaining the 
benefit of a full withholding tax reduction under the 
Germany-Netherlands double tax treaty.  
Double tax treaties between the Netherlands and the 
resident states of most of the affiliates provided for a full 
reduction of withholding tax on dividends. The location of 
the Dutch subsidiaries ensured that dividends flowed from 
affiliates in general and German companies in particular 
ultimately to Bermuda with a minimum of tax.  
Within the G-group, the Dutch subsidiaries acted as 
conduits. The Dutch subsidiaries had no employees, 
business premises or equipment. Their business director 
served several other affiliates. They had no activity apart 
from the holding of affiliates‘ shares.  
As discussed in section 4.24, the Bundesfinanzhof 
accorded importance to the activity of the other affiliated 
companies.
337
 It noted that the Dutch subsidiaries formed 
part of a group of companies involved in the television 
sector. Within the group, they functioned as long-term 
shareholders of other affiliated companies. The court 
                                               
337 G-group 2005 (31 May 2005) IR 74, 88/04 at para 32 (The 
Bundesfinanzhof, Germany). 
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regarded these facts as ―economic and other valid reasons‖ 
for the interposition of the Dutch subsidiaries.
338
 
In contrast, when examining the activity of Dutch BV in 
G-group 2002, the Bundesfinanzhof observed:
339
  
Finally, it is without any relevance in this connection 
that [Dutch BV‘s] sister-companies, also resident in the 
Netherlands, might fulfil the requirement of an 
economic activity and found an active functional part of 
the G group. Assuming that this is true, the only 
economic activity of the sister-corporations may not be 
attributed to [Dutch BV] in a way that [Dutch BV] could 
be treated as a managing holding corporation.  
Economic activity that is irrelevant to the income in 
question cannot be considered  relevant when determining 
whether an intermediary acted as a conduit with respect to 
that income. In G-group 2005, the activity of the Dutch 
subsidiaries did not complement the activity of the 
affiliates that were involved in the television sector. That 
is, the existence of the Dutch subsidiaries did not serve the 
economic interest of the affiliates. Therefore, their activity 
does not add to the significance of Dutch subsidiaries in 
the G-group. 
The German legislature amended section 50d(3) of the 
EStG on 19 December 2006. In the language of the 
amended section 50d(3), the German legislature addressed 
specifically the loopholes exploited by the taxpayer in G-
group 2005. The provision, however, still uses business 
activity as a criterion, and fails to cover situations in 
which an intermediary engages in an economic activity. 
4.31. The amended section 50d(3) of the EStG 
Section 50d(3), as it stands after its amendment on 19 
December 2006, reads:
340
 
                                               
338 G-group 2005, above n 337, at para 31 (bb). 
339 Re a Corporation (2002) 5 ITLR 589 at 601. 
340 Einkommensteuergesetz [EStG] [Income Tax Act], 16 October 1934 
BGBl I at 3366 as amended by Jahressteuergesetzes [Finance Law], 13 
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1A foreign company is not entitled to a full or partial 
relief under sections 1 and 2, if and to the extent persons 
with a holding in it, are not entitled to reimbursement or 
exemption, had they received income directly, and 
1. There is no economic or other relevant reason 
to establish the foreign company or 
2. The foreign company does not earn more than 
10 per cent of its gross income from its own 
economic activity or 
3. The foreign company does not participate in 
general commerce with business premises 
suitably equipped for a business purpose. 
2Only the situations of the foreign company are 
decisive; organisational, economic and other significant 
features of companies, that have close relations to the 
foreign company … shall not be considered. 3Own 
business operations shall be regarded as absent, as long 
as the foreign company earns its gross returns from the 
management of assets or a third party is in charge of 
their essential business operations. 4Sentences 1 to 3 
shall not be applied, if the main class of the shares of 
the foreign company are traded substantially and 
regularly on a recognised stock exchange or the foreign 
company is subjected to the rules and regulations of the 
Investment Tax Act. 
By quantifying ―economic activity‖, and by clarifying its 
meaning, the provision may prevent companies without a 
business activity from obtaining the benefit of withholding 
tax reductions under a double tax treaty; it fails, however, 
to cover situations in which an interposed foreign 
company acts as a conduit despite being involved in a 
genuine business activity. Such a situation existed in 
Ministre de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie v 
Société Bank of Scotland.
341
  
Although Bank of Scotland
342
 was a French case and it 
did not concern section 50d(3) of the EStG at all, it is 
relevant in the present context because it illustrates that 
section 50d(3) would have failed to function effectively 
                                                                                            
December 2006 BGBl I at 2878, § 50d, ¶ 3. The numbering system 
adopted with superscript numbers 1 to 4 is the the numbering system 
of the Einkommensteuergesetz. These superscript numbers appear at 
the beginning of the sentences, and are not paragraph numbers. 
341 Ministre de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie v Société 
Bank of Scotland (2006) 9 ITLR 683 (Conseil d‘etat, France). 
342 Ibid. 
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given the facts and circumstances of Bank of Scotland. 
The Bank of Scotland case concerned an attempt by a 
United States company, Pharmaceutical Inc, to use the 
United Kingdom as the intermediary jurisdiction in a 
conduit transaction for income flowing from France to the 
United States, trying in the process to take advantage of 
the provisions of the double tax treaty between France and 
the United Kingdom. Although Bank of Scotland is a 
French case that involved an unrelated conduit company, 
it helps to explain the foregoing argument because the 
conduit company was engaged in substantive business 
activity.  
4.32. The Bank of Scotland case 
Pharmaceuticals Inc held all the shares in Marion SA, a 
French company. In 1992, Pharmaceuticals Inc sold the 
usufruct of some shares issued by Marion SA to the Bank 
of Scotland for three years. The Bank of Scotland acquired 
the usufruct in consideration of a single payment. Under 
the usufruct contract, the Bank of Scotland was entitled to 
receive a pre-determined amount of dividend from Marion 
SA in three-year period. Pharmaceuticals Inc guaranteed 
the payment of dividends.  
Article 9(6)
343
 of the France-United Kingdom double 
tax treaty of 22 May 1968 reduced the French withholding 
                                               
343 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income, 
France–the United Kingdom (22 May 1968, entered into force 27 
October 1969), art 9(6). It provided: ―Dividends paid by a company 
which is a resident of France to a resident of the United Kingdom may 
be taxed in the United Kingdom. Such dividends may also be taxed in 
France but where such dividends are beneficially owned by a resident 
of the United Kingdom the tax so charged shall not exceed: 
(a) 5 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends if the beneficial 
owner is a company which controls the company paying those 
dividends; 
(b) in all other cases 15 per cent of the gross amount of the 
dividends.‖ 
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tax to 15 per cent on dividends distributed to a company 
resident in United Kingdom. Further, Article 9(7)
344
 of the 
treaty provided for a refund of the avoir fiscal after the 
deduction of the withholding tax. Pharmaceuticals Inc 
designed the arrangement in order to obtain benefits of 
these provisions. If Pharmaceuticals Inc had received 
dividends directly from Marion SA, it would have paid 15 
per cent French withholding tax under the France-United 
States double tax treaty of 31 August 1994.
345
 The 
arrangement would have allowed Pharmaceutical Inc to 
receive dividends free of French withholding tax. Further, 
at the end of three years period, the Bank of Scotland 
would have received the total amount of dividends plus 
the refund of avoir fiscal, which was greater than the 
amount it initially paid to Pharmaceuticals Inc.  
In 1993, Marion SA distributed dividends to the bank 
after deducting 25 per cent French withholding tax. The 
bank applied to the French tax administration for a partial 
refund of the withholding tax and a reimbursement of the 
avoir fiscal tax credit under the France-United Kingdom 
double tax treaty. 
 
                                               
344 The France-United Kingdom double tax treaty, above n 343, art 
9(7). The relevant part of the Article 9(7) provided ―A resident of the 
United Kingdom who receives from a company which is a resident of 
France dividends which, if received by a resident of France, would 
entitle such resident to a fiscal credit (avoir fiscal), shall be entitled to 
a payment from the French Treasury equal to such credit (avoir fiscal) 
subject to the deduction of the tax provided for in sub-paragraph (b) of 
paragraph (6) of this Article.‖ 
345 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and 
Capital, France–the United States (31 August 1994, entered into force 
8 December 2004), art 10(2)(b). 
Substantive Business Activity 
177 
 
Pharmaceuticals
Inc
Bank of Scotland
Marion SA
100%
Usufruct 
agreement
(transfer of 
dividend
coupons)
Consideration
for the usufruct
agreement
Dividends
USA
The United Kingdom
France
Ownership
 
Figure 4.7: The Bank of Scotland case 
The French tax administration denied the request on the 
grounds that the Bank of Scotland was not the beneficial 
owner of the dividends. The French tax administration 
characterised the transactions as a loan made by the bank 
to Pharmaceuticals Inc, which was repaid by the dividends 
from Marion SA. 
The Supreme Administrative Court ruled in favour of 
the French tax administration. According to the court, only 
the beneficial owner of the dividends was entitled to a 
refund of withholding tax and the reimbursement of the 
tax credit under the France-United Kingdom double tax 
treaty.
346
 After analysing the contractual arrangement, it 
                                               
346 The France-United Kingdom double tax treaty of 22 May 1968, 
above n 97. 
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was of the opinion that Pharmaceutical Inc was the 
beneficial owner and had delegated the repayment of the 
loan to Marion SA.
347
 The court found that the sole 
purpose of the arrangement was to obtain the benefit of 
avoir fiscal tax credit available under the France-United 
Kingdom double tax treaty,
348
 which was not available 
under the double tax treaty between France and the United 
States.
349
 The Supreme Administrative Court refused 
treaty benefits to the Bank of Scotland because it did not 
consider the bank to be the beneficial owner. 
4.33. Would section 50d(3) have worked in the facts 
and circumstances of Bank of Scotland? 
If it is assumed that a taxpayer had used the tax-planning 
scheme in the Bank of Scotland case for obtaining tax 
relief under a German tax treaty, it is possible that the 
Bank of Scotland, as a foreign company, would have been 
allowed a withholding tax reduction by virtue of the 
business activity test under section 50d(3) EStG. The bank 
seemed to satisfy the conditions in the provision. It was 
involved in a business activity and earned more than 10 
per cent of its gross income from it. It had business 
premises and it participated in general commerce. 
Although there were no economic or other relevant 
reasons for interposing the Bank of Scotland, it would still 
have been entitled to treaty benefits because its shares 
were traded substantially and regularly on a recognised 
stock exchange.  
                                               
347 Ministre de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie v Société 
Bank of Scotland, above n 341, at 703. 
348 The France-United Kingdom double tax treaty of 22 May 1968, 
above n 97. 
349 The France-United States double tax treaty of 31 August 1994, 
above n 345. 
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This result does not make sense in the context of 
double tax treaties. The bank could not be considered to be 
the owner of the income in a substantive economic sense, 
regardless of the fact that it was involved in genuine 
business activity. That is, although the conditions in the 
amended version of section 50d(3) are independent, 
business activity works as a conclusive criterion at least in 
some situations. That is, the new version of section 50d(3) 
does not necessarily overcome the shortcomings of its 
older version. 
This analysis confirms that the absence of business 
activity may establish that an intermediary is a mere 
conduit; however, the fact that an intermediary is involved 
in business activity does not necessarily show that it is not 
acting as a conduit. 
4.34. Conclusion 
Although different reports of the OECD and courts 
substitute the substantive business activity test for the 
beneficial ownership test, it is not related to the concept of 
ownership at all. 
Originally, courts have applied the substantive business 
activity test to cases involving straw companies and base 
companies. The focal issue in these cases is whether a 
corporation should be recognised for tax purposes. Courts 
have considered the presence of substantive business 
activity to be sufficient in order to recognise a corporation 
as a separate taxable entity. Conduit company cases prima 
facie appear similar to straw company cases and base 
company cases. Probably for this reason, courts apply the 
substantive business activity to conduit company cases 
with the reasoning they have adopted in cases involving 
straw companies and base companies.  
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Unlike cases involving straw companies and base 
companies, however, conduit company cases should be 
determined in the context of the object and purpose of 
double tax treaties. Although the absence of a business 
activity indicates that the interposition of an intermediary 
lacks substance even for the purpose of qualifying for 
treaty benefits, its presence does not necessarily indicate 
that the interposition of an intermediary does not 
contradict the object and purpose of a double tax treaty. It 
follows that the business activity criterion can work only 
as a one-way test in conduit company cases. In other 
words, the substantive business activity test cannot 
logically be applied as a decisive test to conduit company 
cases. 
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5.1. Introduction 
As discussed in section 2.30, dominion is a surrogate form 
of reasoning courts have used to apply the beneficial 
ownership test to conduit company cases. The word 
―dominion‖ is not a term of art. This chapter uses it in 
order to represent an incident that exhibits ownership. 
Salmond describes rights and liberties that belong to this 
incident as follows:
350
 
                                               
350 John William Salmond and P J Fitzgerald Salmond on 
Jurisprudence (12th ed, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1966) at 246.  
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[T]he owner normally has the right to use and enjoy the 
thing owned: the right to manage it, i.e., the right to 
decide how it shall be used; and the right to the income 
from it. …, these rights are in fact liberties: the owner 
has a liberty to use it, in contrast with others who are 
under a duty not to use or interfere with it. 
That is, in essence ―dominion‖ is a property right.351 
The OECD‘s Conduit Companies Report uses the 
criterion of the absence of dominion for determining 
whether a recipient company is not the beneficial owner of 
passive income. It borrows the dominion test from cases in 
which a tax authority argues that a recipient company acts 
in the capacity of a ―nominee or agent‖. The role of a 
nominee or agent is to pass on income to its principal. One 
result is that nominee or agent does not have dominion. 
That is why the OECD Model Convention does not regard a 
nominee or agent as the beneficial owner. 
It does not make sense to decide conduit company 
cases on the basis of the criterion of dominion because 
companies are, by definition, owners of their income. A 
nominee or agent is under an obligation to pass on its 
income in property law, whereas a conduit company may 
pass on passive income because of a contractual 
obligation. It is also possible that a conduit company has 
no contractual obligation to pass on passive income. In a 
practical sense, however, a conduit company distributes 
the passive income to its shareholders as dividends, or 
deals with the passive income in a manner that eventually 
benefits its shareholders. 
The chapter argues that the use of a ―nominee or agent‖ 
by the official commentary as an example of conduits is 
misleading. The use of a nominee or agent as an example 
of conduits implies that the presence of dominion justifies 
                                               
351 See Lawrence C Becker Property Rights: Philosophical 
Foundations (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1977) at 18. 
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considering a recipient of passive income to be its 
beneficial owner. The criterion of dominion is, however, 
not necessarily decisive for solving conduit company 
cases. The focal issue in conduit company cases should be 
whether the arrangement is consistent with the object and 
purpose of a double tax agreement. 
5.2. Paragraph 14(b) of the Conduit Companies 
Report 
Paragraph 14(b) of the OECD‘s Conduit Companies Report 
of 1987
352
 discusses the application of the beneficial 
ownership test to conduit companies under Article 10(2), 
11(2) and 12(1) of the OECD Model Convention. It uses the 
criterion of ―dominion‖. It states:353 
Articles 10 to 12 of the OECD Model deny the limitation 
of tax in the State of source on dividends, interest and 
royalties if the conduit company is not its ―beneficial 
owner‖. Thus the limitation is not available when, 
economically it would benefit a person not entitled to it 
who interposed the conduit company as an intermediary 
between himself and the payer of the income … .The 
Commentaries mention the case of a nominee or agent. 
The provisions would, however, apply also to other 
cases where a person enters into contracts or takes over 
obligations under which he has a similar function to 
those of a nominee or an agent. Thus a conduit company 
can normally not be regarded as the beneficial owner if, 
though the formal owner of certain assets, it has very 
narrow powers which render it a mere fiduciary or an 
administrator acting on account of the interested parties 
(most likely the shareholders of the conduit company). 
In practice, however, it will usually be difficult for the 
country of source to show that the conduit company is 
not the beneficial owner. The fact that its main function 
is to hold assets or rights is not itself sufficient to 
categorise it as mere intermediary, although this may 
indicate that further examination is necessary. 
The significance of paragraph 14(b) is evident from the 
fact that the official commentary on Articles 10, 11 and 12 
                                               
352 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Double Taxation Conventions 
and the Use of Conduit Companies‖ in OECD Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs International Tax Avoidance and Evasion: Four Related 
Studies, Issues in International Taxation No 1 (OECD, Paris, 1987) 87 
at para 14(b). 
353 Ibid. 
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of the OECD Model Convention has incorporated the 
paragraph since the amendment of the Model Convention 
in 2003.
354
 Further, when applying the dominion test to 
conduit companies as a surrogate test for the beneficial 
ownership test, some courts relied on this paragraph.
355
 
For this reason, it becomes important to begin with an 
analysis of the paragraph. 
5.3. Conceptual and linguistic confusions  
As discussed in section 2.26, this paragraph is based on an 
illogical assumption. It assumes that in some situations a 
conduit company can be regarded as the beneficial owner. 
From a substantive economic point of view, it is hard to 
consider a company that acts as a conduit to be the 
beneficial owner. Further, in the first sentence, the phrase 
―if the conduit company is not its ‗beneficial owner‘‖356 
creates a linguistic confusion. It implies that a ―conduit 
company‖ is different from a company that is not the 
beneficial owner.  
The paragraph seems to use the term ―conduit 
company‖ for a company that immediately receives 
passive income from the source company but does not 
work in the capacity of a nominee or agent. Because it is 
not necessary that such a company always works as a 
                                               
354 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Commentary on Article 10 
concerning the Taxation of Dividends‖ (OECD, Paris, 2010) in OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital (OECD, Paris, 2010) 187 at para 12.2. OECD Committee on 
Fiscal Affairs ―Commentary on Article 11 concerning the Taxation of 
Interest‖ (OECD, Paris, 2010) in OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs 
Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (OECD, Paris, 2010) 
211 at para 10. OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Commentary on 
Article 12 concerning the Taxation of Royalties‖ (OECD, Paris, 2010) 
in OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs Model Tax Convention on 
Income and on Capital (OECD, Paris, 2010) 220 at para 4.1. 
355 For example Prévost Car Inc v Her Majesty the Queen (2008) TCC 
231 and Royal Dutch Shell (6 April 1994) Case no 28 638, BNB 
1994/217 (the Hoge Raad, the Netherlands). 
356 The Conduit Companies Report, above n 352, at para 14(b). 
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conduit, this chapter uses the term ―recipient company‖ in 
order to avoid confusion. 
5.4. “Narrow powers”: the absence of dominion 
Paragraph 14(b) refers to the official commentary on 
Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the OECD Model Convention of 
1977. The official commentary on Articles 10 and 11 
stated:
357
 
Under paragraph 2, the limitation of tax in the State of 
source is not available when an intermediary, such as an 
agent or nominee, is interposed between the beneficiary 
and the payer, unless the beneficial owner is a resident 
of the other Contracting State.  
The official commentary on Article 12 was similar:
358
 
Under paragraph 1, the exemption from tax in the State 
of source is not available when an intermediary, such as 
an agent or nominee, is interposed between the 
beneficiary and the payer, unless the beneficial owner is 
a resident of the other Contracting State. 
Paragraph 14(b) suggests that the official commentary 
used a ―nominee or agent‖ as an example of conduits.  
An agent hands over money belonging to his principal, 
which is received for the principal‘s use.359 Similarly, a 
nominee passes on money to its mandator. For this reason, 
a nominee or agent does not qualify as the beneficial 
owner of passive income. 
Agents and nominees pass on money to the person on 
whose behalf they work because property rights are vested 
                                               
357 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Commentary on Article 10 
concerning the Taxation of Dividends‖ (OECD, Paris, 1977) in OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs Model Tax Convention on Income and 
on Capital (OECD, Paris, 1977) 150 at para 12. OECD Committee on 
Fiscal Affairs ―Commentary on Article 11 concerning the Taxation of 
Interest‖ (OECD, Paris, 1977) in OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs 
Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (OECD, Paris, 1977) 
169 at para 8. 
358 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Commentary on Article 12 
concerning the Taxation of Royalties‖ (OECD, Paris, 1977) in OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs Model Tax Convention on Income and 
on Capital (OECD, Paris, 1977) 182 at para 4. 
359 See G H L Fridman Law of Agency (2nd ed, Butterworths, London, 
1966) at 10. 
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in that person. They, therefore, do not have the freedom to 
decide how to use the money. That is, they lack dominion. 
Thus, in order to determine whether a relationship 
between two persons is an agency relationship, courts 
occasionally address the issue of whether the alleged agent 
has dominion over its business and income that it derives 
from the business. In such cases, the criterion of dominion 
has been referred to as ―control‖.360 
As with agents and nominees, conduit companies 
appear to pass on income to residents of a third state. This 
could be why paragraph 14(b) draws an analogy between 
the function of a conduit company and the role of a 
nominee or agent. The paragraph regards a conduit 
company as a person who ―enters into contracts or takes 
over obligations under which he has a similar function to 
those of a nominee or agent‖.361 By applying the analogy, 
the report transposes the dominion test to conduit 
companies. It could be inferred, therefore, that the phrase 
―narrow powers‖ in paragraph 14(b) means the absence of 
the freedom to decide how to use passive income. That is, 
the term could be equated with the absence of dominion. 
It is illogical, however, to transpose the dominion test 
from cases involving nominees or agents to conduit 
company cases simply because they both pass on passive 
income. Reasons why conduit companies may pass on 
passive income differ from the reason for which nominees 
or agents pass on income. While nominees and agents are 
obliged under property law to pass on income to the 
                                               
360 For example South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club 
Ltd v News Ltd and Others (2000) 177 ALR 611 and Royal Securities 
Corp Ltd v Montreal Trust Co (1966) 59 DLR (2d) 666 at 684. See also 
William Bowstead and F M B Reynolds Bowstead and Reynolds on 
Agency (18th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2006) at para 1-017. 
361 The Conduit Companies Report, above n 352, at para 14(b). 
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person on whose behalf they work, conduit companies are 
under no obligation in property law to pass on passive 
income. A conduit company may be under a contractual 
obligation to do so; however, in such a case contact law, 
not property law, creates the obligation. The following 
sections discuss obligations to pass on passive income 
under property law and contract law separately.  
5.5. The obligation to pass on passive income in 
property law 
As indicated earlier, in cases involving nominees or 
agents, the property is owned by the person for whom they 
work. For this reason, in property law, a nominee or agent 
is obliged to pass on income.
362
 In such cases, income 
originates as the property of a person on whose behalf the 
nominee or agent receives it. That is, the income is 
destined to reach that person in the form it arises. 
In conduit company cases, by contrast, passive income 
originates as the property of a recipient company. That is, 
if the recipient company passes the income on to a 
company that is resident in a third state, it does so in the 
capacity of the owner of the income. For this reason, even 
if a recipient company is interposed as a conduit company 
that does not act as a nominee or agent, it is under no 
obligation in property law to pass on passive income to the 
resident of a third state. Conduit structures are often 
achieved by interposing a subsidiary as an immediate 
recipient. Although in such cases the subsidiary passes on 
passive income in the form of dividends to its shareholders 
                                               
362
 See John William Salmond and P J Fitzgerald Salmond on 
Jurisprudence (12th ed, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1966) at 258. G 
H L Fridman Law of Agency (2nd ed, Butterworths, London, 1966) at 
10. F E Dowrick ―The Relationship of Principal and Agent‖ (1954) 17 
MLR 24, at 32. 
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who are resident in a third state, it is not obliged to do so 
under property law.  
The whole idea of company law is that companies are 
independent and are able to control their property. It 
follows that conduit companies are, by definition, the 
owners of passive income they receive. In other words, 
conduit companies have dominion over passive income 
simply by virtue of being corporations. 
It therefore does not make sense to apply the dominion 
test to decide whether a recipient company is the 
beneficial owner. If the criterion of dominion is used for 
deciding conduit company cases, a recipient company will 
always qualify for treaty benefits regardless of whether 
any tax planning arrangement in issue is inconsistent with 
the object and purpose of a double tax agreement. The 
opinion of the Government Commissioner, Mr. François 
Séners, in Ministre de l'Economie, des Finances et de 
l'Industrie v Société Bank of Scotland
363
 supports this 
argument. 
5.6. Bank of Scotland: the absence of an obligation in 
property law is indecisive 
Recalling the facts of the Bank of Scotland case from 
section 4.32, the French tax administration did not 
consider the bank to be the beneficial owner, and 
therefore, rejected the bank‘s request of a partial refund of 
the withholding tax and a reimbursement of the avoir 
fiscal tax credit under the France-United Kingdom double 
tax treaty of 22 May 1968.
364
 The case went to the 
Supreme Administrative Court.  
                                               
363 Ministre de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie v Société 
Bank of Scotland (2006) 9 ITLR 683, at 711. 
364 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income, 
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When advising the court, the Government 
Commissioner agreed with the tax administration. He 
analysed several explanations of the term ―beneficial 
owner‖, which excluded from the description of a 
beneficial owner nominees or agents, or a person who 
received income for the account of another person. He 
concluded:
365
 
The doctrinal analyses are united [in] the fact that the 
direct recipient of income is not entitled to obtain the 
advantages granted by international tax treaties if he is 
not the ultimate recipient of this income and if he has 
only received it in the status of intermediary for another 
person to whom the income is destined to be transferred 
in one form or another. 
This analysis does not completely resolve the 
question in the present case which is more complex 
since, as the Bank of Scotland contends, it has truly 
received, for its own account and as the ultimate 
recipient, the dividends distributed by [Marion SA]. This 
could lead you to conclude that despite the triangular 
arrangement operated with the companies in the … 
group, it was the beneficial owner of the dividends paid. 
The fact that it could be regarded in this matter as a 
lender with respect to [Pharmaceuticals Inc] did not 
however prevent the latter from freeing itself from this 
debt by the grant of a real right that it held with regard 
to [Marion SA]. 
I think nevertheless that this case reveals that the 
notion of beneficial ownership cannot be reduced to 
cases of transfer of intended benefits and that, by its 
nature, it encompasses situations of fraud on the law … 
If you are with me on this conceptual territory, it 
remains only to judge whether, in this particular case, 
there was an abusive arrangement … 
The Government Commissioner used the phrase 
―beneficial ownership … by its nature … encompasses 
situations of fraud on the law‖. The usage shows that he 
regarded the beneficial ownership test as an anti-
avoidance test, not a test of ownership. He applied the 
beneficial ownership test in the manner of the general anti-
avoidance doctrine of abuse of law, which is essentially 
                                                                                            
France–the United Kingdom (22 May 1968, entered into force 27 
October 1969), arts 9(6) and 9(7). 
365 Ministre de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie v Société 
Bank of Scotland, above n 363, at 711 (emphasis added). 
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the approach of the predication test in another guise. 
Similar to the approach adopted by Lord Denning in the 
Newton’s case,366  the Government Commissioner 
generalised the application of the beneficial ownership 
test. That is, he did not concretise the law by basing his 
decision on the absence or presence of a specific criterion, 
in this case the criterion of dominion. The observation 
shows that he regarded the presence of dominion as 
insufficient to determine whether the Bank of Scotland 
was the beneficial owner. Essentially, in his opinion 
although the bank had dominion over the dividends, it was 
involved in an arrangement that was inconsistent with the 
object and purpose of the France-United Kingdom double 
tax treaty. He advised the court to apply the abuse of law 
doctrine. 
The approach of the Supreme Administrative Court 
seemed to align with the advice of the Government 
Commissioner. The court accorded no significance to the 
presence of dominion. It examined the arrangement and 
found that the usufruct contract concealed a loan 
agreement between the bank and Pharmaceuticals Inc. On 
an analysis of the usufruct agreement, the court concluded 
that the beneficial owner of the dividend payments was 
Pharmaceuticals Inc, which delegated the repayment of the 
loan to Marion SA. The usufruct agreement was motivated 
solely by tax reasons, with the aim of benefiting from the 
reimbursement of the avoir fiscal tax credit available 
under the France-United Kingdom double tax 
                                               
366 L J Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1958) 98 CLR 1, 
at 8 (Privy Council, Australia). 
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agreement.
367
 In essence, the court based its decision on 
the substance of the usufruct agreement. 
The Bank of Scotland case illustrates that, even if a 
recipient company has dominion over passive income, it 
can still act as a conduit. The focal issue in conduit 
company cases, therefore, should be whether the 
arrangement is consistent with the object and purpose of a 
double tax agreement. 
5.7. Obligation to pass on passive income in contract 
law 
A recipient company may be bound to pass on passive 
income by a contract, and therefore, has narrow powers. 
However, the existence of narrow powers in such a case is 
a result of a contractual obligation, not a result of an 
obligation in property law. The recipient company still has 
dominion over passive income and it can opt not to pass 
on the income. It will breach the contract, if it opts not to 
pass on the income; however, contract law will govern the 
situation. 
A contractual obligation to pass on passive income, 
however, seems indecisive for solving conduit company 
cases because its presence or absence does not answer the 
question of whether the arrangement contradicts the object 
and purpose of a double tax treaty. This point can be 
illustrated with the help of Aiken Industries Inc v 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
368
 
5.8. Aiken Industries: complete dominion and control 
As discussed in section 2.4, the Aiken Industries case 
involved Ecuadorian Ltd, a Bahamian company that made 
                                               
367 Ministre de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie v Société 
Bank of Scotland, above n 363, at 703. 
368 Aiken Industries Inc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 56 TC 
925 (1971) 934 
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a loan to Mechanical Inc, a United States company, in 
exchange for a note. If Ecuadorian Ltd had received 
interest directly from Mechanical Inc, it would have 
incurred United States withholding tax. Ecuadorian Ltd 
interposed Industrias, a Honduran company. In effect, 
Industrias borrowed from Ecuadorian Ltd and lent to 
Mechanical Inc by a back-to-back loan. Thus, the interest 
flowed from the United States to the Bahamas through 
Honduras. The object was to obtain the United States 
withholding tax exemption under Article IX of the United 
States-Honduras double tax treaty.
369
 
The United States Tax Court held that ―Industrias had 
no actual beneficial interest in the interest payments it 
received‖.370 When interpreting Article IX of the United 
States-Honduras double tax treaty, the court observed:
371
 
As [utilised] in the context of article IX, we interpret the 
terms ―received by‖ to mean interest received by a 
corporation of either of the contracting States as its own 
and not with the obligation to transmit it to another. The 
words ―received by‖ refer not merely to the obtaining of 
physical possession on a temporary basis of funds 
representing interest payments from a corporation of a 
contracting State, but contemplate complete dominion 
and control over the funds. 
The court used the phrase ―complete dominion and 
control‖ to represent an attribute of beneficial ownership; 
however, as discussed in section 2.5, it interpreted the 
beneficial ownership concept for treaty purposes, which 
led it to use the phrase in a substantive economic sense.  
The court seemed to appreciate that because of the 
obligation under the loan contract with Ecuadorian Ltd, 
                                               
369 Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, the United 
States–Honduras (25 June 1956, entered into force 6 February 1957). 
The convention was terminated on 31 December 1966. 
370 Aiken Industries Inc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, above n 
368, at 934. 
371 Ibid, at 933 (emphasis added). 
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Industrias lacked ―complete dominion and control‖ over 
the interest payments, or had narrow powers over the 
interest payments. The court focused, however, on the 
issue of whether Industrias‘s contractual obligation had 
substance. It observed:
372
 
The convention requires more than a mere exchange of 
paper between related corporations to come within the 
protection of the exemption from taxation granted by 
article IX of the convention, and on the record as a 
whole, [Aiken Industries] has failed to demonstrate that 
a substantive indebtedness existed between a United 
States corporation and a Honduran corporation. 
Further, the court noted that transactions occurred 
between related parties and that Industrias was left with 
the same inflow and outflow of funds. Based on these 
facts it observed ―… we cannot find that this transaction 
had any valid economic or business purpose‖.373 The 
court‘s analysis of the facts shows that it intended to refer 
to the arrangement as a whole, when it used the words 
―this transaction‖. It held that Industrias could not be 
regarded as having ―received‖ the interest within the 
meaning of Article IX of the United States-Honduras 
double tax treaty.
374
 Essentially, the court investigated 
whether the effect of the arrangement was improper use of 
the treaty. 
The approach adopted by the United States Tax Court 
implies that the presence of a contractual obligation to 
pass on passive income in itself is insufficient for 
regarding an interposed company a conduit. The England 
and Wales Court of Appeal adopted this approach 
                                               
372
 Aiken Industries Inc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, above n 
368, at 933 (emphasis added). 
373 Ibid, at 934. 
374 Ibid. 
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explicitly in Indofood International Finance Ltd v JP 
Morgan Chase Bank NA, London Branch.
375
 
5.9. The Indofood case 
In 2002, Indofood, an Indonesian corporation wanted to 
raise funds by issuing loan notes on the international 
market. If Indofood issued notes, it would have to 
withhold 20 per cent tax on interest payments to note 
holders whose country of residence did not have a double 
tax agreement with Indonesia. That is, issuing notes 
directly in the international market would have increased 
the tax cost on interest payments for Indofood. 
The Indonesia-Mauritius double tax treaty of 10 
December 1996
376
 was in effect in 2002. Article 10(2) of 
the treaty limited Indonesian withholding tax on interest 
payments by 10 per cent. In order to reduce the tax cost, 
Indofood incorporated a Mauritian subsidiary, which will 
be referred to as Finance. Finance borrowed money from 
the international bond market on loan notes and on-lent 
the proceeds to Indofood. 
 
                                               
375 Indofood International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, 
London Branch [2006] EWCA Civ 158. 
376 Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Indonesia–
Mauritius (10 December 1996, entered into force 12 January 1998), 
art 10(2). 
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Figure 5.1: The Indofood case - before the termination of the treaty  
The loan notes were issued for five years and were 
governed by the law of the United Kingdom. Their 
conditions required Indofood to pay interest to Finance. 
Finance in turn was obliged to transfer the interest to JP 
Morgan, a bank in the United Kingdom, which acted as 
the trustee and principal paying agent for the note holders. 
The conditions allowed Finance to redeem the loan notes 
at par, if a change in the law of Indonesia caused Indofood 
to deduct more than 10 per cent withholding tax. They 
required Finance to take ―reasonable measures‖377 before 
redeeming the notes. 
                                               
377 Indofood International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, 
London Branch, above n 375, at para 2. 
Effectiveness of the Beneficial Ownership Test in Conduit Company Cases 
196 
 
After the first interest payment to Finance, Indofood 
paid interest directly to the bank. In 2004, Indonesia gave 
notice to terminate the Indonesia-Mauritius double tax 
treaty. Since Indofood would have had to withhold tax at 
20 per cent after the termination of the treaty, it decided to 
redeem the notes. 
JP Morgan contended that the conditions of loan notes 
required Indofood to take ―reasonable measures‖. It 
proposed that, as a reasonable measure, Indofood should 
incorporate a Dutch subsidiary, which will be referred to 
as Dutch BV, and should assign Dutch BV the ownership of 
its debt to Finance. It presumed that Dutch BV would be 
entitled to an Indonesian withholding tax reduction under 
Article 10(2) of the Indonesia-Netherlands double tax 
treaty of 29 January 2002.
378
 
 
                                               
378 Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, the Netherlands–
Indonesia (29 January 2002, entered into force 1 January 2004), art 
10(2). 
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 Figure 5.2: The Indofood case – the proposed structure 
When Indofood sought the advice of the Director 
General of Taxes in Indonesia on the issue of whether 
Dutch BV would be recognised as the beneficial owner 
under the Indonesia-Netherlands double tax treaty, he 
replied in the negative. Subsequently, in a circular, he 
defined beneficial owner as follows:
379
 
―Beneficial owner‖ refers to the actual owner of income 
such as Dividend, Interest, and or Royalty either 
individual taxpayer or business entity taxpayer that has 
the full privilege to directly benefit from the income. 
As a result, a dispute arose between Indofood and JP 
Morgan over a ―reasonable measure‖, and the matter went 
to the Court of Appeal in the United Kingdom. In order to 
                                               
379 Indofood International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, 
London Branch, above n 375, at para19 (emphasis added). 
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determine whether establishing Dutch BV was a 
―reasonable measure‖, the court investigated whether 
Dutch BV could be considered the beneficial owner of the 
interest payments from Indofood under the Indonesia-
Netherlands double tax treaty. The court held that Dutch 
BV could not be regarded as the beneficial owner of the 
interest, and therefore, the option of establishing Dutch BV 
was not a reasonable measure. 
5.10. Indofood: the presence of a contractual obligation 
and beneficial ownership 
On evaluating the facts in the light of the definition of 
―beneficial owner‖ accorded by the Director General, the 
court was of the opinion that ―the legal, commercial and 
practical structure behind the loan notes‖380 was 
inconsistent with the concept that Finance or Dutch BV 
could enjoy the full privilege to benefit directly from the 
income. 
The court began with an examination of the legal 
structure and found that Finance was bound to pay to JP 
Morgan the interest it received from Indofood because 
conditions of the loan notes precluded it from funding the 
money from any other source. Dutch BV was likely to be 
bound by same conditions. Essentially, the court found 
that Finance was so bound and that Dutch BV would be 
contractually obliged to pass on its income to JP Morgan. 
It did not, however, consider this finding to be conclusive. 
The court was of the opinion that:
381
 
… the meaning to be given to the phrase ―beneficial 
owner‖ is plainly not to be limited by so technical and 
legal an approach. Regard is to be had to the substance 
of the matter. 
                                               
380 Indofood International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, 
London Branch, above n 375, at para 43. 
381 Ibid, at para 44. 
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For this reason, it focused on investigating the commercial 
and practical structure behind the loan notes. 
The court noted that, after the first interest payment to 
Finance, Indofood had been paying interest directly to JP 
Morgan. In its opinion, Indofood was bound to ensure that 
such an arrangement continued lest it was required to pay 
again under its guarantee to the note holders. It further 
found that in practical terms Finance or Dutch BV could 
not have used the interest payments for any other purpose 
except for funding its liability to JP Morgan. It did not 
consider Finance and Dutch BV to have the ―full privilege‖ 
needed to qualify as the beneficial owner just because they 
could fund their liability to JP Morgan. It, therefore, 
equated the position of Finance and Dutch BV to that of an 
―administrator of the income‖.382 The court found this 
conclusion to be consistent with the object and purpose of 
the Indonesian double tax agreements with Mauritius and 
the Netherlands.
383
 
The point that emerges is that the court interpreted 
differently the term ―beneficial owner‖ for legal purposes 
and for purposes of double tax agreements. The court 
regarded the criterion of the presence of a contractual 
obligation to pass on passive income as an indicator of 
beneficial ownership for legal purposes. Since it was 
concerned with the interpretation of ―beneficial owner‖ for 
the purposes of Indonesian double tax agreements with 
Mauritius and the Netherlands, it regarded the simple 
presence of a contractual obligation as indecisive. 
Further, when determining whether Indofood was, and 
Dutch BV would be, the beneficial owner under the double 
                                               
382 Indofood International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, 
London Branch, above n 375, at para 44. 
383 Ibid, at para 45. 
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tax treaties in question, the court examined the substance 
of the arrangement in the light of the object and purpose of 
the treaties. 
The approach of courts in the Bank of Scotland case 
and the Indofood case shows that the main issue in conduit 
company cases is whether the arrangement is consistent 
with the object and purpose of a double tax agreement. 
The issue requires a substantive economic approach. It 
cannot be resolved solely on the basis of the presence of 
an obligation to pass on passive income, whether in 
property law or in contract law. 
Nevertheless, paragraph 14(b) of the Conduit 
Companies Report
384
 considers the main issue in a conduit 
company case to be whether a recipient company is 
obliged to pass on passive income, particularly under 
property law. That is, it treated dominion as a sufficient 
criterion for deciding conduit company cases. As indicated 
in section 5.4, a reason for paragraph 14(b) to adopt this 
approach is its reference to the official commentary on 
Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the OECD Model Convention of 
1977, which presented a ―nominee or agent‖ as an 
example of conduits.  
This official commentary has not only misled 
paragraph 14(b), but also misdirected courts in the Royal 
Dutch Shell case
385
and Prévost Car Inc v Her Majesty the 
Queen.
386
 The following sections examine the reasoning in 
these cases. 
                                               
384 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Double Taxation Conventions 
and the Use of Conduit Companies‖ in OECD Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs International Tax Avoidance and Evasion: Four Related 
Studies, Issues in International Taxation No 1 (OECD, Paris, 1987) 87 
at para 14(b). 
385 For example Royal Dutch Shell (6 April 1994) Case no 28 638, 
BNB 1994/217 (the Hoge Raad, the Netherlands). 
386 Prévost Car Inc v Her Majesty the Queen (2008) TCC 231. 
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5.11. The example of a “nominee or agent” as conduit: 
a fallacy 
Because the official commentary used a ―nominee or 
agent‖ as an example of conduits, it misdirects courts on 
two different, though related, issues. 
First, the commentary implied that cases concerning 
nominees and agents involve an issue of beneficial 
ownership. That is, it implied that in some cases nominees 
or agents can be entitled to treaty benefits. The implication 
does not make sense. In cases involving agents and 
nominees, property is vested solely in the person on whose 
behalf they work. It follows that passive income originates 
from a source company as the property of a company that 
is resident in a third state. That is, nominees or agents 
fundamentally do not own passive income. For this reason, 
nominees or agents should not be able to qualify for treaty 
benefits on any criterion.  
The official commentary on Articles 10 and 11, as it 
stands after its amendment in 2003, has overcome this 
shortcoming to a large extent. It states:
387
 
Where an item of income is received by a resident of a 
Contracting State acting in the capacity of agent or 
nominee it would be inconsistent with the object and 
purpose of the Convention for the State of source to 
grant relief or exemption merely on account of the 
status of the immediate recipient of the income as a 
resident of the other Contracting State. The immediate 
recipient of the income in this situation qualifies as a 
resident but no potential double taxation arises as a 
consequence of that status since the recipient is not 
treated as the owner of the income for tax purposes in 
the State of residence. 
                                               
387 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Commentary on Article 10 
concerning the Taxation of Dividends‖ (OECD, Paris, 2010) in OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs Model Tax Convention on Income and 
on Capital (OECD, Paris, 2010) 187 at para 12.1. OECD Committee on 
Fiscal Affairs ―Commentary on Article 11 concerning the Taxation of 
Interest‖ (OECD, Paris, 2010) in OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs 
Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (OECD, Paris, 2010) 
211 at para 10. 
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It is obvious that the commentary has clarified that, 
because nominees or agents, by definition, do not own 
income, no potential double taxation arises. For this 
reason, it becomes redundant to ask the question of 
whether a ―nominee or agent‖ is the beneficial owner of 
passive income.  
Second, the official commentary on Articles 10, 11 and 
12 of the OECD Model Convention of 1977 suggested that 
the presence of dominion also justifies treating the 
property as being held by someone who is not a conduit. 
That is, it implied that an immediate recipient that 
exercises dominion over property necessarily qualifies for 
treaty benefits, or an immediate recipient that does not act 
in the capacity of a nominee or agent necessarily qualifies 
for treaty benefits. 
The decision of the Hoge Raad of 6 April 1994,
388
 also 
known as the Royal Dutch Shell case, is an example of 
such a misinterpretation. This case concerns the 
application of Article 10(2) of the Netherlands-United 
Kingdom double tax treaty of 7 November 1980.
389
 
Although the Hoge Raad did not refer to the official 
commentary on Article 10(2) of the OECD Model 
Convention of 1977, the Attorney General, who agreed 
with the court, relied on it. Further, Article 10(2) of the 
Netherlands-United Kingdom double tax treaty was the 
same as Article 10(2) of the OECD Model Convention of 
1977.
390
 For this reason, the case can be treated as relevant 
in the present context. 
                                               
388 Royal Dutch Shell (6 April 1994) Case no 28 638, BNB 1994/217 
(the Hoge Raad, the Netherlands). 
389
 Convention for the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to 
Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, the Netherlands–the United 
Kingdom (07 November 1980), art 10(2). 
390 ―Conclusie Advocaat-Generaal mr. Van Soest‖ in Royal Dutch 
Shell, above n 337, para 4.5. 
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5.12. Royal Dutch Shell 
Luxembourg SA, a holding company resident in 
Luxembourg, owned some shares of Royal Dutch Shell, a 
Dutch corporation. Royal Dutch Shell declared dividends. 
Soon after the dividends were declared, but before they 
were made payable, X Ltd, a stockbroker company 
resident in the United Kingdom, bought coupons for 
dividends on the shares from Luxembourg SA. 
Luxembourg SA
X Ltd
Royal Dutch 
Shell
Transfer of 
dividend
coupons
Consideration
80 per cent of the 
gross dividends
Dividends  
15 per cent 
withholding tax 
reduction 
Luxembourg
The United Kingdom
The Netherlands
Ownership
 
Figure 5.3: The Royal Dutch Shell case 
The purpose of the arrangement was to obtain a 10 per 
cent withholding tax reduction under Article 10(2) of the 
double tax treaty between the Netherlands and United 
Kingdom.
391
 The Netherlands-Luxembourg double tax 
                                               
391 The Netherlands–the United Kingdom double tax treaty of 7 
November 1980, above n 389, art 10(2). The relevant part of art 10(2) 
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treaty of 1968
392
 would have offered a withholding tax 
exemption to Luxembourg SA at the same rate; however, 
Luxembourg SA was not entitled to a withholding tax 
reduction because it was a holding company within the 
meaning of the Luxembourg holding company law of 
1929
393
 and was therefore subjected to Dutch withholding 
tax at the rate of 25 per cent. 
When the dividend was available for payment, X Ltd 
cashed the coupons. The paying agent of the dividend 
withheld Dutch withholding tax at the rate of 25 per cent. 
X Ltd applied to the Dutch tax authority for a partial 
refund of the withholding tax on the basis of Article 10 of 
the Netherlands-United Kingdom double tax treaty.
394
 The 
Dutch tax inspector denied the refund, arguing that X Ltd 
was not the beneficial owner.  
The Hoge Raad held that X Ltd was the beneficial 
owner. Explaining its reasons for considering X Ltd to be 
the beneficial owner, it observed (author‘s translation):395 
[X Ltd] became [the] owner of the dividend coupons as 
a result of purchase thereof. [It] can further be assumed 
                                                                                            
provides, ―… dividends may be taxed in the State of which the 
company paying the dividends is a resident, and according to the law 
of that State, but where such dividends are beneficially owned by a 
resident of the other State the tax so charged shall not exceed: 
… 
(b) … 15 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends.‖ 
392 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and 
Fortune, the Netherlands–Luxembourg (8 May 1968, entered into 
force 20 October 1969), art 10(2)(b). 
393 Loi du juillet 1929 sue le regime fiscal des societies de 
participations financiers 1929 (Luxembourg). 
394 The Netherlands-United Kingdom double tax treaty of 7 November 
1980, above n 389, art 27(6). 
395
 ―Beoordeling van de middelen van cassatie‖ in Royal Dutch Shell, 
above n 388, para 3.2 (emphasis added). See also Stef van Weeghel 
The Improper Use of Tax Treaties: with Particular Reference to the 
Netherlands and the United States (Kluwer, London, 1998) at 76 
(emphasis added). 
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that subsequent to the purchase [X Ltd] could freely 
avail itself of those coupons and, subsequent to the 
cashing, could freely avail itself of the distribution, and 
in cashing the coupons [X Ltd] did not act as a 
voluntary agent of or for the account of the principal. 
Under these circumstances the taxpayer is the 
beneficial owner of the dividend. 
The freedom to avail oneself of property corresponds to 
the liberty to use property. The liberty to use property 
constitutes dominion over property, as discussed in section 
5.1. Dominion is a characteristic of ownership. The Hoge 
Raad seems to assume that X Ltd could ―freely avail 
itself‖ of the distribution after cashing the dividend 
coupons because X Ltd did not act as a nominee or agent 
when cashing them. X Ltd did not act in the capacity of a 
nominee or agent because it was the legal owner by virtue 
of buying them. Effectively, the court treated the freedom 
to avail oneself of property as a characteristic of 
ownership. The freedom to avail oneself of property, 
therefore, can be equated to dominion.  
The observation shows that the court regarded the 
presence of dominion as an indicator of beneficial 
ownership. In essence, the Hoge Raad‘s reasoning was as 
follows: because X Ltd had the ownership, it had the 
dominion and therefore, it did not act in the capacity of 
―nominee or agent‖; and because X Ltd was not a 
―nominee or agent‖, it was the beneficial owner. 
Effectively, the court considered the presence of dominion 
to be sufficient to determine whether X Ltd was the 
beneficial owner. 
The court seems to commit an error of logic known as 
―denying the antecedents‖ or ―inverse error‖. The fact that 
a person acts in the capacity of a ―nominee or agent‖ 
implies that the person is not the beneficial owner for the 
purpose of double tax treaties. However, if a person does 
not act in the capacity of a ―nominee or agent‖, he does 
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not necessarily qualify as the beneficial owner for the 
purpose of double tax treaties. The approach of Lord 
Justice Chadwick in the Indofood case lends support to 
this argument. As discussed in section 5.9, the court in the 
Indofood case was concerned with the issue of whether the 
proposed Dutch corporation, Dutch BV, would be regarded 
as the beneficial owner under the double tax treaty 
between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Lord Justice 
Chadwick observed:
396
 
The fact that neither [Finance] nor [Dutch BV] was or 
would be a trustee, agent or nominee for the noteholders 
or anyone else in relation to the interest receivable from 
Indofood is by no means conclusive. 
The foregoing analysis illustrates that the use of a 
―nominee or agent‖ as an example of a conduit has misled 
courts to apply the dominion test to conduit company 
cases. 
5.13. Reasons for the existence of X Ltd 
As discussed in section 5.5, because a nominee or agent 
does not have dominion over income, a mandatory or 
principal receives the income as it originates. The Hoge 
Raad decided Royal Dutch Shell on the basis of the 
dominion test and it was probably misled by the fact that 
Luxembourg SA received a price paid for the dividend, not 
the dividend. The difference in the character of income 
was purely formal. 
Because Luxembourg SA was a 1929 holding company, 
it was liable to pay the Netherlands statutory withholding 
tax at 25 per cent on the dividend payment it would have 
received from Royal Dutch Shell. That is, had 
Luxembourg SA received dividends directly from Royal 
Dutch Shell, it would have received 75 per cent of the 
                                               
396 Indofood International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, 
London Branch [2006] EWCA Civ 158, at para 42. 
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gross dividends. The price at which Luxembourg SA sold 
dividend coupons to X Ltd was 80 per cent of the gross 
dividends. In effect, Luxembourg SA avoided five per cent 
of the Netherlands statutory withholding tax. 
Subsequently, when X Ltd received a 15 per cent 
withholding tax reduction under the Netherlands-United 
Kingdom double tax treaty, it gained a profit of five per 
cent. 
In substance, X Ltd does not seem to have had any 
reasons for existence except to enable Luxembourg SA to 
obtain a tax benefit by taking advantage of the 
Netherlands-United Kingdom double tax treaty. It acted as 
a conduit that earned five per cent profit in the process of 
passing on dividends from Royal Dutch Shell to 
Luxembourg SA.
397
 
The arrangement in the Royal Dutch Shell case 
resembles the arrangement in the Bank of Scotland case. In 
both cases, when passive income arose, recipient 
companies were neither contractually bound nor obliged in 
property law to pass the income on to resident companies. 
Further, the recipient companies were unrelated to 
companies in the source and resident states. Nevertheless, 
the courts came to opposite conclusions because their 
approach differed. While the court in the Bank of 
Scotland
398
 case evaluated the effect of the arrangement, 
the court in the Royal Dutch Shell case based its decision 
on the criterion of the presence of dominion. 
The Royal Dutch Shell case shows that the application 
of the dominion test leads a court to analyse facts from a 
company law perspective, rather than from a substantive 
                                               
397 See also Herman Born ―Beneficial Ownership: Decision of the 
Netherlands Supreme Court of 6 April 1994‖ (1994) ET 469, at 472. 
398 Ministre de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie v Société 
Bank of Scotland (2006) 9 ITLR 683, at 703. 
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economic perspective. As a consequence, it focuses on a 
criterion that an intermediary possesses by definition, and 
ignores factors that may help it to determine whether the 
arrangement is consistent with the object and purpose of a 
double tax agreement. Although this point emerges as an 
implication of the Hoge Raad‘s reasoning in the Royal 
Dutch Shell case, it is illustrated directly by the reasoning 
of the Tax Court of Canada in Prévost Car Inc. v Her 
Majesty the Queen.
399
 
5.14. The Prévost Car case 
The Prévost Car case involved Volvo, a Swedish 
company, and Henlys, a company resident in the United 
Kingdom. They entered into a ―shareholders‘ and 
subscription‖ agreement under which they incorporated 
Dutch BV in the Netherlands in order to acquire shares of 
Prévost, a Canadian company. Dutch BV was not a party to 
the agreement. Volvo owned the majority of shares in 
Dutch BV. 
 
                                               
399 Prévost Car Inc v Her Majesty the Queen (2008) TCC 231 (Tax 
Court of Canada, Canada). 
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Figure 5.4: The Prévost Car case 
Dutch BV had no physical office or employees. It had 
the same directors as Prévost. It executed a power of 
attorney in favour of a Dutch management company, TIM, 
to carry out its business transactions and to pay interim 
dividends on its behalf to Volvo and Henlys. 
According to the shareholders‘ and subscription 
agreement, at least 80 per cent of profits of Prévost and 
Dutch BV were to be distributed to Volvo and Henlys. It 
provided that the board of directors of Dutch BV would 
take reasonable steps to procure dividends and other 
payments from Prévost to enable Dutch BV to pay 
dividends to Volvo and Henlys.  
Prévost paid dividends to Dutch BV and Dutch BV 
distributed them to Volvo and Henlys. Prévost deducted 
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five per cent withholding tax from dividend payments in 
accordance with Article 10(2) of the Canada-Netherlands 
double tax treaty of 4 March 1993.
400
 The Canadian 
Minister of National Revenue issued assessment notices 
with respect to the payments on the basis that Volvo and 
Henlys were their beneficial owners. 
The Tax Court of Canada held that Dutch BV was the 
beneficial owner of the dividend payments from Prévost. 
The Federal Court of Appeal confirmed its decision.
401
 
5.15. Prévost Car: dominion an indicator of beneficial 
ownership 
The Tax Court of Canada referred to the official 
commentary on Article 10(2) of the OECD Model 
Convention of 1977.
402
 Although the court acknowledged 
that the official commentary was amended in 2003, it did 
not note the change in the commentary with respect to 
nominees and agents.
403
 Further, the court referred to 
paragraph 14(b) of the Conduit Companies Report, which 
itself relies on the official commentary of the relevant 
provisions of the OECD Model Convention of 1977 for 
transposing the dominion test from cases involving 
nominees or agents to conduit company cases.
404
 A 
possible reason for the court to refer to paragraph 14(b) is 
that the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs incorporated 
the paragraph in the official commentary in 2003.  
                                               
400 Protocol to the Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and 
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, 
Canada–the Netherlands (4 March 1993, entered into force 30 July 
1994). 
401 Her Majesty the Queen v Prévost Car Inc 2009 FCA 57 (Federal 
Court Of Appeal, Canada). 
402 Prévost Car Inc v Her Majesty the Queen, above n 399, at para 31. 
403 Ibid, at para 32. 
404 Ibid. 
Dominion 
211 
 
Nevertheless, the point is that when discussing the 
meaning of the term ―beneficial owner‖, the Tax Court 
was influenced by the official commentary on Article 
10(2) of the OECD Model Convention of 1977, which used 
a ―nominee or agent‖ as an example of conduits. The court 
observed:
405
 
… the ‗beneficial owner‘ of dividends is the person who 
receives the dividends for his or her own use and 
enjoyment and assumes the risk and control of the 
dividend he or she received. The person who is [the] 
beneficial owner of the dividend is the person who 
enjoys and assumes all the attributes of ownership. In 
short the dividend is for the owner‘s own benefit and 
this person is not accountable to anyone for how he or 
she deals with the dividend income … It is the true 
owner of property who is the beneficial owner of the 
property. Where an agency or mandate exists or the 
property is in the name of a nominee, one looks to find 
on whose behalf the agent or mandatary is acting or for 
whom the nominee has lent his or her name. When 
corporate entities are concerned, one does not pierce the 
corporate veil unless the corporation is a conduit for 
another person and has absolutely no discretion as to the 
use or application of funds put through it as [a] conduit, 
or has agreed to act on someone else‘s behalf pursuant 
to that person‘s instructions without any right to do 
other than what that person instructs it ... 
Because the court considered the characteristic of being 
non-accountable to anyone for dealing with income to be 
an attribute of ownership, that attribute can be equated to 
dominion. The observation shows that the court regarded 
the presence of dominion as an indicator of beneficial 
ownership. Two points emerge. 
First, the case involved a conduit company scheme. 
Nevertheless, the court applied the dominion test to the 
case because it equated the function of conduit companies 
with the role of nominees and agents. 
Second, as a result of applying the dominion test the 
court compared the beneficial ownership test to the 
                                               
405 Prévost Car Inc v Her Majesty the Queen, above n 399, at para 100 
(emphasis added). 
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doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, and therefore, 
analysed the facts from the perspective of company law. 
The next two sections will discuss these points 
separately. 
5.16. Prévost Car: analogy between nominees and 
agents, and conduit companies 
As with paragraph 14(b) of the Conduit Companies 
Report, the court drew an analogy between nominees and 
agents on one hand, and conduit companies on the other. It 
seemed to compare the two categories on the basis that 
they ―act on someone else‘s behalf pursuant to that 
person‘s instructions‖,406 and therefore, have ―no 
discretion as to the use or application of funds‖.407 In this 
manner, the court transposed the dominion test from cases 
involving nominees and agents to the present case, which 
was a conduit company case. It observed:
408
 
However, there is no evidence that the dividends from 
Prévost were ab initio destined [to] Volvo and Henlys 
with [Dutch BV] as a funnel of flowing dividends from 
Prévost ... There was no predetermined or automatic 
flow of funds to Volvo and Henlys … 
The use of phrases ―ab initio destined‖ and 
―predetermined or automatic flow‖ shows that the court 
examined the facts on the basis of a criterion that generally 
exists in a case involving a nominee or agent. That is, the 
court applied the reasoning of a case of a nominee or agent 
to a conduit company case. 
As discussed in section 5.5, in cases involving a 
nominee or agent, income originates as the property of a 
person on whose behalf the nominee or agent receives it. 
That is, the income is ab initio destined to reach that 
                                               
406
 Prévost Car Inc v Her Majesty the Queen, above n 399, at para 
102. 
407 Ibid. 
408 Ibid, at para 102 (emphasis added). 
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person in the form in which it arises. In conduit company 
cases, on the other hand, passive income originates as the 
property of the recipient company. When the recipient 
company passes the income on to a company that is 
resident in a third state, it does so in the capacity of the 
legal owner of the income. Because the recipient company 
is the legal owner of the income, unlike a nominee or 
agent, it has dominion over its income and is not obliged 
in property law to pass on the income. That is, as a legal 
owner, the recipient company may opt not to pay to the 
resident company. The point is that although from a 
substantive economic point of view a conduit company 
passes on the income that it received, in a formal legalistic 
sense the income cannot be regarded as ab initio destined 
to the resident of a third country. This point of difference 
makes it illogical to assume that in conduit company cases 
passive income is ab initio destined to reach to the resident 
company.  
5.17. Prévost Car: analogy between the beneficial 
ownership test and piercing the corporate veil  
As discussed earlier, the word ―beneficial‖ is hard to apply 
to a corporation in any substantive sense because a 
corporation is a creation of the law. An apparently similar 
kind of problem arises in cases where the issue is whether 
the court should pierce the corporate veil; that is, cases in 
which the question before the court is whether a company 
should be treated as a wholly independent legal person or 
whether the court should look through the veil of 
incorporation and determine the economic substance of 
the company or its transaction. While this issue prima 
facie resembles the question of whether a company is the 
beneficial owner of passive income that it receives, it is 
essentially a different question.  
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When applying the doctrine of piercing the corporate 
veil, courts analyse facts from a perspective of company 
law. By contrast, the application of the beneficial 
ownership test requires courts to investigate facts for tax 
purposes. Nevertheless, courts proceed on the basis that 
tests appropriate to situations when the law can pierce the 
corporate veil can logically be applied to determine 
whether a company is indeed a beneficial owner of income 
that it receives. The Prévost Car case is a good example. 
Because the court in the Prévost Car case applied the 
dominion test to Dutch BV, it determined the issue of 
whether Dutch BV was the legal owner, rather than 
whether Dutch BV was the substantive economic owner. 
That is, the court applied the beneficial ownership test 
from a legal perspective. As a result, the court seems to 
have mistaken disregarding the separate entity for tax 
purposes for lifting of the corporate veil.  
The court analysed the facts of the case from the 
perspective of company law, and therefore regarded Dutch 
BV as a separate entity that exercised dominion over the 
income. It observed:
409
 
[Dutch BV] was a statutory entity carrying on business 
operations and corporate activity in accordance with the 
Dutch law under which it was constituted … 
… 
[Dutch BV] was the registered owner of Prévost 
shares. It paid for the shares. It owned the shares for 
itself. When dividends are received by [Dutch BV] in 
respect of shares it owns, the dividends are the property 
of [Dutch BV]. Until such time as the management board 
declares an interim dividend and the dividend is 
approved by the shareholders, the monies represented 
by the dividend continue to be property of, and [was] 
owned solely by, [Dutch BV]. The dividends are an asset 
of [Dutch BV] and are available to its creditors, if any. 
No other person other than [Dutch BV] has an interest in 
the dividends received from Prévost. [Dutch BV] can use 
the dividends as it wishes and is not accountable to its 
                                               
409 Prévost Car Inc v Her Majesty the Queen, above n 399, at para 
103. 
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shareholders except by virtue of the laws of the 
Netherlands. 
 The observation shows that the court tested Dutch BV 
against a criterion that Dutch BV possessed by definition, 
which was dominion over dividends. It, therefore, found 
Dutch BV to be the beneficial owner. However, the court 
asked the wrong question. As discussed in section 5.6 in 
the context of the Bank of Scotland case, the main issue in 
conduit company cases should be whether the arrangement 
is consistent with the object and purpose of a double tax 
agreement. For determining this issue, courts should 
analyse the facts with the objective of finding substantive 
economic reasons for the existence of Dutch BV in the 
corporate structure. It is therefore worth applying the 
reasons for the existence approach to examine whether 
Dutch BV was the beneficial owner of the dividends. 
5.18. Reasons for the existence of Dutch BV 
The court found that the dividends were not ―ad initio 
destined‖410 for Volvo and Henlys. It also found that no 
person other than Dutch BV had an interest in the 
dividends received from Prévost.
411
 As a matter of 
economic substance, these findings are questionable. On 
an analysis of the arrangement in the light of the object 
and purpose of double tax treaties, it is hard to conclude 
that there were reasons for Dutch BV‘s existence other 
than to pass on dividends from Prévost to Volvo and 
Henlys.  
As discussed in section 5.14, under the shareholders‘ 
and subscription agreement, Volvo and Henlys, between 
them, were entitled to a minimum of 80 per cent of the 
                                               
410 Prévost Car Inc v Her Majesty the Queen, above n 399, at para 
102. 
411 Ibid, at para 103. 
Effectiveness of the Beneficial Ownership Test in Conduit Company Cases 
216 
 
profits each of Prévost and Dutch BV. The agreement 
provided that the directors of Dutch BV, who were also the 
directors of Prévost, would ensure that Prévost would 
declare dividends so that Dutch BV could pay dividends to 
Volvo and Henlys. It could, therefore, be inferred that 
Dutch BV passed on what it received from Prévost.  
This inference is strengthened by the facts that Dutch 
BV had no office or employees. Its only activity appeared 
to be to make dividend payments to Volvo and Henlys for 
which it mandated a management company. The court did 
not find evidence regarding the type of business activity 
Dutch BV carried out.  
Together, these facts show that Dutch BV acted as a 
conduit and therefore that the arrangement it was involved 
in was inconsistent with the object and purpose of the 
double tax agreement in question.  
Nevertheless, the court accorded no significance to 
these facts. It observed:
412
 
There is no evidence that [Dutch BV] was a conduit for 
Volvo and Henlys. It is true that [Dutch BV] had no 
physical office or employees in the Netherlands or 
elsewhere. It also mandated to TIM the transaction of its 
business as well for TIM to pay interim dividends on its 
behalf to Volvo and Henlys… 
… [Dutch BV] was not party to the shareholders‘ 
agreement; neither Henlys nor Volvo could take action 
against [Dutch BV] for failure to follow the dividend 
policy described in the shareholders‘ agreement …. 
… I cannot find any obligation in law requiring 
[Dutch BV] to pay dividends to its shareholders on a 
basis determined by the shareholders‘ agreement. When 
[Dutch BV] decides to pay dividends it must pay the 
dividends in accordance with Dutch law. 
The observation shows that the court examined the 
shareholders‘ and subscription agreement in order to 
determine whether Dutch BV was contractually obliged to 
pass on dividends. That is the court focused on the issue of 
                                               
412 Prévost Car Inc v Her Majesty the Queen, above n 399, at para 
102. 
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whether Dutch BV was under an obligation to pass on 
dividends, which as discussed in section 5.7 is indecisive 
for solving conduit company cases. The fact that an 
interposed company is not under an obligation to pass on 
dividends cannot logically lead to the conclusion that that 
company is not a conduit.  
5.19. Conclusion 
Dominion may be helpful for deciding cases involving 
nominees and agents; however, since it is a concept that is 
used in a formal legalistic sense it cannot logically 
determine an issue that, under the policy of double tax 
agreements, is a matter of substance. As a result of 
applying the dominion test to conduit company cases, 
courts have evaluated facts from a formal legalistic point 
of view, rather than adopting a substantive economic 
approach.  
The reasoning of courts in Royal Dutch Shell and 
Prévost Car illustrate that by treating the dominion test as 
decisive, courts effectively ask the question whether the 
immediate recipient was a nominee or agent. Since they 
find that the immediate recipient is not a nominee or 
agent, they conclude that the immediate recipient is not a 
conduit. This reasoning, however, does not make sense. A 
company that immediately receives passive income can be 
a conduit without being a nominee or agent. 
The absence of dominion shows that an intermediary 
acts in the capacity of a nominee or agent, and therefore, is 
not entitled to treaty benefits. Such cases, however, do not 
involve an issue of beneficial ownership. In such cases, an 
intermediary possesses no ownership rights at all, and 
therefore, does not qualify for treaty benefits on any 
criterion. For this reason, it seems misleading to present a 
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nominee or agent as an example of conduit in order to 
demonstrate the role of a conduit company.  
Conduit companies are the legal owners of passive 
income. Generally, conduit companies tend to exploit their 
status as the legal owners to disguise their role, which is in 
effect no more than to pass on passive income. That is 
why double tax agreements require courts to differentiate 
legal ownership from substantive economic ownership. 
Because dominion indicates no more than legal ownership, 
it cannot be decisive by itself for deciding conduit 
company cases. 
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6.1. Introduction 
The United States courts developed the step transaction 
doctrine in their domestic tax jurisdiction as a variation of 
the substance over form approach. When the United States 
courts apply the step transaction doctrine to a series of 
transactions, they integrate the individual steps into a 
single transaction. They apply the step transaction doctrine 
if they find that the individual steps are so interlinked that 
they could be treated as a part of an overall plan. The 
doctrine migrated to conduit company cases in Del 
Commercial Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue.
413
 Interestingly, the Dutch courts have adopted 
the same approach in certain conduit company cases.
414
 
Because they have not assigned a particular term to their 
approach, for the convenience of reference, this chapter 
will refer to it also as ―the step transaction doctrine‖.  
The United States and Dutch courts adopted the step 
transaction doctrine for deciding certain conduit company 
cases in which parties transferred income generating assets 
via back-to-back transactions from the country of 
residence of a beneficial owner – the resident state – to the 
country of the origin of passive income, the source state. 
These transactions involved one or more interposed 
companies. They were designed to avoid withholding tax 
in the source state under the double tax treaty between it 
and the state where the interposed company was located.  
In order to determine whether the company interposed 
in the other contracting state was entitled to treaty 
benefits, the courts investigated whether the individual 
                                               
413 Del Commercial Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue TC Memo 411 (1999). Del Commercial Properties Inc v 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue 251 F 3d 210 (2001). 
414 W-family 1 (18 May 1994) Case no 28 293, BNB 1994/252 (the 
Hoge Raad, the Netherlands), and W-family 2 (18 May 1994) Case no 
28 296, BNB 1994/253 (the Hoge Raad, the Netherlands). 
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transactions were so linked that they could be treated as a 
part of a single transaction. Since they found that the 
transactions were interlinked, they treated the series of 
transactions in substance as a transfer of the income 
generating assets from the resident state directly to the 
source state. Because this transaction in substance resulted 
in an avoidance of the source state withholding tax by 
residents of non-contracting states, the courts treated the 
interposed company as a conduit. That is, they did not 
consider the company to be the beneficial owner. 
Effectively the courts treated beneficial ownership as an 
anti-avoidance test, instead of treating it as a test of 
ownership. That is, they did not assign a strict linguistic 
meaning to beneficial ownership. To this extent, their 
approach corresponds to the ―reasons for existence‖ 
approach. 
However, the problem with their reasoning is that it 
narrows the scope of the step transaction doctrine. 
Consequently, it also restricts the scope of the beneficial 
ownership test. In order to decide whether the step 
transaction doctrine should be applied, the courts accorded 
undue significance to the presence of the link between 
those transactions only where the parties transferred the 
income generating assets from the ultimate owner to the 
source state. That is, unlike the reasons for existence 
approach, the approach of the courts did not involve an 
examination of the arrangement as a whole. As indicated 
in section 3.12, in addition to the flow of income 
generating assets, an arrangement includes factors such as 
the flow of passive income, business activities of 
interposed companies and their locations. 
The step transaction doctrine should catch any 
arrangement that results in the flow of benefits of a double 
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tax treaty to a resident of a non-contracting state. 
However, the approach adopted by the United States and 
Dutch courts restricted the application of the doctrine to 
the criterion of the presence of a link between transactions 
involving the transfer of income generating assets. 
Although the presence of a link between transactions may 
indicate that an immediate recipient does not act as a 
conduit, its absence does not necessarily show that the 
immediate recipient owns passive income beneficially. 
Although the courts based their decision on the 
criterion of the presence of a link between transactions, 
their approach differs from the surrogate tests in two 
respects. First, unlike the surrogate tests, the step 
transaction doctrine does not treat beneficial ownership as 
a test of ownership. Second, the courts consider the link 
between transactions to be related inversely to beneficial 
ownership. By contract, when applying the surrogate tests, 
courts regarded the criteria by which the tests operate as 
positively related to beneficial ownership.  
The proximity of the approach adopted by the United 
States and Dutch courts to the ―reasons for existence‖ 
approach, and its contrast with the surrogate tests make 
this chapter revisit material from previous chapters, 
especially chapter 3. Before discussing conduit company 
cases in which courts have used the step transaction 
doctrine, it is necessary to discuss the doctrine as it 
originated in the United States domestic tax jurisdiction. 
6.2. The step transaction doctrine 
When explaining the operation of the step transaction 
doctrine, the United States Supreme Court in Leonard 
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Greene and Joyce Greene v United States of America
415
 
observed:
416
 
The doctrine treats the ―steps‖ in a series of formally 
separate but related transactions involving the transfer 
of property as a single transaction, if all the steps are 
substantially linked … Rather than viewing each step as 
an isolated incident, the steps are viewed together as 
components of an overall plan. 
The United States courts apply the step transaction 
doctrine to cases where taxing the individual steps of a 
transaction rather than the transaction as a whole would 
undermine the substance of the transaction resulting in 
improper treatment of the whole transaction.
417
  
Because in a conduit company scheme the beneficial 
owner is a resident of a third state, allowing a reduction in 
the source state withholding tax contradicts the object and 
purpose of the double tax agreement. Applying the step 
transaction doctrine to a conduit company scheme, a court 
treats an intermediary as a conduit and disregards steps 
that involve the transfer of passive income from a source 
to a resident company through the intermediary. 
The United States courts adopt three tests for 
determining whether individual steps are ―substantially 
linked‖.418 These tests are the ―binding commitment‖ test, 
the ―end-result‖ test, and the ―mutual interdependence‖ 
test. 
                                               
415 Leonard Greene and Joyce Greene v United States of America 13 F 
3d 577 (2d Cir 1994). 
416 Ibid at 583 (emphasis added). 
417 See Yoram Keinan ―Rethinking the Role of the Judicial Step 
Transaction Principle and a Proposal for Codification‖ (2007) 22 
Akron Tax J 45, at 48. 
418 Leonard Greene and Joyce Greene v United States of America, 
above n 415, at 583. 
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6.3. The binding commitment test 
When using the ―binding commitment‖ test, the United 
States courts invoke the step transaction doctrine only if 
the taxpayer was under a commitment to complete the 
remaining steps at the time the first step took place.
419
 
Courts will not apply the doctrine if there was a moment 
during the transactions at which the parties were not under 
a binding obligation.
420
  
The narrow scope of the test makes it easy for 
taxpayers to manipulate the result of the application of the 
test.
421
 For this reason, the United States courts rarely 
apply it. In the light of the narrow scope of the test, one 
might expect that in conduit company cases, the courts 
would regard the presence of an obligation of an 
interposed company to pass on passive income as a 
binding commitment. As discussed in sections 5.5 and 5.7, 
even if an intermediary company is under no obligation to 
pass on passive income to a resident company, it can still 
act as a conduit, and therefore, can be involved in a 
transaction that is contrary to the object and purpose of a 
double tax agreement. For this reason, the test seems 
inappropriate for deciding conduit company cases. 
6.4. The end-result test 
Under the ―end-result‖ test, the United States courts 
integrate separate steps if they find that the steps form part 
of a single scheme intended to achieve a single result. 
They do not recognise the individual steps as separate 
―unless the taxpayer shows that at the time the parties 
                                               
419 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v Gordon 391 US 83 (1968) at 
96. 
420 Long Term Capital Holdings v United States of America 330 F 
Supp 2d 122 (2004). 
421 See Robert A Penrod v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 88 TC 
1415 (1987) at 1428. 
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engaged in the individual steps, its result was the intended 
end result in and of itself.‖422 
The end-result test focuses on the taxpayer‘s intent at 
the time of the first step. Thus, the parties‘ intent for each 
event is examined separately, and if the intent of the 
parties pertaining to a particular event is that such an event 
will merely serve as another step in achieving an end-
result, the court will disregard the event.
423
 
Under the end-result test, courts focus on the issue of 
whether a taxpayer intended to reach a particular result by 
structuring a series of transactions in a certain way, not on 
the issue of whether a taxpayer intended to avoid taxes.
424
 
The United States courts have not applied the end-
result test to conduit company cases. The approach 
adopted by the Dutch courts in W-family 1,
425
 however, 
corresponds to the end-result test. As section 6.11 
discusses, the court in W-family 1 regarded transactions as 
interlinked because it found that parties transferred shares 
to the immediate recipient with the intent that the 
company in the source state would buy them subsequently. 
For this reason, W family 1 could be seen to provide an 
illustration of the application of the end-result test to 
conduit company cases; and the inferences drawn may be 
associated with the end-result test. 
                                               
422 Andantech LLC v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 83 TCM (CCH) 
1476 (2002) at 1504 (emphasis added). 
423 Long Term Capital Holdings v United States of America, above n 
420, at 191. 
424 Jean D. True v United States of America 190 F 3d 1165 (10th Cir 
1999) at 1175. 
425 W-family 1 (18 May 1994) Case no 28 293, BNB 1994/252 at para 
4.5 (the Hoge Raad, the Netherlands). 
Effectiveness of the Beneficial Ownership Test in Conduit Company Cases 
226 
 
6.5. The mutual-interdependence test 
Pursuant to the ―mutual-interdependence‖ test, courts 
apply the step transaction doctrine if ―the steps are so 
interdependent that the legal relations created by one 
transaction would have been fruitless without a 
completion of the series‖.426 They examine whether the 
individual steps or events have independent significance 
or have meaning only as parts of the larger transaction.
427
 
The United States Tax Court and the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia applied the mutual 
interdependence test to Del Commercial Properties Inc v 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
428
 which was a conduit 
company case. The tax planning scheme in this case 
involved a series of transactions by means of which the 
principal amount of a loan made by a Canadian bank was 
passed on to a United States company via different 
countries in order to avoid United States withholding tax 
on interest payments. 
6.6. The Del Commercial case 
Del Commercial
429
 involved a group of affiliated 
companies with the following structure. DL Shekel, the 
parent company held all the shares of Tridel. Tridel wholly 
owned Delcom Financial, which in turn owned all the 
shares of Delcom Holdings. These companies were 
resident in Canada.  
Delcom Holdings wholly owned Delcom Cayman, a 
company resident in the Cayman Islands. Delcom Cayman 
                                               
426 Redding v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 630 F 2d 1169 
(1980) at 1177. 
427 See Robert A Penrod v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, above n 
421, at 1430. 
428 Del Commercial Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue TC Memo 411 (1999). Del Commercial Properties Inc v 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue 251 F 3d 210 (2001). 
429 Ibid. 
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held all the shares of Delcom Antilles, an Antillean 
Corporation. Delcom Antilles in turn wholly owned a 
Dutch subsidiary, Del Netherlands. Delcom Holdings also 
owned all the shares of Del Commercial, a company 
resident in the United States, which was the taxpayer. 
Royal Bank of Canada
DL Shekel
Tridel
Delcom Financial
Delcom Holdings
Delcom Cayman
Delcom Antilles
Del Netherlands
Del Commercial
Loan
Loan
Loan
Capital 
Contribution
Capital 
Contribution
Capital 
Contribution
Interest
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
Canada
The Cayman Islands
The Netherlands Antilles
The Netherlands
USA
Ownership
Interest
 
Figure 6.1: The Del Commercial case 
Del Commercial was engaged in the business of leasing 
industrial real estate property and needed funds for its 
business. Tridel, therefore, arranged the following finance 
scheme. Delcom Financial borrowed money from Royal 
Bank of Canada and on-lent it to Delcom Holdings. The 
principal amount was then passed on to Delcom 
Netherlands through Delcom Cayman and Delcom 
Antilles by a series of similar transactions, which involved 
each intermediary contributing the principal amount to its 
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wholly owned subsidiary in exchange for the subsidiary‘s 
common shares. Subsequently, Del Netherlands loaned the 
principal amount to Del Commercial. Del Netherlands had 
minimal assets, apart from the loan to Del Commercial. 
Del Netherlands was engaged in minimal business 
activity. 
The interest rate and payment schedule of the loan 
made by Del Netherlands to Del Commercial were the 
same as the loan made by Bank of Canada to Delcom 
Financial. Del Commercial guaranteed repayment of the 
loan amount to the bank and authorised the bank to place a 
mortgage on its property in the United States. 
Initially Del Commercial repaid the loan to Del 
Netherlands. Del Netherlands in turn transferred the 
payment to both Delcom Financial and Delcom Holdings, 
which forwarded the funds to the bank. However, after a 
year-and-a-half Del Commercial began repaying directly 
either to Delcom Holdings or to Delcom Financial, which 
forwarded the payments to the bank. Del Netherlands 
reported the interest paid by Del Commercial to Delcom 
Holdings and Delcom Financial on its tax returns. 
The scheme was designed to obtain the United States 
withholding tax exemption on interest under Article VI of 
the United States-Netherlands double tax treaty of 29 
April 1948.
430
 If Del Commercial had paid interest directly 
to Delcom Financial, it would have had to withhold tax at 
                                               
430 Supplementary Convention Modifying and Supplementing the 
Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Certain other Taxes 
(30 December 1965, entered into force 8 July 1966), art VI. Article 
VI(1) stated: ―Interest on bonds, notes, debentures, securities, deposits 
or any other form of indebtedness … paid to a resident or corporation 
of one of the Contracting States shall be exempt from tax by the other 
Contracting State.‖ 
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the rate of 15 per cent under Article XI of the United 
States-Canada double tax treaty of 26 September 1980.
431
 
Del Commercial did not withhold tax on interest 
payments. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a 
notice of deficiency to Del Commercial on the grounds 
that the substance of the loan to it reflected a loan not from 
Del Netherlands, but from Delcom Financial, and 
therefore, the interest payments from Del Commercial 
should be treated as having been paid to Delcom 
Financial. 
The United States Tax Court and the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit decided in favour of 
the Commissioner.  
6.7. Del Commercial: a comparison with the Northern 
Indiana case 
Del Commercial argued that both courts should rely on the 
decision in Northern Indiana Public Service Company v 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
432
 which the United 
States Tax Court and the Court of Appeals for Seventh 
Circuit had decided in favour of the taxpayer. It will be 
recalled from section 4.13 that, as with the present case, in 
the Northern Indiana case a United States company, 
Northern Indiana, borrowed funds from residents of third 
                                               
431 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on 
Capital, Canada–United States (26 September 1980), art XI. Article XI 
(6)(a) states: ―Interest arising in the United States that is contingent 
interest of a type that does not qualify as portfolio interest under 
United States law may be taxed by the United States but, if the 
beneficial owner of the interest is a resident of Canada, the gross 
amount of the interest may be taxed at a rate not exceeding the rate 
prescribed in subparagraph (b) of paragraph 2 of Article X 
(Dividends).‖ Article X(2)(b) applies withholding tax at the rate of 15 
per cent.  
432 Northern Indiana Public Service Company v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue 105 TC 341 (1995). Northern Indiana Public Service 
Company v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 115 F 3d 506 (7th Cir 
1997). 
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states through Finance, an interposed Dutch company. As 
with Del Commercial, Northern Indiana guaranteed the 
repayment of the original loan.  
The courts rejected Del Commercial‘s argument and 
distinguished the role of the interposed company in the 
Northern Indiana case from the role of Del Netherlands in 
the Del Commercial case. The Court of Appeals 
observed:
433
 
In [the Northern Indiana case], … [t]he appellate court 
explained that [Finance] participated in the transactions 
because it could obtain funds on the Eurobond market 
when ―prevailing market conditions made the overall 
cost of borrowing abroad less than the cost of borrowing 
domestically.‖ … Additionally, [Finance] received a 
profit from its transactions with the U.S. taxpayer. This 
profit then was reinvested in the Eurobond market. The 
―profit motive‖ of [Finance] was sufficient to show that 
the motive of the transaction was not simply tax 
avoidance.  
Not only are the two cases not factually similar, but 
the taxpayer‘s evidence in [the Northern Indiana case] 
was substantially stronger than [Del Commercial‘s] 
evidence in this case. 
It, therefore, could be inferred that the only fact on 
which the courts in Del Commercial distinguished 
Finance‘s function from Del Netherlands‘ role was the 
presence of a profit spread.  
As discussed in section 4.27, the presence of a profit 
spread does not sufficiently indicate that an interposed 
company does not act as a conduit. The courts‘ agreement 
with the legal analysis of the Northern Indiana case is 
relevant because it shows that they considered the 
presence of a close correspondence between terms of the 
contracts in Del Commercial as sufficient to indicate that 
Del Netherlands acted as a conduit. Consequently, they 
analysed the facts from a formal legalist perspective. 
Section 6.17 illustrates this point further. 
                                               
433 Del Commercial Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue 251 F 3d 210 (2001) at 216. 
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6.8. Del Commercial: the step transaction doctrine 
Both courts applied the step transaction doctrine. The 
Court of Appeals explained: ―if the sole purpose of a 
transaction with a foreign corporation is to dodge U.S. 
taxes, the treaty cannot shield the taxpayer from the 
fatality of the step-transaction doctrine.‖434 It also 
observed: ―In step-transaction cases, the existence of 
formal business activity is a given but the inquiry turns on 
the existence of a nontax business motive.‖435 
In order to determine the non-tax business motive, both 
courts investigated whether a ―link‖436 or ―nexus‖437 
existed between the loan made by the Royal Bank of 
Canada to Delcom Financial and the loan from Del 
Netherlands to Del Commercial. The Court of Appeals 
observed:
438
 
[S]everal facts demonstrate the nexus between the 
original Royal Bank loan and the loan from [Del 
Netherlands] to [Del Commercial]: (1) the interest rates 
and repayment schedules of the two loans closely 
correspond; (2) Royal Bank obtained a guaranty of 
repayment from [Del Commercial] and a security 
interest in [Del Commercial‘s] real property; and (3) … 
[Del Commercial] made payments on the loan directly 
to Delcom Financial … 
The courts emphasised the interdependence of the two 
loan transactions. That is, they applied the mutual-
interdependence test. They did not apply the end-result 
test because they focused on the parties‘ intention to avoid 
tax, not on the parties‘ intention to reach a particular 
result.  
                                               
434 Del Commercial Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, above n 433, at 214. 
435 Ibid. 
436 Del Commercial Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue TC Memo 411 (1999).  
437 Del Commercial Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, above n 433, at 214. 
438 Ibid. 
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Because the courts found that the two loan transactions 
were mutually interdependent, they invoked the step 
transaction doctrine and held that in substance the interest 
payments by Del Commercial were made to Delcom 
Financial. For this reason, the Tax Court regarded Del 
Netherlands as a ―mere shell or conduit‖439 and refused a 
withholding tax exemption under the United States-
Netherlands double tax treaty. It held that Del Commercial 
was liable for 15 per cent withholding tax on the interest 
payments under the United States-Canada double tax 
treaty. The Court of Appeals confirmed the findings of the 
Tax Court.
440
 
6.9. Del Commercial: the step transaction doctrine 
and beneficial ownership 
Although Article VI of the United States-Netherlands 
double tax treaty did not use the term ―beneficial 
owner‖,441 the courts implicitly read the beneficial 
ownership requirement into the provision. The Tax Court 
observed:
442
 
[U]nder [the] treaty between the United States and 
Canada …, interest payments made by U.S. taxpayers to 
Canadian corporations are subject to tax at a rate not 
exceeding 15 percent if the Canadian corporations are 
the beneficial recipients and owners of the interest 
income. 
The Court of Appeals was of the same opinion.
443
 The 
courts decided to impose a 15 per cent withholding tax in 
                                               
439 Del Commercial Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, above n 436. 
440 Del Commercial Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, above n 433, at 217. 
441 The United States-Netherlands double tax treaty, above n 430, art 
VI. 
442 Del Commercial Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, above n 436. 
443 Del Commercial Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, above n 433, at 213. 
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accordance with the United States-Canada treaty, because 
they considered Delcom Financial to be the beneficial 
owner of the interest payments. They found that Del 
Netherlands was a ―mere shell or conduit‖444 for the 
beneficial owner, Delcom Financial. In other words, they 
found that Del Netherlands was not the beneficial owner. 
Their approach implies that they considered the presence 
of a link between transactions to indicate the absence of 
beneficial ownership. While this implication is prima facie 
true, more could be read into the reasoning. 
The presence or absence of a link cannot be logically 
connected to the presence or absence of beneficial 
ownership. As indicated earlier, the step transaction 
doctrine is an anti-avoidance doctrine. The existence of a 
link between transactions indicates the presence of tax 
avoidance. In Del Commercial, the presence of the link 
showed that the interposition of Del Netherlands resulted 
in the use of the United States-Netherlands double tax 
treaty by Delcom Financial, a Canadian resident, to avoid 
the United States withholding tax. When the courts found 
that treaty benefits were in substance being obtained by a 
resident of a non-contracting state, they regarded Del 
Netherlands as a conduit, or they did not consider Del 
Netherlands to be the beneficial owner. Therefore, 
effectively, the courts did not consider Del Netherlands as 
a beneficial owner because its interposition resulted in 
avoidance of the United States withholding tax by a 
resident of a third state. The courts treated beneficial 
ownership as an anti-avoidance test, rather than a test of 
ownership.  
                                               
444 Del Commercial Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, above n 436. 
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The courts regarded beneficial ownership as a 
requirement that was informed by the purpose of the 
limitation of treaty benefits. They did not accord a 
linguistic interpretation to beneficial ownership. Probably 
for this reason, they did not adopt a surrogate form of 
reasoning, whereby they would have considered the 
presence of a criterion to indicate the presence of 
beneficial ownership. 
As indicated in section 6.4, the Dutch courts have 
adopted an approach similar to the United States step 
transaction doctrine. In the W-family 1 case,
445
 the Dutch 
courts determined whether an interposed company was the 
beneficial owner on the basis of the question of whether 
the individual steps of a series of transactions were linked. 
As with the United States courts, the Dutch courts 
regarded the beneficial ownership test as an anti-
avoidance test. In order to determine whether the 
transactions were linked, they investigated whether the 
parties entered into the transactions with an intention to 
achieve an end result.  
6.10. The W-family 1 case 
The W-family 1 case involved Mrs. W, a resident of 
Belgium, who held shares in a Dutch company, Dutch BV, 
jointly with family relatives, Ms. D, a Swiss resident, and 
Mr. S, a resident of the Netherlands. On 20 April 1978, 
Mrs. W incorporated a wholly owned company in the 
Netherlands Antilles, Antillean NV. On 30 June 1978, Mrs. 
W and Ms. D transferred their shares in Dutch BV. While 
Mrs. W transferred the shares to Antillean NV as a capital 
contribution, Ms. D sold her shares for a debt that was not 
yet due. On the same day, the shareholders of Dutch BV 
                                               
445 W-family 1 (18 May 1994) Case no 28 293, BNB 1994/252 (the 
Hoge Raad, the Netherlands). 
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decided to redeem 10 of the shares that Mrs. W and Ms. D 
transferred to Antillean NV. Dutch BV redeemed its shares 
on 20 July 1978. 
Mr. S
Mrs. W
Ms. D
Antillean NV
Dutch BV
Transfer of
shares
100%
Buy-back
10 shares
Payment
for
buy-back
Ownership
Switzerland
The Netherlands Antilles
Belgium
The Netherlands
 
Figure 6.2: The W-family 1 case 
The Dutch tax inspector characterised the redemption 
of shares as a repurchase directly from Mrs. W and Ms. D. 
Treating the payment from Dutch BV as a dividend 
distribution, he imposed a deficiency assessment for 
dividend withholding tax. Antillean NV argued that 
prevailing circumstances prevented family members from 
managing the business carried out by Dutch BV. It argued, 
therefore, that Antillean NV was created for the purpose of 
the concentration of the family‘s wealth. In the support of 
this argument, Antillean NV pointed out that, apart from 
Dutch BV‘s shares, Mrs. W and Ms. D transferred their 
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shareholdings in other Dutch companies to Antillean NV, 
and that Antillean NV had not distributed any dividends to 
them. In essence, Antillean NV argued that it was created 
for valid reasons other than tax avoidance, and was, 
therefore, entitled to a Dutch withholding tax refund under 
Article 11 of the BRK.
446
 
The lower court of Arnhem confirmed the tax 
inspector‘s decision. The Hoge Raad agreed with the 
lower court. 
6.11. W-family 1: the step transaction doctrine   
The lower court examined the minutes of the meeting of 
Dutch BV‘s shareholders and found that they did not 
simply show that the shareholders of Dutch BV decided to 
buy back its shares; rather, they showed that the 
shareholders had also discussed the transfer of shares from 
Mrs. W and Ms. D to Antillean NV, and comprehensively 
formulated conditions of the buyback agreement, such as 
price, guarantee and payments.
447
 Further, the court 
pointed out that conditions of the deed of transfer between 
Mrs. W and Ms. D and Antilles NV were included 
verbatim in the deed of purchase between Antillean NV 
and Dutch BV.
448
 The court, therefore, concluded (author‘s 
translation):
449
 
Given the contents of the relevant instruments and the 
interdependence between them …, it is obvious that 
                                               
446 Tax Arrangement for the Kingdom of the Netherlands (28 October 
1964, entered into force 12 December 1985), art 11(3). It provides: 
―The [dividend withholding tax] … shall not be levied, or if so levied, 
shall be refunded with respect to dividends derived by an entity whose 
capital is wholly or partly divided into shares and which is a resident 
of the other country and holds at least 25 per cent of the paid-up 
capital of the company.‖ 
447
 See ―HOF Arnhem 28 juni 1991 (Nr. 1658/1988)‖ in W-family 1, 
above n 445, at para 4.4 (emphasis added). 
448 Ibid, 4.5. 
449 Ibid. 
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there was a direct interlink between a number of legal 
acts, the execution of which was decided upon by all 
those involved before (throughout) 30 June 1978. 
The court seems to have examined the events in order 
to determine whether the acquisition of Dutch BV‘s shares 
by Antillean NV and the redemption of the shares by Dutch 
BV were substantively linked. That is, the court attempted 
to determine whether the individual transactions should be 
treated as parts of a single transaction for tax purposes.  
The court seems to emphasise that every step was 
predetermined.
450
 That is, when Mrs. W and Ms. D 
transferred their shares to Antillean NV, the parties 
intended that Dutch BV would redeem its shares. The court 
considered the two transactions to be interlinked because 
they were intended to achieve the end result that they in 
fact achieved. In his case note on W-family 2, P.J. Wattel 
expressed the same opinion. Citing IJzerman,
451
 he stated 
(author‘s translation):452  
In my opinion, grounds for the decision indicate a fiscal 
qualification of the series of transactions as a whole to 
the end result (purchase). IJzerman describes this way 
of interpreting the rules of law as follows: ―the way 
chosen is (…) fiscally not qualified in accordance with 
the separate steps under civil law, but goes directly to 
the end result with due observance of connections 
between the agreements‖.453 
It is clear that the approach that the lower court of 
Arnhem adopted corresponds to the end result test as used 
by the United States court to implement the step 
transaction doctrine. 
                                               
450 Also see ―Noot‖ in W-family 2 (18 May 1994) Case no 28 296, BNB 
1994/253 at para 7 (the Hoge Raad, the Netherlands). 
451
 RLH IJzerman Het leerstuk van de wetsontduiking in het 
belastingrecht (Kluwer, Deventer, 1991). 
452 ―Noot‖ in W-family 2, above n 450, at para 4. 
453 IJzerman, above n 451, at 70. 
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6.12. W-family1: link between transactions and tax 
avoidance 
The court rejected Antillean NV‘s argument that it was 
established for the purpose of the concentration of the 
family‘s wealth. It observed (author‘s translation):454 
Reasons for establishing [Antillean NV] put forward by 
Dutch BV failed to explain why [Antillean NV] 
redeemed its shares indirectly through Antillean NV 
instead of buying them directly from [Mrs. W and Ms. 
D]. It, therefore, must be assumed that the parties 
interposed Antillean NV to achieve the redemption of 
the shares, whereby they used the company solely for 
tax reasons. 
As the Hoge Raad held in … [Y-group 1990], it is 
against the purpose of Article 11 BRK to allow treaty 
benefits in a case where a non-resident of the 
Netherlands Antilles enjoys dividends distributed by a 
Dutch company to an Antillean company that is 
interposed solely to avoid tax. The fact that [Antillean 
NV] has not paid a dividend is insignificant. The interest 
of the former shareholders in [Dutch BV‘s] assets is in 
substance convertible into their interest in [Antillean 
NV‘s] assets and therefore is at their disposal. 
Essentially the lower court considered the presence of 
the link between transactions to show that the end result, 
which was the redemption of the shares by Dutch BV 
directly from the Mrs. W and Ms. D, caused the use of 
Article 11(3) of the BRK by residents of non-contracting 
states to avoid Dutch withholding tax. That is, it regarded 
the presence of the link between transactions to indicate 
tax avoidance. The observation confirms that the lower 
court adopted an approach that was effectively the same as 
the United States step-transaction doctrine.  
6.13. W-family 1: the step transaction doctrine and 
beneficial ownership 
Based on its finding that the individual transactions were 
interlinked, the lower court inferred (author‘s 
translation):
455
 
                                               
454 See ―HOF Arnhem 28 juni 1991 (Nr. 1658/1988)‖ in W-family 1, 
above n 505, at para 4.7. 
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… at least in the period from 30 June 1978 to 20 July 
1978, neither had [Antillean NV] any intention of being 
the economic owner of the shares of Dutch BV, nor had 
[Mrs. W and Ms. D] envisaged that it would be. 
The Hoge Raad drew this same inference.
456
 The courts 
used the term ―economic owner‖ interchangeably with the 
term ―beneficial owner‖.457 Although Article 11 of the 
BRK did not use the term ―beneficial owner‖,458 the courts 
read the beneficial ownership requirement into the 
provision. The observation shows that the court did not 
consider Antillean NV to be the beneficial owner because 
Mrs. W and Ms. D transferred the shares with the intention 
that Dutch BV would redeem them. That is, the court did 
not consider Antillean NV to be the beneficial owner 
because the transactions were intended to achieve the end 
result.  
As indicated earlier, the courts applied the end result 
test in order to determine whether the individual 
transactions should be treated as parts of a single 
transaction for tax purposes. By implication, because the 
Dutch courts applied the step transaction doctrine, they 
concluded that Antillean NV was not the beneficial owner. 
It could, therefore, be inferred that, as with the United 
States courts in Del Commercial, the Dutch courts used 
beneficial ownership as an anti-avoidance test, not a test of 
ownership. 
                                                                                            
455 See ―HOF Arnhem 28 juni 1991 (Nr. 1658/1988)‖ in W-family 1, 
above n 445, at para 4.6 (emphasis added). 
456 See ―[Tekst] ARREST‖ in W-family 1, above n 445, at para 3.2.1.  
457 See See ―[Mening] Conclusie Advocaat-Generaal mr. Verburg‖ in 
W-family 1, above n 445, at para 9. 
458 Tax Arrangement for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, above n 
446, art 11(3). It stated: ―The [dividend withholding tax] … shall not 
be levied, or if so levied, shall be refunded with respect to dividends 
derived by an entity whose capital is wholly or partly divided into 
shares and which is a resident of the other country and holds at least 
25 per cent of the paid-up capital of the company.‖ 
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6.14. Link between transactions: an indecisive 
approach 
The courts of the United States and the Netherlands 
adopted similar approaches in conduit company cases that 
concerned the same issues. Because they found that 
individual transactions were linked, they considered the 
immediate recipients acted as conduits and therefore were 
not entitled to treaty benefits. They considered the 
presence of a link to be an indicator of the absence of 
beneficial ownership.  
In Del Commercial and W-family 1, the arrangement 
involved the interposition of an immediate recipient for 
the purpose of obtaining a withholding tax reduction under 
the relevant double tax treaties. The parties implemented 
the arrangement with the help of transactions by which 
ownership of income generating assets were transferred 
from the resident state to the source state. That is, the 
transactions were the overt acts. It follows that the courts 
examined the overt acts when they investigated the series 
for determining whether the individual steps were 
interlinked. To this extent, the application of the step 
transaction doctrine corresponds to the ―reasons for the 
existence‖ approach as discussed in chapter 3. However, 
as sections 6.15 and 6.28 illustrate, unlike the ―reasons for 
existence‖ approach, the courts did not consider the 
arrangement as a whole. They focused only on 
transactions where the parties transfer passive income 
generating assets from a resident state to a source state. 
In Del Commercial and W-family 1, the courts began by 
adopting the correct approach; however, they constricted 
the approach because they based their decisions on 
transactions concerning the transfer of assets from the 
resident company to the source company. The presence of 
a link may show that an immediate recipient acts as a 
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conduit; however, its absence does not necessarily show 
that an immediate recipient does not act as a conduit. The 
following sections analyse the reasoning of the courts in 
Del Commercial and W-family 1 further. 
6.15. Del Commercial: did courts consider the 
arrangement as a whole? 
In Del Commercial Properties Inc v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue,
459
 the United States courts were of the 
opinion that the loan made by the Royal Bank of Canada 
to Delcom Financial was substantially linked to the loan 
from Del Netherlands to Del Commercial. As indicated in 
section 6.8, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit considered three facts.
460
 
First, there was a close correspondence in interest rates 
and repayment schedules of the two contracts. Second, Del 
Commercial provided a guarantee and security over its 
property to the bank for the loan that it borrowed from Del 
Netherlands. Third, Del Commercial repaid the loan 
directly to Delcom Financial. 
The court seems to have examined the arrangement as a 
whole. However, the distinction that the court drew 
between the function of Finance in Northern Indiana on 
one hand and the role of Del Netherlands on the other 
shows that it based its decision on the co-relation of 
interest rates and payment schedules. The distinction was 
based on the fact that Finance in Northern Indiana earned 
a profit spread on the inflow and outflow of interest.  
Considering the frame of reference within which the 
court in Del Commercial analysed the facts for applying 
                                               
459 Del Commercial Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue TC Memo 411 (1999). Del Commercial Properties Inc v 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue 251 F 3d 210 (2001). 
460 Del Commercial Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue 251 F 3d 210 (2001) at 216. 
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the mutual-interdependence test, it viewed the presence of 
a profit spread to show that the interest rates with respect 
to individual loan transactions were different. This 
difference indicated that the transactions were 
independent. For this reason, the court in Del Commercial 
did not regard Finance as a conduit. 
In Del Commercial, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit observed: ―In step-
transaction cases, the existence of formal business activity 
is a given but the inquiry turns on the existence of a 
nontax business motive.‖461 Applying the step transaction 
doctrine, it assumed that Del Netherlands carried out a 
substantive business activity, even though the United 
States Tax Court found otherwise.
462
 The approach shows 
that the court did not examine the arrangement as a whole. 
It regarded the similarity between the two loan contracts 
as sufficient to indicate that Del Netherlands acted as a 
conduit. This point can be explained further by comparing 
the approach of the court in Del Commercial with that of 
the England and Wales Court of Appeal in Indofood 
International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, 
London Branch.
463
 
6.16. The Indofood case 
As discussed in section 5.9, the Indofood case
464
 involved 
an Indonesian company, Indofood, which incorporated a 
Mauritian subsidiary, Finance, to borrow funds from 
international investors. Indofood established the structure 
                                               
461 Del Commercial Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, above n 460, at 214. 
462 Del Commercial Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue TC Memo 411 (1999). 
463 Indofood International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, 
London Branch [2006] EWCA Civ 158. 
464 Ibid. 
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in order to obtain an Indonesian withholding tax reduction 
under the Indonesia-Mauritius double tax treaty of 10 
December 1996.
465
 
Before the bonds matured, the government of Indonesia 
issued a notice terminating the treaty, which led to a 
dispute between Indofood and the paying agent of the 
bondholders, JP Morgan. While Indofood wished to 
redeem the bonds at par, which was a possible option 
under the contract, JP Morgan contended that Indofood 
could establish another subsidiary in the Netherlands, 
Dutch BV and could assign to Dutch BV the ownership of 
its debt to Finance. 
In order to decide whether establishing Dutch BV was a 
reasonable measure, the England and Wales Court of 
Appeal had to determine whether Dutch BV would be 
considered to be the beneficial owner of interest payments 
from Indofood under the Indonesia-Netherlands double tax 
treaty of 29 January 2002.
466
 The court found that Finance 
did not own the interest payments beneficially. Since 
Dutch BV was most likely to take over Finance‘s 
obligations, the court held that Dutch BV would not be 
considered the beneficial owner. 
467
 
The court examined the ―legal, commercial and 
practical structure behind the loan notes‖.468 In 
considering the legal structure, it noted the fact that 
                                               
465 Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Indonesia–
Mauritius (10 December 1996, entered into force 12 January 1998), 
art 10(2). 
466 Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, the Netherlands–
Indonesia (29 January 2002, entered into force 1 January 2004), art 
10(2). 
467 Indofood International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, 
London Branch, above n 463, at para 43. 
468 Ibid. 
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Finance was, and Dutch BV would be, contractually bound 
to pay to JP Morgan what it received from Indofood. 
Although the same inflow and outflow of interest also 
indicated that Finance acted, and Dutch BV would act, as a 
conduit, the court did not regard this fact as decisive. The 
court maintained that basing the decision on this fact 
meant assigning a narrow and technical meaning to the 
term ―beneficial owner‖.469 The court accorded equal 
importance to the facts that Finance had borrowed funds 
from the bondholders against Indofood‘s guarantee and 
that after paying the first instalment of interest to Finance, 
Indofood had paid interest directly to JP Morgan.
470
 
According to the court, these facts show that, in 
commercial and practical terms, Finance or Dutch BV 
could not derive any direct benefit from the interest 
payments from Indofood. The point is that the court 
considered the arrangement as a whole. 
Comparing Del Commercial with the Indofood case, it 
is clear that, as with the Indofood case, Del Commercial 
involved a back-to-back loan structure. The observation 
quoted in section 6.8 shows that the facts that the United 
States court noted are similar to those that the England and 
Wales Court of Appeal considered in Indofood. However, 
unlike the court in the Indofood, the court in Del 
Commercial did not accord equal significance to each fact. 
Although the United States court noted the facts, it based 
its decision on the close correspondence between the loan 
contracts, which also showed the same inflow and outflow 
of interest. That is, the United States court did not consider 
the arrangement as a whole. In the light of the approach 
                                               
469 Indofood International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, 
London Branch, above n 463, at para 44. 
470 Ibid. 
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adopted by the court in Indofood, it could be inferred that, 
although the courts in Del Commercial used the beneficial 
ownership test as an anti-avoidance test, they narrowed 
down the scope of the test. Consequently, they ended up 
assigning it a technical interpretation. 
6.17. Del Commercial: narrow and technical approach 
Similar terms and conditions of contracts may show that 
transactions are interlinked, and therefore, the interposed 
company acts as a conduit; however, logically an 
intermediary company can still act as a conduit even if 
terms and conditions of contracts differ. The approach 
may imply that a difference between terms and conditions 
of contracts shows that an immediate recipient is the 
beneficial owner of passive income even if it does not 
carry out a substantive business activity. Another United 
States case, SDI Netherlands BV v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue,
471
 helps to illustrate the argument. 
The SDI Netherlands case
472
 turned on the issue of the 
source of royalty payments made by an interposed 
company to a resident company that was a resident of a 
third state. The court applied the source rule under section 
861(a)(4) of the United States Internal Revenue Code,
473
 
which makes the source of royalty payments the country 
in which the licensed intangible property is used. 
                                               
471 SDI Netherlands BV v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 107 TC 
161 (1996). 
472 Ibid. 
473 Internal Revenue Code 26 USC § 861(a)(4). It provides: (a) The 
following items of gross income shall be treated as income from 
sources within the United States: 
(4) Rentals or royalties from property located in the United States or 
from any interest in such property, including rentals or royalties for 
the use of or for the privilege of using in the United States patents, 
copyrights, secret processes and formulas, good will, trade-marks, 
trade brands, franchises, and other like property.  
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The United States Tax Court in SDI Netherlands did not 
consider payments from the immediate recipient to the 
company in the resident state to constitute United States 
sourced income. It considered that regarding the royalty 
payments by the immediate recipient as United States 
sourced income could cause a cascading royalty problem, 
whereby multiple withholding taxes could be paid on the 
same royalty payment as it is moved up a chain of 
licensors.
474
  
This chapter refers to the SDI Netherlands case in a 
different context. It does not concern the source rule per 
se. It concerns the reasoning that the court adopted when 
applying the rule. The court had to decide whether 
royalties that the interposed company passed on to the 
resident of a third state constituted income received from a 
source within the United States. It effectively determined 
whether licensing agreements through which parties 
transferred the intellectual property from the third state to 
the source state via an intermediary state were connected. 
The court regarded the agreements as separate because 
their terms were different.  
6.18. The SDI Netherlands case 
SDI Netherlands involved the SDI group, which was 
engaged in the software business. SDI Ltd, a Bermudan 
parent company wholly owned SDI Bermuda, another 
Bermudan company. SDI Ltd also held all the shares in SDI 
Antilles, a company incorporated in the Netherlands 
Antilles. SDI Antilles in turn wholly owned SDI 
Netherlands, a Dutch company, which was also the 
taxpayer. SDI Netherlands held all the shares in SDI USA, a 
company resident in the United States. In addition to SDI 
                                               
474 SDI Netherlands BV v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, above n 
471, at 176. 
The Step Transaction Doctrine 
247 
 
USA, SDI Netherlands wholly owned subsidiaries in 
Germany, France and the United Kingdom. 
SDI Ltd
SDI Bermuda
SDI Antilles
SDI Netherlands
SDI USA
SDI Germany
SDI France
SDI UK
Bermuda
The Netherlands Antilles
The Netherlands
USA
Germany
France
United Kingdom
Sub-license
License
Royalties
Royalties
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
ownership
 
Figure 6.3: The SDI Netherlands case 
The United States Tax Court noted: ―SDI Ltd. provided 
management services to certain of its direct and indirect 
subsidiaries for which such subsidiaries paid it 
management fees‖.475 In the light of the structure of the 
SDI group, it could be assumed that SDI Ltd provided 
management services to at least some of the subsidiaries 
of SDI Netherlands. 
In a license agreement, SDI Bermuda granted SDI 
Netherlands rights to use or to market its software on a 
worldwide basis. Subsequently, SDI Netherlands entered 
                                               
475 SDI Netherlands BV v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, above n 
471, at 176. 
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into a sub-license agreement with SDI USA, whereby it 
granted SDI USA the rights to use or market the software 
only within the United States. SDI Netherlands apparently 
also entered into sub-license agreements with its other 
subsidiaries. Terms and conditions of the head-and-sub-
agreements differed particularly with respect to the rate of 
royalties. Consequently, SDI Netherlands earned a profit 
spread on the inflow and outflow of royalties. 
Royalty payments from the United States companies to 
Dutch companies were exempt from United States 
withholding tax under Article IX of the United States-
Netherlands double tax treaty of 29 April 1948.
476
 During 
the years in question, SDI USA and SDI Netherlands made 
royalty payments in accordance with their respective 
agreements without deducting the United States 
withholding tax. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
issued notices of deficiency against SDI Netherlands. 
6.19. The “flow-through characterisation concept” 
The Commissioner argued that the royalty payments from 
SDI Netherlands to SDI Bermuda constituted United States 
source income under section 861(a)(4) of the IRC
477
 
because they were paid for the use of the software in the 
United States. The Commissioner relied on the Revenue 
Ruling 80-362,
478
 which also concerned Article IX of the 
United States-Netherlands double tax treaty.
479
 
                                               
476 Supplementary Convention Modifying and Supplementing the 
Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Certain other Taxes 
(30 December 1965, entered into force 8 July 1966), art IX(1). Article 
IX(1) stated: ―Royalties paid to a resident or corporation of one of the 
Contracting States shall be exempt from tax by the other Contracting 
State.‖ 
477 Section 861(1)(4) IRC, above n 473. 
478 Revenue Ruling 80-326 (1980) 2 CB 208. 
479 The United States-Netherlands double tax treaty, above n 476. 
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Revenue-Ruling 80-362 involved A, a resident of a 
third state, who licensed the rights to a United States 
patent to X, an unrelated Dutch corporation. X agreed to 
pay a fixed royalty each year to A. X relicensed the United 
States patent rights to Y, a United States company. The 
ruling found royalties from Y to X exempt under Article 
IX(1) of the United States-Netherlands treaty. However, it 
determined that because no tax convention existed 
between A‘s country of residence and the United States 
providing a similar exemption and because:
480
 
the royalties from X to A are paid in consideration for 
the privilege of using a patent in the United states, they 
are treated as income from source within the United 
States under section 861(a)(4) and are subject to United 
States income taxation … 
In SDI Netherlands, the Commissioner viewed the case 
as a simple matter of tracing the percentage of royalty 
payments from SDI Netherlands to SDI Bermuda back to 
the royalty paid by SDI USA to SDI Netherlands and treating 
that percentage of payment as United States source 
income.
481
 The case turned on the issue of whether the 
royalties paid by SDI Netherlands to SDI Bermuda 
constituted income received from a source within the 
United States and therefore were subjected to withholding 
tax.
482
 
The court referred to the Commissioner‘s argument as 
the ―flow-through characterisation concept‖.483 Rejecting 
the argument, it held that the two license agreements:
484
 
                                               
480 Revenue Ruling 80-326, above n 478 (emphasis added). 
481 SDI Netherlands BV v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 107 TC 
161 (1996), at 172. 
482 Ibid, at 171. 
483 Ibid, at 174. 
484 Ibid, at 175. 
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should be accorded separate status with the result that, 
although the royalties paid by [SDI Netherlands] to SDI 
Bermuda were derived from the royalties received by 
[SDI Netherlands] from SDI USA, they were separate 
payments. 
6.20. The “flow-through characterisation concept” and 
link between transactions  
Although SDI Netherlands did not concern the step 
transaction doctrine, the logic of the ―flow-through 
characterisation concept‖ corresponds to the logic of the 
step transaction doctrine. 
As with Del Commercial
485
 and W-family 1,
486
 SDI 
Netherlands involved back-to-back transactions whereby 
parties transferred an income-generating asset from a 
resident state to a source state. That is, instead of licensing 
the software directly to SDI USA, SDI Bermuda first granted 
a license to SDI Netherlands, which in turn licensed it to 
SDI USA. It is obvious from the Revenue-Ruling 80-326 
that the ―flow-through‖ concept traces passive income in 
the hands of an ultimate recipient back to its source on the 
basis that income payment made by an immediate 
recipient to the ultimate recipient was ―in 
consideration‖487 of the right to use income-generating 
assets. The term ―in consideration‖ connotes a connection 
or a link between the payment and the income-generating 
assets located in the source state. 
The court in SDI Netherlands
488
 investigated whether 
royalty payments from SDI Netherlands to SDI Bermuda 
were linked to royalty payments from SDI USA to SDI 
                                               
485 Del Commercial Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue TC Memo 411 (1999). Del Commercial Properties Inc v 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue 251 F 3d 210 (2001). 
486 W-family 1 (18 May 1994) Case no 28 293, BNB 1994/252 (the 
Hoge Raad, the Netherlands). 
487 Revenue Ruling 80-326, above n 478. 
488 SDI Netherlands BV v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, above n 
481, at 175. 
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Netherlands. In order to determine the issue it examined 
terms and conditions of the license agreements with 
respect to each transaction. Its approach corresponds to 
that adopted by the courts in Del Commercial. It is 
instructive to analyse the reasoning of the court in SDI 
Netherlands. 
6.21. The “flow-through concept” and the “conduit 
concept”: an analogy 
The court noted that Commissioner did not argue that:
489
 
[SDI Netherlands] was a mere conduit or agent of SDI 
USA in paying royalties to SDI Bermuda or that SDI 
Bermuda was the beneficial owner of the royalties [SDI 
Netherlands] received from SDI USA so that the US-
Netherlands exemption should not apply. 
Nevertheless, it relied on Aiken Industries Inc v 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
490
 and Northern 
Indiana Public Service Company v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue,
491
 which were decided on the issue of 
whether the immediate recipient of passive income acted 
as a conduit. When justifying its approach, the court 
observed:
492
 
Although [Aiken Industries] … and [Northern Indiana] 
… involved the conduit concept, we think they provide 
some guidance for our disposition of the instant case. 
We take this view because the flow-through 
[characterisation] concept is, in a very real sense, the 
conduit concept albeit in a somewhat different garb, i.e., 
whether the U.S. source income is being received as 
such, because of the status of the paying entity in one 
case, and the status of the subject matter of the payment 
in the other. 
                                               
489 SDI Netherlands BV v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, above n 
481, at 173. 
490 Aiken Industries Inc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 56 TC 
925(1971). 
491 Northern Indiana Public Service Company v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue 105 TC 341 (1995). Northern Indiana Public Service 
Company v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 115 F 3d 506 (7th Cir 
1997). 
492 SDI Netherlands BV v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, above n 
481, at 174 (emphasis added). 
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Although Article IX of the United States-Netherlands 
double tax treaty did not use the term ―beneficial 
owner‖,493 these observations suggest that, as with the 
courts in W-family 1 and Del Commercial, the court in SDI 
Netherlands read the beneficial ownership requirement 
into the provision. It did so by drawing an analogy 
between the ―conduit concept‖ and the ―flow-through 
characterisation concept‖. The words ―is being received as 
such‖494 and ―the subject matter of the payment‖495 
suggest that the court focused on the form in which 
income reached the ultimate owner. That is, the court 
considered each concept to address the issue of whether an 
ultimate recipient received income as it originated from 
the source state.  
As discussed in section 5.5, because a conduit company 
may not always act as an agent, it does not necessarily 
pass on income to a resident of a third state in the original 
form. The point is that by treating the two concepts as 
being effectively the same, the court restricted the 
meaning of a conduit to an agent, or the scope of the 
beneficial ownership requirement to a person who does 
not act in the capacity of an agent. As a result, the court 
referred to Aiken Industries and Northern Indiana in a 
narrow sense. 
                                               
493 Supplementary Convention Modifying and Supplementing the 
Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Certain other Taxes 
(30 December 1965, entered into force 8 July 1966), art IX(1). Article 
IX(1) stated: ―Royalties paid to a resident or corporation of one of the 
Contracting States shall be exempt from tax by the other Contracting 
State.‖ 
494 SDI Netherlands BV v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, above n 
481, at 174. 
495 Ibid. 
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6.22. The court’s interpretation of Aiken Industries and 
Northern Indiana 
When applying its analysis of Aiken Industries and 
Northern Indiana to the present case, the court 
observed:
496
 
… the … situation falls more within the ambit of 
Northern Indiana than Aiken Industries. In the latter 
case, there was an identity both in terms and timing 
between the back to back loans, as well as a close 
relationship between the parties involved. In the former 
case, although there was a clear connecting purpose 
between the borrowing and lending transactions, i.e., to 
obtain the benefit of the exemption from the 
withholding tax on interest under the U.S.-Netherlands 
treaty; there were differences in terms, i.e., in the 
interest rate (albeit not large); and a close relationship 
between all the parties was not present since the 
borrowings by the finance subsidiary were from 
unrelated parties. 
The observation shows that in order to determine 
whether SDI Netherlands was a conduit, or whether SDI 
Netherlands was not the beneficial owner, the court 
restricted its investigation to two issues.  
First, the words ―a clear connecting purpose between ... 
transactions‖ suggest that the court considered the 
presence of a connection between transactions to indicate 
that SDI Bermuda interposed SDI Netherlands as a conduit 
in order to avoid the United States withholding tax on 
royalty payments from SDI USA. In order to ascertain 
whether the transactions were connected, the court focused 
on whether terms and conditions of contracts were 
identical. This approach is similar to that of the courts in 
Del Commercial.  
Second, the court examined whether a close 
relationship existed between an interposed company and 
the other parties. 
                                               
496 Ibid, at 175 (emphasis added). 
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6.23. Similarity in terms and conditions 
When referring to Aiken Industries
497
 and Northern 
Indiana
498
 in the context of the flow-through argument, 
the court focused on the similarities of terms and 
conditions. It approved the reasoning in Northern Indiana. 
It held that Finance was not considered to be a ―mere 
conduit or agent‖ because it earned a profit spread on the 
inflow and outflow of the interest.
499
 
From the observation quoted in section 6.22, it is clear 
that the court regarded the presence of the profit spread in 
Northern Indiana to show that the terms and conditions of 
the contracts differed. In the light of the analogy that the 
court drew between the flow-through concept and the 
conduit concept,
500
 its reasoning implied that a difference 
between terms and conditions of contracts with respect to 
individual transactions indicates that an interposed 
company is entitled to treaty benefits. The court in Del 
Commercial
501
 seemed to adopt the same approach. 
In the SDI Netherlands case, when determining whether 
such a similarity existed, the court observed:
502
 
The facts of the matter are that the two license 
agreements had separate and distinct terms and that [SDI 
Netherlands] had an independent role as the licensee 
from SDI Bermuda and the licensor of the other entities, 
including but not limited to SDI USA. The schedules of 
royalty payments [provide] for a spread, not unlike the 
                                               
497 Aiken Industries Inc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, above n 
490. 
498 Northern Indiana Public Service Company v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue 105 TC 341 (1995). Northern Indiana Public Service 
Company v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 115 F 3d 506 (7th Cir 
1997). 
499 SDI Netherlands BV v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 107 TC 
161 (1996), at 174. 
500 Ibid, at 174. 
501 Del Commercial Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue 251 F 3d 210 (2001) at 216. 
502 SDI Netherlands BV v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, above n 
499, at 175. 
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spread involved in Northern Indiana, which 
compensated [SDI Netherlands] for its efforts. Like the 
finance subsidiary in Northern Indiana, [SDI 
Netherlands] engaged in licensing activities from which 
it realized substantial earnings. In fact, on a percentage 
basis, it earned between 5 and 6 percent, compared to 
the 1 percent earned by [the] finance subsidiary in 
Northern Indiana. Under the circumstances herein, we 
think these arrangements should be accorded separate 
status with the result that, although the royalties paid by 
[SDI Netherlands] to SDI Bermuda were derived from the 
royalties received by [SDI Netherlands] from SDI USA, 
they were separate payments. 
It is clear that the court did not regard SDI Netherlands as a 
conduit because the terms and conditions of the license 
agreements differed.  
As discussed in section 6.20, the ―flow-through 
characterisation concept‖ corresponds to the logic of the 
step transaction doctrine. Further, as with the Del 
Commercial, the court in SDI Netherlands regarded the 
difference between terms and conditions of contracts to 
indicate that transactions were not linked. For these 
reasons, SDI Netherlands could be considered to illustrate 
that the narrow and technical approach adopted by the 
court in Del Commercial may imply that a simple 
difference in terms and conditions of contracts with two 
individual transactions shows that an intermediary is not a 
conduit. The fact that the rates of royalty payments differ 
does not help in deciding whether an interposed company 
is a conduit. It has no economic significance in the context 
of a conduit company case because the royalty payments 
flow to the same destination. 
6.24. Close relationship 
As discussed in section 6.22, the court considered the 
absence of a close relationship between the parties to 
indicate that an interposed company does not act as a 
conduit. However, an interposed company can act legally 
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or substantively as a conduit, even if it is unrelated to the 
other parties.
503
 
Further, since the court‘s analogy between the ―flow-
through characterisation concept‖ and the ―conduit 
concept‖ restricted the meaning of a conduit to an agent, it 
could be inferred that the court considered the factor of 
―close relationship‖ in a formal legalistic sense. When 
determining whether such a relationship existed, it 
observed:
504
 
In the instant case, there was a close relationship 
between the parties. However, although [counsel for the 
Commissioner] asks us, in passing, to take that 
relationship into account, she does not pursue the matter 
to the point where she contends that it is a significant 
factor. Given the fact that [counsel for the 
Commissioner] [recognises] the existence of all of the 
parties as valid corporate entities and does not attack the 
bona fides of the license agreements between SDI USA 
and [SDI Netherlands], on the one hand, or [SDI 
Netherlands] and SDI Bermuda, on the other, we are not 
disposed to allow the close relationship element to 
control our decision. 
The court‘s dilemma between the substantive economic 
perspective and the formal legalistic perspective is 
apparent. On one hand, the court seems to be of the view 
that the facts showed that the parties were closely related 
and the substance of the license agreement was 
questionable. This view seems to incline towards the 
substantive economic perspective. On the other hand, 
since the court decided the case in the context of the 
―flow-through characterisation concept‖, it held that there 
was no close relationship between the parties simply 
because the Commissioner recognised their existence as 
                                               
503 For example Ministre de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie 
v Société Bank of Scotland (2006) 9 ITLR 683 (Conseil d‘etat, France) 
and Royal Dutch Shell (6 April 1994) Case no 28 638, BNB 1994/217 
(the Hoge Raad, the Netherlands). 
504 SDI Netherlands BV v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, above n 
499, at 175. 
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valid corporate entities. That is, the court allowed itself to 
be governed by the legal perspective. 
6.25. Reasons for existence of SDI Netherlands 
As discussed in section 6.18, SDI Bermuda granted the 
rights to market and to use its software on a worldwide 
basis exclusively to SDI Netherlands. The license 
agreement between SDI Netherlands and SDI USA granted 
SDI USA a right to use the software only within the United 
States. If SDI Bermuda had licensed the software directly 
to SDI USA, royalty payments from SDI USA would have 
incurred United States withholding tax at the statutory 
rate. Locating SDI Netherlands in the Netherlands not only 
ensured that the royalty payments from SDI USA were 
exempt from United States withholding tax, but also 
allowed royalties to flow from the United States to 
Bermuda without being taxed because the Netherlands 
does not impose withholding tax on out-flowing royalties. 
As indicated in section 6.18, it was SDI Ltd that 
provided management services to subsidiaries of SDI 
Netherlands. In the light of this fact, SDI Netherlands‘ 
activity appears limited to sub-licensing the software to its 
subsidiaries. For this reason, it cannot be considered to be 
engaged in substantive business activity, even if it earned 
a profit on the inflow and outflow of the royalties. As 
discussed in section 4.26, the presence of a profit spread 
does not necessarily indicate the presence of a substantive 
business activity. 
These facts contribute to the conclusion that SDI 
Netherlands existed in the SDI group for no other reason 
than to obtain the exemption of the United States 
withholding tax under the United States-Netherlands 
double tax treaty. 
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6.26. W-family 1: deviation from the reasons for 
existence approach 
As discussed in section 6.11, the lower court of Arnhem in 
W-family 1
505
 also used the step transaction doctrine. It 
applied the end-result test and found that the transactions 
were interlinked because the parties implemented them 
with the intention that Dutch BV would redeem the shares. 
It, therefore, applied the step transaction doctrine and 
treated the transactions as part of a single transaction, 
which was a transfer of shares from Mrs. W and Ms. D to 
Dutch BV. The court concluded that allowing treaty 
benefits would be contrary to the purpose of the restricting 
treaty benefits to residents of contracting states because in 
substance residents of non-contracting states derived treaty 
benefits. For this reason, the court did not regard Antillean 
NV as the beneficial owner. That is, it treated Antillean NV 
as a conduit, and therefore denied the Dutch withholding 
tax reduction under Article 11(3) of the BRK.
506
 In effect, 
the court treated the beneficial ownership test as an anti-
avoidance test. 
The lower court referred to the Y-group 1990 case,
507
 in 
which the Hoge Raad adopted the ―reasons for existence‖ 
approach. As with the lower court, the Hoge Raad also 
regarded the term beneficial owner as a requirement for 
limiting treaty benefits and treated beneficial ownership as 
an anti-avoidance test. The lower court‘s reference to Y-
group 1990 creates an impression that it followed the 
―reasons for existence‖ approach. While the lower court 
did begin by asking the same question as that asked by the 
                                               
505 W-family 1 (18 May 1994) Case no 28 293, BNB 1994/252 (the 
Hoge Raad, the Netherlands). 
506 Tax Arrangement for the Kingdom of the Netherlands (28 October 
1964, entered into force 12 December 1985). 
507 Y-group 1990 (28 June 1989) Case no 25 451, BNB 1990/45 (the 
Hoge Raad, the Netherlands). 
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Hoge Raad in Y-group 1990, its approach differed 
considerably. Before comparing the approach of the two 
courts, it is helpful to recall the Y-group 1990 case. 
6.27. The Y-group 1990 case 
As discussed in section 3.5, Y-group 1990 involved Y 
Canada, a Canadian company, which wholly owned Y 
Netherlands, a Dutch company. After Y Netherlands 
declared dividends, Y Canada incorporated Y Antilles, an 
Antillean company, which it owned jointly with P 
Panama, a Panamanian company. Y Netherlands paid a 
part of its dividends to Y Canada. Subsequently, Y Canada 
bifurcated shares of Y Netherlands into ordinary and 
preference shares, and sold the ordinary shares to Y 
Antilles. Y Netherlands paid the remaining amount of the 
dividend to Y Antilles after deducting the Dutch 
withholding tax. 
The Dutch tax inspector refused Y Antilles‘ request for 
a withholding tax reduction under Article 11 (3) of the 
BRK.
508
 The tax inspector argued that Y Antilles had no 
practical significance in the corporate structure.  
As indicated in section 3.6, the lower court of 
Amsterdam and the Hoge Raad read the beneficial 
ownership requirement into Article 11(3) of the BRK. The 
Hoge Raad assigned the term ―beneficial owner‖ the 
function of limiting the benefit of the withholding tax 
reduction to residents of the contracting states. When 
                                               
508 Tax Arrangement for the Kingdom of the Netherlands (28 October 
1964, entered into force 12 December 1985), art 11(3). It stated: ―The 
[dividend withholding tax] … shall not be levied, or if so levied, shall 
be refunded with respect to dividends derived by an entity whose 
capital is wholly or partly divided into shares and which is a resident 
of the other country and holds at least 25 per cent of the paid-up 
capital of the company.‖ 
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interpreting Article 11(3), it observed (author‘s 
translation):
509
 
… Article 11 is intended to prevent double taxation of 
dividends payable by a company resident in the 
Netherlands or the Netherlands Antilles, and enjoyed by 
a resident of one of these countries. 
The lower court of Amsterdam and the Hoge Raad 
agreed with the tax inspector. Considering the 
arrangement in its entirety, they could not find any 
practical significance for the existence of Y Antilles. They 
treated the arrangement as if Y Canada had received the 
dividend and held that granting a withholding tax 
reduction to Antillean NV would contradict the object and 
purpose of Article 11(3) of the BRK.
510
  
6.28. W-family 1: did the court consider the 
arrangement in its entirety?  
The Hoge Raad in Y-group 1990 considered the 
arrangement as a whole and denied the withholding tax 
reduction to Y Antilles because it could not find valid 
reasons for the existence of Y Antilles. Relatively, the 
lower court of Arnhem in W-family 1 adopted a narrower 
approach. The lower court confined itself to the share 
transactions involving the parties. It based its decision to 
deny the withholding tax reduction to Antillean NV on the 
presence of a link between these transactions. It did not 
consider the arrangement as a whole, which necessitates 
examining the flow of income from Dutch BV to Mrs. W 
and Ms. D. The opinion of the Advocate General, Mr. 
                                               
509 Tax Arrangement for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, above n 
508, at para 4.6. 
510 ―Beoordeling van het middel‖ in Y-group 1990, above n 507, at 
para 4.2. 
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Verburg, in W-family 1 supports these points. He observed 
(author‘s translation):511 
The court has recognised such a connection between 
separate successive acts, which led to the redemption of 
the shares by Antillean NV, that in its opinion no 
significance should be accorded to the order in which 
various signatures are placed. 
How could the following be inferred: 
―at least in the period from 30 June 1978 to 20 July 
1978, neither had [Antillean NV] any intention of being 
the economic owner of the shares of Dutch BV, nor had 
[Mrs. W and Ms. D] envisaged that it would be.‖ 
I assume … the court meant that Antillean NV and 
its shareholders had no practical significance. 
The court in [Y-group 1990] … held as follows: 
―The interconnecting interested parties with respect 
to the dispute in question, therefore, lacked a practical 
reason and the dividend came exclusively from tax 
considerations.‖ 
Such an inference, it seems to me, requires a 
broader foundation than that applied by the court … 
The observation suggests that the lower court of 
Arnhem did not take into account the arrangement in its 
entirety. It also confirms that the Hoge Raad in Y-group 
1990 adopted a broader approach than the one adopted by 
the lower court of Arnhem in W-family 1.  
As a result of relying solely on the presence of the link, 
the lower court of Arnhem inadvertently assigned a strict 
legalistic interpretation to the beneficial ownership 
requirement. Its reasoning implied that the absence of a 
link between transactions necessarily means that an 
interposed company does not act as a conduit. The Hoge 
Raad drew this implication when it followed the reasoning 
of the lower court of Arnhem in W-family 2.
512
 
6.29. The W-family 2 case 
W-family 2 involved the same family as W-family 1. On 30 
June 1978, Mrs. W and Ms. D transferred their shares in 
                                               
511 ―[Mening] Conclusie Advocaat-Generaal mr. Verburg‖ in Y-group 
1990, above n 507, at para 7 (emphasis added). 
512 W-family 2 (18 May 1994) Case no 28 296, BNB 1994/253 at para 
4 (the Hoge Raad, the Netherlands). 
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other Dutch corporations, in addition to their Dutch BV‘s 
shares, to Antillean NV. Netherlands BV was one of the 
other Dutch corporations. Mrs W and Ms. D each 
transferred their shares to Antillean NV as a capital 
contribution and for a profit sharing right. Unlike the 
position in the W-family 1 case, however, Netherlands BV 
did not redeem its shares from Antillean NV. Rather, 
Netherlands BV distributed dividends to Antillean NV on 
15 December 1980 and withheld 25 per cent tax on the 
payment. 
Mr. S
Mrs. W
Ms. D
Antillean NV
Netherlands BV
Transfer of
shares
100%
Dividend
Ownership
Switzerland
The Netherlands Antilles
Belgium
The Netherlands
 
Figure 6.4: The W-family 2 case 
Antillean NV applied to the Dutch Tax Inspector for a 
refund of the Dutch withholding tax under Article 11(3) of 
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the BRK. The inspector denied the refund because (author‘s 
translation):
513
 
Antillean NV was a ―paper company‖ established with 
the objective of obtaining a reduction of withholding tax 
on dividends distributed by the Dutch corporations. 
Accordingly, a legal situation has been created almost 
solely with the purpose of unjustified avoidance of 
taxation, as a result of which the object and purpose of 
the Dividend Tax Act 1965 and [the BRK] were ignored. 
The lower court of Arnhem decided in favour of the tax 
inspector. Referring to its findings in the W-family 1 case, 
the court emphasised the fact that Mrs. W and Ms. D 
transferred their shares in Dutch BV solely for avoiding 
tax. It held that Antillean NV failed to show why the 
transfer of Netherlands BV‘s shares to Antillean NV should 
not be assessed differently. It was of the opinion that the 
fact that Netherlands BV had not bought back its shares 
should not affect the assessment.
514
 
On appeal, however, the Hoge Raad decided in favour 
of Antillean NV. It was of the opinion that the lower court 
had no sound reason to follow its findings in the W-family 
1 case.
515
 Differentiating the facts of the present case from 
the W-family 1 case, the court observed (author‘s 
translation):
516
 
The [lower court‘s decision in the W-family 1 case] … 
refers to an acquisition of [Dutch BV‘s] shares by 
[Antillean NV] or a transfer of shares in [Dutch BV] to 
[Antillean NV] in which it was certain that the shares in 
connection with such a purchase or transfer would be 
purchased by [Dutch BV]. 
In the present case, however, neither the acquisition 
of shares of [Netherlands BV] nor the contribution of 
such shares in [Antillean NV] is followed by a 
                                               
513 ―[Tekst] ARREST‖ in W-family 2, above n 512, at para 3.1.4 
(emphasis added). 
514 ―HOF Arnhem 28 juni 1991 (Nr. 1694/1988)‖ in W-family 2, above 
n 512, at para 4.2. 
515 ―[Tekst] ARREST‖ in W-family 2, above n 512, at para 3.2.3. 
516 Ibid. See also Stef van Weeghel The Improper Use of Tax Treaties: 
with Particular Reference to the Netherlands and the United States 
(Kluwer, London, 1998) at 171. 
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corresponding purchase of these shares by the [Dutch 
private company] … 
The mere circumstance that the shares in 
[Netherlands BV] were contributed to or sold to 
[Antillean NV] solely for tax reasons does not lead to the 
conclusion that there was a contravention of the object 
and purpose of the BRK and the law. 
The facts … that [Antillean NV] is a company 
incorporated in a country with a low tax burden, that 
[Antillean NV] is not involved in economic activity of 
its own – in the sense of business activity – or does it 
only incidentally, and that [Antillean NV] is a resident in 
the country with the low tax burden simply because of 
its incorporation there by fiction of law, form 
insufficient grounds for a different conclusion. 
Although the Hoge Raad did not accept the findings of the 
lower court in the W-family 1 case, it still followed the 
approach adopted by the lower court in that case. 
In W-family 2, the Hoge Raad seized on the absence of 
the redemption of the share by Netherlands BV to 
distinguish the present case from W-family 1. The court 
allowed treaty benefits to Antillean NV because 
Netherlands BV did not redeem its shares. In the absence 
of the redemption of the shares by Netherlands BV, the 
series of transactions remained incomplete and the link 
between them was broken. Because there was no link, the 
court did not consider Antillean NV to act as a conduit.
517
 
It is clear that the court ignored the importance of facts 
such as the non-involvement of Antillean NV in economic 
activity and its location.  
The reasoning does not make sense. An incomplete 
series of transactions may cause the link to break, but 
other facts together may contribute to show that an 
interposed company acts as a conduit. The reasoning of 
the Swiss Federal Tax Administration in X-group 1979
518
 
is a good example. 
                                               
517 Also see ―Noot‖ in W-family 2, above n 512, at para 7. 
518 X-group 1979 (1979) 48 Archives de droit fiscal Suisse 271 (The 
Federal Tax Administration, Switzerland). 
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6.30. The X-group 1979 case 
Recalling the facts from section 3.12, in X-group 1979, 
Mr. N, a German resident, owned shares in four Swiss 
companies, which had accumulated profits. If Mr. N had 
received dividends directly from them, he would have 
incurred Swiss withholding tax at the rate of 15 per cent 
under the Switzerland-Germany double tax treaty of 11 
August 1971.
519
 
Dividends distributed by Swiss companies to Dutch 
companies qualified for a total withholding tax refund 
under Article 9(2)(a)(i) of the Switzerland-Netherlands 
double tax treaty of 12 November 1951.
520
 Thus, in order 
to obtain the Swiss withholding tax refund, Mr. N 
transferred the shares of the Swiss companies to X 
Amsterdam, an interposed Dutch company, via two other 
interposed companies located in Panama and the 
Netherlands Antilles. The parties participated in a series of 
transactions in which the purchaser acquired the shares 
with the help of a loan from the seller. Similar transactions 
occurred in subsequent acquisitions of shares of the Swiss 
                                               
519 Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, 
Switzerland–Germany (11 August 1971, entered into force 29 
December 1972), art 10(2)(c). 
520 Protocol to the Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and 
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and 
Property, Switzerland–the Netherlands (12 November 1951, entered 
into force 22 December 1966) art 9(2)(a)(i). It provided: ―In the case 
of tax on income from movable capital levied by one of the two States 
by deduction at source, the recipient of such income domiciled in the 
other State may, within a period of two years, request reimbursement 
through the State in which he is domiciled, subject to the production 
of an official certificate of domicile and of liability to direct taxation 
in the State of domicile: 
a) in case of dividends: 
(i) in the total amount of tax withheld if the recipient of such 
dividends is an entity whose capital wholly or partly consist of shares 
and which owns at least 25 per cent of the voting stock of the entity 
paying the dividends, provided the relation between the two entities 
has not been constituted or maintained primarily for purpose of 
assuring receipt of the total fund.‖ 
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companies by the interposed companies. A condition in 
the loan contracts was that the repayment of debts would 
be only out of dividend income. 
The Swiss companies distributed dividends to X 
Amsterdam after deducting 25 per cent Swiss withholding 
tax. When X Amsterdam requested a full refund from the 
Swiss Federal Tax Administration under Article 9(2) of 
the Switzerland-Netherlands double tax treaty of 12 
November 1951,
521
 the administration allowed only a 
partial refund. 
Under, Article 9(2)(a)(i) a Dutch company was allowed 
a total refund of Swiss withholding tax on dividends 
distributed by a Swiss company only if the relationship 
between the two companies was not established, or was 
not maintained, primarily in order to obtain the benefit of 
such total reimbursement.
522
 In order to determine whether 
the relationship between the Swiss corporations and X 
Amsterdam was established primarily to obtain the refund 
of the Swiss withholding tax, the Swiss Tax 
Administration considered the arrangement in its entirety. 
It clarified that it was concerned with the means by which 
the arrangement was implemented, rather than the motive 
of Mr. N.
523
  
By contrast, as discussed in section 6.11, in the W-
family 1 case
524
 the issue of whether the transactions were 
interlinked, or whether the parties achieved the alleged 
                                               
521 Protocol to the Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and 
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and 
Property, Switzerland–the Netherlands (12 November 1951, entered 
into force 22 December 1966) art 9(2)(a)(i). 
522 The Netherlands-Switzerland double tax treaty of 12 November 
1951, above n 141, art 9(2) 
523 X-group 1979, above n 518, at 275. 
524 W-family 1 (18 May 1994) Case no 28 293, BNB 1994/252 (the 
Hoge Raad, the Netherlands). 
The Step Transaction Doctrine 
267 
 
end result, depended upon the question of whether they 
intended to achieve the end result. That is, the answer to 
the question of what was the effect of the end result 
depended on the intention of the parties.  
The issue of whether an arrangement is contrary to the 
object and purpose of a double tax arrangement should be 
determined independently of a taxpayer‘s intention. The 
intention of the parties does not necessarily help to 
determine the issue of whether the arrangement is contrary 
to the object and purpose of a double tax treaty because its 
effect may differ from the parties‘ intention. 
6.31. Consideration of the arrangement as a whole 
As with the Dutch courts in W-family 1 and W-family 2, 
the Swiss Federal Tax Administration took into account 
the series of transactions and the loan contracts between 
the interposed companies;
525
 however, unlike the Dutch 
courts, the administration also considered the fact that X 
Amsterdam‘s economic role was of secondary importance 
or was virtually non-existent.
526
 It noted that X 
Amsterdam had performed few financial transactions and 
that there was no economic relationship between it and the 
Swiss companies.
527
 It also pointed out that the interposed 
companies were located either in countries where income 
from participation was exempted generally from all taxes 
or countries that had an extended network of tax 
treaties.
528
  
 The approach adopted by the Swiss Federal Tax 
Administration shows that the link between transactions 
cannot be logically regarded as decisive. Although the 
                                               
525 X-group 1979, above n 518, at 277. 
526 Ibid, at 275. 
527 Ibid, at 275. 
528 Ibid, at 277. 
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presence of a link between transactions indicates that a 
company interposed in the other contracting state is a 
conduit, the absence of a link does not necessarily show 
that the interposed company does not act as a conduit.  
If the facts of W-family 2 are analysed with the help of 
the reasons for existence approach, different conclusions 
may be drawn. 
6.32. Reasons for the existence of Antillean NV 
The facts that Antillean NV did not carry out business 
activity and was located in a tax haven suggest that 
Antillean NV acted as a conduit with respect to dividends, 
even though it was the legal owner of Netherlands BV‘s 
shares. 
As with W-family 2, the parties in X-group 1979
529
 
transferred income-generating assets to the immediate 
recipient, X Amsterdam. As well, in X-group 1979 the 
Swiss subsidiaries did not redeem their shares but 
distributed dividends to X Amsterdam. If the Swiss 
Federal Tax Administration had used the link between 
transactions test, it would have considered X Amsterdam 
to be the beneficial owner for two reasons. First, the series 
of transactions was incomplete, and therefore, the 
administration would have considered the link to be 
absent. Second, because X Amsterdam was the legal 
owner of the shares, the administration would have 
regarded it as the beneficial owner of the dividends. 
However, the Swiss Federal Tax Administration did not 
allow treaty benefits to X Amsterdam because, unlike the 
Hoge Raad, it considered the arrangement as a whole. 
                                               
529 X-group 1979 (1979) 48 Archives de droit fiscal Suisse 271 (The 
Federal Tax Administration, Switzerland). 
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In his case note on W-family 2, P.J. Wattel observed 
(author‘s translation):530 
As the [lower court] decided quite rightly, the fact that 
in [W-family 2] no redemption (but normal distribution) 
occurred, which did occur in [W-family 1], is … not 
decisive. It is not about the coincidental form of 
distribution of profits by [Dutch BV] and [Netherlands 
BV] to [Antillean NV], but about the question whether an 
indissoluble connection existed between the distribution 
of profits by [Dutch BV] and [Netherlands BV] to 
[Antillean NV] respectively and the preceding 
contribution to [Antillean NV] of shares of [Dutch BV] 
and [Netherlands BV] respectively, which had 
accumulated profits ready to be distributed. 
Wattels‘s observation suggests that in addition to a link 
between transactions that shows a flow of income-
generating assets from a resident state to a source state, 
courts should also consider a link between transactions 
that shows a flow of passive income from the source state 
to the resident state. 
Antillean NV seems to have no reasons for existence 
other than to obtain the benefits of a Dutch withholding 
tax reduction under the BRK.
531
 Mrs. W and Ms. D 
transferred their shares in several Dutch companies to 
Antillean NV. Antillean NV appeared to carry out no other 
activity than to hold these shares. As the Netherlands 
Antilles does not impose withholding tax on the outgoing 
dividends, the location of the Antillean NV ensured that 
dividends flowed from the Dutch companies in general 
and Netherlands BV in particular ultimately to Mrs. W in 
Belgium and Ms. D in Switzerland. For these reasons, the 
arrangement appears to be contrary to the object and 
purpose of the BRK. 
                                               
530 Also see ―Noot‖ in W-family 2, above n 524, at para 7. 
531 Tax Arrangement for the Kingdom of the Netherlands (28 October 
1964, entered into force 12 December 1985), art 11(3). 
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6.33. Conclusion 
The scope of the step transaction doctrine is a facet of the 
substance over form doctrine. It should catch any 
shenanigan that leads the benefit of a double tax treaty to 
flow to a non-resident. The United States and Dutch 
courts, however, limited its scope by over emphasising the 
significance of the presence of a link between transactions 
where the parties transfer income generating assets from 
the resident state to the source state. As a consequence, the 
courts failed to consider the arrangement as a whole.  
In a conduit company case, an examination of an 
arrangement is not limited to determining whether a 
substantive link exists between transactions that show a 
one-way flow of assets from the resident state to the 
source state. It also involves transactions that show a flow 
of passive income from the source company to the resident 
company, and facts such as the absence of a substantive 
business activity and the location of interposed companies 
in a tax haven or a country that imposes low income tax. 
These facts together may show that an interposed 
company has no reasons for existence in a corporate 
structure, even though the parties transferred income 
generating assets from the resident state to the company 
that immediately received passive income, not to the 
company in the source state.  
Nevertheless, because of adopting a narrow approach, 
the United States and Dutch courts essentially based their 
decisions on a formal link rather than a substantive link 
between transactions. In Del Commercial,
532
 the United 
States courts considered similarities between terms and 
conditions of contracts to indicate a link between 
                                               
532 Del Commercial Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue TC Memo 411 (1999). Del Commercial Properties Inc v 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue 251 F 3d 210 (2001), at 216. 
The Step Transaction Doctrine 
271 
 
transactions. SDI Netherlands
533
 shows that even if terms 
and conditions differ, the arrangement can still contradict 
the object and purpose of a double tax treaty. Further, in 
W-family 1,
534
 the Dutch courts regarded the intention of 
the parties to reach an end result as an indicator of the link 
between the individual steps. The intention of the parties 
does not necessarily help determine the issue of whether 
the arrangement is contrary to the object and purpose of a 
double tax treaty because the effect of such an 
arrangement may differ from the intention of the parties. 
W-family 2
535
 illustrates that an interposed company act as 
a conduit even when the parties had no intention to 
achieve the end result of transferring income generating 
assets to the source state.   
The presence of a link between transactions indicates 
that interposed companies in general, and the immediate 
recipient in particular, act as conduits; its absence, 
however, does not necessarily show that the immediate 
recipient does not act as a conduit. 
                                               
533 SDI Netherlands BV v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, above n 
499. 
534 See ―HOF Arnhem 28 juni 1991 (Nr. 1658/1988)‖ in W-family 1 (18 
May 1994) Case no 28 293, BNB 1994/252 (the Hoge Raad, the 
Netherlands), at para 4.5 (emphasis added). 
535 W-family 2 (18 May 1994) Case no 28 296, BNB 1994/253 at para 
4 (the Hoge Raad, the Netherlands). 
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7.1. The underlying theory 
According to Prebble‘s thesis of ―ectopia‖,536 income tax 
law is fundamentally dislocated from the reality of its 
subject matter. The explanation for the difficulty in 
applying the beneficial ownership test to conduit company 
cases can be viewed as a particular application of this 
theory. 
Because double tax agreements are international 
treaties, they should be interpreted liberally and according 
to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties,
537
 which states that a treaty should be interpreted 
in accordance with the ordinary meaning given to its terms 
in their context, and in the light of its object and 
purpose.
538
 In addition to the prevention of double taxation 
                                               
536 John Prebble ―Can Income Tax Law be Simplified?‖ (1996) 2 NZ 
Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 187 at 189. 
537 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969, entered 
into force 27 January 1980). 
538 Ibid, art 31(1). It states: ―A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith 
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.‖ 
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of income between contracting states, a significant 
purpose of a double tax agreement is to limit its benefits to 
residents of the contracting states. In the light of this 
purpose, the treaty‘s provisions should be accorded a 
substantive economic interpretation. 
Generally, double tax agreements are based on the 
OECD Model Convention, which prevents the double 
taxation of passive income by reducing the tax withheld in 
the country of the origin of passive income,
539
 and in part 
by reducing tax by exemption
540
 or credit
541
 in the 
destination state. In order to limit the benefit of a 
(withholding) tax reduction, the convention requires the 
recipient of passive income to be its beneficial owner. In 
the light of the purpose of limiting treaty benefits, the term 
―beneficial owner‖ indicates that a person should own 
passive income in a substantive economic sense.  
It is logically possible to decide whether an individual 
is entitled to treaty benefits on the basis of beneficial 
ownership. It is logically impossible, however, to use 
beneficial ownership as a test for deciding whether a 
company is entitled to treaty benefits. In a substantive 
economic sense, a company cannot be considered to be the 
owner of its income. When a company receives income, 
its shareholders are economically better off. From this 
consideration, it follows that companies should never be 
entitled to treaty benefits. This inference does not deny the 
fact that in appropriate circumstances, shareholders should 
be so entitled to treaty benefits if they are residents in one 
of the contracting states. Yet, the OECD Model Convention 
                                               
539 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs Model Tax Convention on 
Income and on Capital (OECD, Paris, 2008), arts 10(2), 11(2) and 
12(1). 
540 Ibid , art 23A(1). 
541 Ibid, art 23A(2). 
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applies the beneficial ownership test to companies. The 
point is that this test, as it operates in double tax treaties, is 
dislocated from the substantive economic reality of 
corporations.   
7.2. A pragmatic position 
The OECD Model Convention assumes that companies, at 
least in some cases, can be considered the beneficial 
owners of income. Its assumption is based on the legal 
perspective, which, in contrast to the substantive economic 
perspective, views companies as entities separate from 
their shareholders. From a legal perspective, companies 
own their assets legally as well as beneficially, simply by 
virtue of being separate entities.
542
  
The position of the OECD Model Convention can be 
appreciated in the light of Fuller‘s theory of legal 
fictions,
543
 according to which the term ―fiction‖ implies 
that, although the statement under discussion is false, it is 
useful. Despite being founded on the substantive economic 
perspective, the OECD Model Convention adopts a legal 
perspective because the latter is useful for trade and 
commerce. This position can hold in cases where 
shareholders of a recipient company are residents of the 
state in which the company is located. It is problematic, 
however, in conduit company cases that involve a 
recipient company the shareholders of which are residents 
in a state other than the contracting states. Because the 
OECD Model Convention assumes that such a company can 
be considered to be a beneficial owner, it allows treaty 
benefits to persons that are residents of a non-contracting 
state in a substantive economic sense. Consequently, it 
                                               
542 Eisner v Macomber 252 US 189 (1920). 
543 Lon L Fuller Legal Fictions (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 
1967). 
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contradicts its generic policy, which is to limit its benefits 
to residents of contracting states. 
7.3. Difficulties for courts 
When it comes to interpreting the term ―beneficial owner‖ 
and applying it to conduit company cases, courts often 
struggle to reconcile opposing perspectives. Because they 
are obliged to determine whether to honour claims to 
treaty benefits made by a recipient company, they often 
prefer to employ a legal perspective. Their position can 
also be explained by referring to Fuller‘s theory. Their 
preference to adopt a legal perspective can be attributed 
generally to their desire to maintain the stability of tax 
law.  
The Authority for Advance Rulings of India faced these 
opposing perspectives in its NatWest Ruling.
544
 As 
discussed in section 2.23, in the NatWest Ruling a bank 
resident in the United Kingdom acquired shares in an 
Indian bank through two wholly owned Mauritian 
subsidiaries. The authority had to decide whether the 
Mauritian subsidiaries qualified as the beneficial owners 
of the dividends paid by the Indian bank under Article 10 
of the India-Mauritius double tax treaty of 24 August 
1982.
545
 The ruling shows that the authority appreciated 
that it should accord a substantive economic interpretation 
to the term ―beneficial owner‖ in the light of the policy to 
ensure that treaty benefits are limited to residents of 
contracting states. In a substantive and economic sense, 
the bank in the United Kingdom was the beneficial owner 
                                               
544 In Re XYZ (1996) 220 ITR 377 (AAR) (The Authority for Advance 
Rulings, India). 
545 Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, 
India–Mauritius (24 August 1982, entered into force 6 December 
1983), art 10(2). 
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of the dividends. However, the authority found itself 
bound by the conventional legalistic perspective, 
according to which the Mauritian subsidiaries were the 
beneficial owners of the dividends by virtue of being 
separate entities. The authority was unable to reconcile the 
two perspectives. Probably for this reason, it decided not 
to apply the beneficial ownership test. Instead, it 
considered chronological events and ruled against the 
Mauritius subsidiaries on the grounds that, prima facie, the 
transaction was designed for tax avoidance.
546
  
The NatWest Ruling is an extreme example of a case in 
which the deciding authority preferred not to apply the 
beneficial ownership test at all. Generally, however, courts 
justify their approach by adopting surrogate tests, as 
explained in this thesis, in place of an actual beneficial 
ownership test. When applying these tests, courts have 
failed to connect their conclusion logically to their 
reasoning because the criteria by which they work do not 
employ the concept of beneficial ownership. Doing their 
best, courts, commentators and the OECD have attributed 
the difficulty in interpreting and applying the beneficial 
ownership concept to the absence of an accurate 
definition. But, because the beneficial ownership concept 
cannot be applied logically, clarifying its meaning may be 
of little help. 
In the light of the purpose of limiting treaty benefits to 
residents of contracting states, the nature of provisions that 
limit the right of the source state to impose withholding 
tax resembles general anti-avoidance rules and judicial 
                                               
546
 The Income Tax Act 1961 (India), s 245R(2)(c). S 245R(2)(c) 
provides that the Authority for Advance Rulings shall not allow an 
application, if after examining it the Authority is of the opinion that 
the application was related to a transaction that was designed prima 
facie for tax avoidance. 
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anti-avoidance doctrines. As with general anti-avoidance 
rules, these provisions are general by nature. From this 
consideration, the term ―beneficial owner‖ simply calls for 
an application of a substantive approach to the 
investigation of a tax-planning arrangement. It does not 
make sense to assign a strict linguistic meaning to the term 
and apply it as a test of ownership. Doing so results in 
specifying criteria against which an arrangement shall be 
tested. Examining the facts against specific criteria often 
results in a formal legalistic analysis. The following few 
sections illustrate the argument. 
7.4. The nature of general anti-avoidance rules 
As the name suggests general anti-avoidance rules are 
general. Judicial anti-avoidance doctrines such as 
substance over form and the abuse of law are also general. 
This general nature does not mean that these rules and 
doctrines catch all attempts to minimise tax burdens. It 
means that they determine whether a disputed arrangement 
qualifies for tax benefits on the basis of a substantive 
analysis that does not test the arrangement against specific 
criteria. Lord Denning‘s approach in L.J. Newton v 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation
547
 illustrates the point. 
He dealt with section 260 of the Income Tax and Social 
Services Contribution Assessment Act 1936-1950, which 
was the former Australian general anti-avoidance rule.
548
  
                                               
547 L J Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1958) 98 CLR 1 
(Privy Council, Australia). 
548 The Income Tax and Social Services Contribution Assessment Act 
1936-1950 (Australia), s 260. The relevant part of s 260 provided: 
―Every contract, agreement, or arrangement made or entered into, 
orally or in writing …, shall so far as it has or purports to have the 
purpose or effect of in any way, directly or indirectly—(a) altering the 
incidence of any income tax; (b) relieving any person from liability to 
pay income tax or make any return; (c) defeating, evading, or avoiding 
any duty or liability imposed on any person by this Act; or (d) 
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As discussed in section 3.3, the Newton case involved a 
dividend stripping scheme in which a company‘s 
shareholders sold their shares to a share broker at a price 
equal to the anticipated dividend. The broker received the 
dividend and sold the shares back to the shareholders at a 
loss. The arrangement was designed for the shareholders 
to avoid tax on their dividend by converting it into capital 
gains.  
The Australian Federal Commissioner of Taxation 
assessed the shareholders for income tax. He applied 
section 260 on the grounds that the transactions formed a 
part of an initial plan that was carried out to achieve the 
end of tax avoidance. The shareholders‘ argument was that 
the interpretation accorded to the provision by the 
Commissioner was too wide to cover all transactions by 
which taxpayers seek to reduce their tax burdens.  
Lord Denning decided in favour of the Commissioner. 
Clarifying the scope of section 260, he observed that the 
provision covered arrangements that have the effect of 
avoiding tax. That is, it caught arrangements that resulted 
in a contradiction of the purpose of the legislation. It 
concerned ways a taxpayer avoids tax, rather than his 
motive. Lord Denning explained that decision-making 
authorities must consider the arrangement as a whole. In 
order to bring an arrangement under section 260, 
authorities may examine overt acts by which the 
arrangement was implemented; and on the basis of this 
examination, predicate that the arrangement was so 
implemented in order to avoid tax.  
Lord Denning‘s approach is commonly referred to as 
the ―predication test‖. There are two relevant features of 
                                                                                            
preventing the operation of this Act in any respect, be absolutely void 
…‖ 
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his approach. First, it interpreted the provision in the light 
of the purpose of legislation. Second, it preserved the 
general nature of the general anti-avoidance rule. That is, 
it did not specify criteria that would allow or disallow tax 
benefits to taxpayers.  
It does not make sense to specify criteria for applying a 
general anti-avoidance rule because doing so constricts the 
scope of the rule. It limits the ability of the decision-
making authority to apply a substantive analysis. 
Specifying criteria enables taxpayers to comply with the 
law in form, not in substance.  
7.5. The nature of the beneficial ownership clause 
An analogy can be drawn between the function of the 
provisions that limit the right of the source state to impose 
withholding tax on one hand and general anti-avoidance 
rules or judicial anti-avoidance doctrines on the other. 
When taxpayers claim a withholding tax reduction, they 
intend to reduce tax. The provisions that reduce the 
amount of withholding tax allow a tax reduction only if 
the arrangement is in alignment with the purpose of a 
double tax treaty to restrict tax benefits to residents of 
contracting states. The approach adopted by the Swiss Tax 
Administration to interpret and apply Article 9(2)(a)(i) of 
the Switzerland-Netherlands double tax treaty of 12 
November 1951
549
 illustrates the point. 
As discussed in section 3.12, X-group 1979
550
 involved 
a German individual who owned shares in certain Swiss 
companies. In order to obtain a refund of Swiss 
                                               
549 Protocol to the Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and 
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and 
Property, Switzerland–the Netherlands (12 November 1951, entered 
into force 22 December 1966) art 9(2)(a)(i). 
550 X-group 1979 (1979) 48 Archives de droit fiscal Suisse 271 (The 
Federal Tax Administration, Switzerland). 
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withholding tax under Article 9(2)(a)(i) of the 
Switzerland-Netherlands double tax treaty of 12 
November 1951, he interposed a Dutch company. He also 
interposed companies in the Netherlands Antilles and 
Panama. Subsequently, he transferred his shares to the 
Dutch subsidiary, via the other interposed companies, in a 
series of transactions that involved an acquisition of shares 
in return for a loan from the seller. 
The anti-abuse clause in Article 9(2)(a)(i) allows a 
refund if ―the relation between the two entities has not 
been constituted or maintained primarily for the purpose 
of assuring receipt of the total fund‖.551 According to the 
Swiss Federal Tax Administration, the provision was 
designed to prevent persons who were neither residents of 
Switzerland nor residents of the Netherlands from 
obtaining a full refund of Swiss withholding tax. By 
implication, the provision determined whether the effect of 
the interposition of the Dutch company contradicted the 
purpose of the treaty, which was to limit tax benefits to 
Swiss and Dutch residents. The Administration clarified 
further that the provision did not require an investigation 
of motives for interposing the Dutch company.  
When applying Article 9(2)(a)(i), the Administration 
considered the arrangement as a whole. On examining the 
business activities of the interposed companies, their 
locations and the loan contracts between them, it 
concluded that there were no ―serious economic 
reasons‖552 for the existence of the Dutch company. For 
this reason, it did not allow a Swiss withholding tax 
refund. This thesis refers to the Swiss Federal Tax 
                                               
551 X-group 1979, above n 550. 
552 Ibid, at 275. 
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Administration‘s approach as the ―reasons for existence‖ 
approach. 
The Swiss Federal Tax Administration did not refer to 
the Newton case. Nevertheless, it is clear that, not only did 
it interpret Article 9(2)(a)(i) along the same lines as Lord 
Denning, its approach for applying this provision 
resembles Lord Denning‘s approach. These similarities 
imply that, as with general anti-avoidance rules and 
judicial anti-avoidance doctrines, the provisions that 
reduce withholding tax are by nature general. The 
implication is further supported by Del Commercial 
Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
553
 in 
which courts used the United States step transaction 
doctrine in order to apply Article VI of the United States-
Netherlands double tax treaty of 29 April 1948.
554
 
The step transaction doctrine is a facet of the United 
States substance over form approach. The doctrine treats 
individual steps in a series of transactions as a single 
transaction, if a substantive link exists between them. The 
application of this doctrine to conduit company cases 
should deny treaty benefits to any arrangement that in 
substance results in passing on of these benefits to 
residents of non-contracting states. However, because the 
United States courts in Del Commercial restricted the 
potential of the doctrine, they also narrowed down the 
scope of the withholding tax provision. Consequently, 
they impaired the ability of the relevant treaty provision to 
                                               
553 Del Commercial Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue TC Memo 411 (1999). Del Commercial Properties Inc v 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue 251 F 3d 210 (2001). 
554 Supplementary Convention Modifying and Supplementing the 
Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Certain other Taxes 
(30 December 1965, entered into force 8 July 1966), art VI. 
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implement effectively the policy to restrict treaty benefits 
to residents of contracting states. 
7.6. Narrow approach does not help 
As discussed in section 6.6, in Del Commercial a 
Canadian company borrowed a loan from the Royal Bank 
of Canada and transferred the principal amount to a United 
States company through a series of transactions via 
interposed companies in Canada, the Cayman Islands, the 
Netherlands Antilles and the Netherlands. All companies 
were affiliated to the same group. The arrangement was 
implemented in order to obtain the United States 
withholding tax exemption on interest payments under 
Article VI of the United States-Netherlands double tax 
treaty of 29 April 1948. 
The United States Tax Court and the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
applied the step transaction doctrine and denied the 
withholding tax exemption. They found that there was a 
close correspondence in interest rates and repayment 
schedules of contracts for the loan made by Royal Bank of 
Canada and the loan made by the Dutch interposed 
company. In their opinion, the close correspondence 
showed that loan transactions were mutually 
interdependent. The courts indicated that if the Dutch 
company had earned a profit spread on the inflow and 
outflow of interest payments, they would not have 
considered it as a conduit. 
The United States Tax Court and the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
found that there was a close correspondence in interest 
rates and repayment schedules of contracts for the loan 
made by Royal Bank of Canada and the loan made by the 
interposed Dutch company. In their opinion, the close 
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correspondence showed that loan transactions were 
mutually interdependent. They applied the step transaction 
doctrine and concluded that in substance the United States 
company paid interest directly to the Canadian company, 
not to the Dutch interposed company. Because granting a 
withholding tax exemption in such a situation would be 
against the policy of the United States Netherlands double 
tax treaty, the courts denied the tax exemption.  
The fact that the courts used the step transaction 
doctrine to apply Article VI of the United States-
Netherlands double tax treaty confirms the point that the 
operation of provisions that limit the right of the source 
state to impose withholding tax is analogous to the 
function of judicial anti-avoidance doctrines. The 
approach also shows that the courts interpreted Article VI 
using the right frame of reference. 
The problem with the courts‘ reasoning is that they 
indicated that if the Dutch company had earned a profit 
spread on the inflow and outflow of interest payments, 
they would not have considered it as a conduit. This 
reasoning implies that the doctrine only applies to 
arrangements in which a link between transactions exists. 
An absence of such a link, however, does not necessarily 
show that an interposed company does not pass on passive 
income to residents of non-contracting states. As indicated 
earlier, the courts narrowed the scope of the step 
transaction doctrine. Although no conduit company case 
has applied the step transaction doctrine since the Del 
Commercial case, the illogicality of the reasoning in the 
Del Commercial case was exposed in SDI Netherlands BV v 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
555
   
                                               
555 SDI Netherlands BV v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 107 TC 
161 (1996). 
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As discussed in section 6.18, in SDI Netherlands a 
Bermudan company licensed software to a Dutch 
company, which in turn sub-licensed the software to a 
United States company. The purpose of the arrangement 
was to obtain an exemption from the United States tax on 
royalty payments from the United States company under 
Article IX of the United States-Netherlands double tax 
treaty of 29 April 1948.
556
  
The court found that the terms of the two licensing 
agreements differed. The difference allowed the Dutch 
company to earn a profit spread on the inflow and outflow 
of royalties. On the basis of the finding, the court accorded 
a separate status to the two agreements. That is, it 
concluded that no link existed between the transactions. It 
held, therefore, that royalty payments from the Dutch 
company to the Bermudan company did not constitute 
income received from a source within the United States. It 
allowed the exemption from United States withholding 
tax. Effectively, the court treated the absence of the link 
between transactions as sufficient to show that the Dutch 
company did not act as a conduit.  
Unlike the courts in Del Commercial, the court in SDI 
Netherlands did not apply the step transaction doctrine; 
however, the underlying logic of the courts in the two 
cases was the same. In the light of the similarity, it is 
possible that courts will not apply the step transaction 
doctrine if they find that the link between transactions 
does not exist. The point is that by narrowing the scope of 
the step transaction doctrine, the courts in Del Commercial 
limited the scope of Article IX of the United States-
Netherlands double tax treaty. Consequently, they 
                                               
556 The United States-Netherlands double tax treaty of 29 April 1948, 
above n 554, art IX(1). 
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constricted the ability of the provision to implement 
effectively the policy of limiting treaty benefits to 
residents of the contracting states.  
Further, as analysed in section 6.25, an application of 
the ―reasons for existence‖ approach to the SDI 
Netherlands case shows that the court ignored factors 
indicating that the Dutch company acted as a conduit. The 
application of that approach leads to a more logical 
conclusion. Because the approach preserves the general 
nature of the provisions that reduce withholding tax, the 
analysis in section 6.25 further supports the argument that, 
as with general anti-avoidance rules, it does not make 
sense to specify criteria by which such provisions should 
work.  
7.7. Significance of the term “beneficial owner” 
Because of the general nature of the provisions that limit 
the right of the source state to impose withholding tax, the 
term ―beneficial owner‖ has a different significance from 
other terms that need interpretation to determine their 
ordinary meaning in the context of the object and purpose 
of a double tax treaty. ―Beneficial owner‖ does not carry a 
linguistic meaning of its own. It simply indicates that a 
substantive analysis should be applied for deciding 
whether an arrangement qualifies for treaty benefits. This 
approach was adopted by the United States Tax Court in 
Aiken Industries Inc v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue.
557
 Aiken Industries concerned the United States-
Honduras double tax treaty of 26 June 1956.
558
 Even 
                                               
557 Aiken Industries Inc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 56 TC 
925 (1971). 
558 Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, the United 
States–Honduras (25 June 1956, entered into force 6 February 1957). 
The convention was terminated on 31 December 1966. 
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though the treaty did not contain the expression 
―beneficial owner‖, the United States Tax Court applied 
what was clearly the policy of the treaty requiring that the 
person who gets treaty benefits should be the resident of 
the jurisdiction that was genuinely meant to get benefit. 
As discussed in section 2.4, Aiken Industries involved a 
back-to-back loan structure, in which Ecuadorian Ltd, a 
Bahamian parent company, interposed Industrias, a 
Honduran company, between itself and Aiken, a United 
States subsidiary. Ecuadorian Ltd implemented the 
arrangement in order to obtain the exemption from United 
States tax on the interest payments by Aiken under Article 
IX of the United States-Honduras double tax treaty. When 
applying Article IX, the United States Tax Court 
considered the arrangement as a whole. It determined the 
issue of whether the contractual obligations of Industrias 
had substance. The court noted that transactions occurred 
between related parties and that Industrias was left with 
the same inflow and outflow of funds. On the basis of 
these facts, it concluded:
559
 
Industrias was merely a conduit for the passage of 
interest payments from [Aiken] to [Ecuadorian Ltd]. 
Industrias had no actual beneficial interest in the interest 
payments it received, and in substance, [Aiken] was 
paying the interest to [Ecuadorian Ltd.] which 
―received‖ the interest within the meaning of article IX. 
Two related points emerge. First, as with Lord Denning 
in the Newton case,
560
 the United States Tax Court did not 
specify criteria that would have allowed treaty benefits to 
Industrias. That is, it generalised the provision. The 
approach adopted by the United States Tax Court further 
supports the argument that the provisions that reduce the 
                                               
559 Aiken Industries Inc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, above n 
557, at 934 (emphasis added). 
560 L J Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1958) 98 CLR 1 
(Privy Council, Australia). 
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amount of withholding tax operate to limit treaty benefits 
in the same manner as general anti-avoidance rules operate 
to prevent domestic tax avoidance. Second, the court used 
the expression ―beneficial interest‖ to represent a finding 
of its substantive analysis. It did not use the expression in 
a strict linguistic sense. 
The court decided Aiken Industries before the term 
―beneficial owner‖ was introduced into the OECD Model 
Convention. The Netherlands Hoge Raad adopted the 
same approach in Y-group 1990,
561
 which it decided after 
the term ―beneficial owner‖ was inserted into the OECD 
Model Convention.  
As discussed in section 3.5, in Y-group 1990, a 
Canadian company owned a Dutch subsidiary that 
generated profits. The Canadian company interposed an 
Antillean company that acquired certain shares of the 
Dutch subsidiary. The purpose of the arrangement was to 
avoid Dutch tax on a major portion of dividends that the 
Canadian company ultimately received through the 
Antillean subsidiary. The Hoge Raad had to determine 
whether the Antillean subsidiary was entitled to a refund 
of the Dutch withholding tax under Article 11(3) of the 
BRK.
562
 The court examined the facts in their totality and 
found that the Antillean subsidiary had no practical 
significance for the dividend payments in question.
563
 On 
                                               
561 Y-group 1990 (28 June 1989) Case no 25 451, BNB 1990/45 (the 
Hoge Raad, the Netherlands). 
562 Tax Arrangement for the Kingdom of the Netherlands (28 October 
1964, entered into force 12 December 1985), art 11(3). It stated: ―The 
[dividend withholding tax] … shall not be levied, or if so levied, shall 
be refunded with respect to dividends derived by an entity whose 
capital is wholly or partly divided into shares and which is a resident 
of the other country and holds at least 25 per cent of the paid-up 
capital of the company.‖ 
563 ―Loop van het geding tot dusverre‖ in Y-group 1990, above n 561, 
at para 7.2. 
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the basis of this finding it held that the Canadian company, 
which enjoyed the dividend was not a resident of a country 
to which the BRK applied. The court therefore denied 
treaty benefits. It is debatable whether the Hoge Raad 
applied fraus legis,
564
 or whether it arrived at an 
independent fiscal determination on the facts.
565
 
Regardless of that debate, it is clear that, as with Lord 
Denning
566
 and the Swiss Federal Tax Administration,
567
 
the Hoge Raad generalised the Dutch withholding tax 
provision. 
Although Article 11(3) of the BRK did not use the term 
―beneficial owner‖, the Hoge Raad was of the opinion that 
its analysis of facts was consistent with Article 10(2) of 
the OECD Model Convention of 1977.
568
 The Advocate 
General presumed that the court intended to refer 
specifically to the beneficial ownership clause in Article 
10(2) of the OECD Model Convention.
569
 The point is that, 
as with the United States Tax Court in Aiken Industries, 
the Hoge Raad considered that the beneficial ownership 
clause indicates that courts should apply a substantive 
analysis. 
                                               
564 See RLH IJzerman Het leerstuk van de wetsontduiking in het 
belastingrecht (Kluwer, Deventer, 1991), at 147. ECCM Kemmerem 
―De Hoge Raad heft de dividendbelasting afgeschaft‖ in Weekblad 
voor fiscal recht, No. 6141, 1995, at 360. 
565 See Stef van Weeghel The Improper Use of Tax Treaties: with 
Particular Reference to the Netherlands and the United States 
(Kluwer, London, 1998) at 160. Also see ―Noot‖ in W-family 2 (18 
May 1994) Case no 28 296, BNB 1994/253 at para 4 (the Hoge Raad, 
the Netherlands). 
566 L J Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1958) 98 CLR 1 
(Privy Council, Australia). 
567 X-group 1979 (1979) 48 Archives de droit fiscal Suisse 271 (The 
Federal Tax Administration, Switzerland). 
568 See ―Arrest‖ in Y-group 1990, above n 561, at para 7.2. 
569 See ―Conclusie Advocaat-Generaal mr. Van Soest‖ in Y-group 
1990, above n 549, at para 2.7. 
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The approach adopted by the courts in Aiken Industries 
and Y-group 1990 supports the point that the term 
―beneficial owner‖ does not carry a meaning of its own. It 
simply reminds courts and tax authorities to adopt a 
substantive approach. 
7.8. “Beneficial owner”: a distraction in conduit 
company cases 
As indicated in section 7.1, an important object and 
purpose of a double tax treaty is to limit its benefits to 
residents of contracting states. Even before introducing the 
term ―beneficial owner‖, the OECD Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs did not intend that residents of a non-contracting 
states could obtain a reduction in source state taxation 
under a convention simply by establishing a company in a 
contracting state. In a report on the discussion of the OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs concerning the introduction 
of the term ―beneficial owner‖ in the OECD Model 
Convention, the rapporteur observed:
570
 
…it is evident that relief in the country of source applies 
only if the recipient is actually resident in the other 
contracting State. 
…determining who is the true recipient and his State 
of residence is a matter of administration and 
inspection. 
Two points emerge. First, the committee always 
intended that a reduction in source state taxation should be 
granted to anyone who is a resident of a contracting state 
and who in substance owns passive income. It introduced 
the term ―beneficial owner‖ to make the intention 
explicit.
571
  
                                               
570 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Preliminary Report on 
Suggested Amendments to Articles 11 and 12 of the Draft 
Convention, relating to Interest and Royalties Respectively‖ FC/WP27 
(68) 1, 30 December 1968, at 14 <www.taxtreatieshistory.org> 
(emphasis added). 
571 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ― Proposal for the Amendment 
of Article 11 and 12 of the Draft Convention, Relating to Interest and 
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Second, the expression ―matter of administration and 
inspection‖ suggests that the committee did not intend that 
the term should be interpreted in a strict linguistic sense. 
Probably, for this reason members of the OECD Committee 
who introduced the term did not define it. Further, a note 
on a discussion of the committee before the insertion of 
the term shows that even the United Kingdom delegation, 
which proposed the introduction of the term, envisaged it 
as an anti-avoidance provision of a general nature. The 
note states:
572
 
The Delegate for the United Kingdom thought that 
[―beneficial owner‖] should be inserted in the 
Convention itself, not necessarily in Articles 10, 11 and 
12, but possibly as a general provision in a separate 
Article. 
It follows that, when applying provisions containing the 
beneficial ownership clause, courts should examine 
whether the person who received treaty benefits is the 
person who ought to be receiving them, rather than 
deciding whether a particular category of recipient is the 
beneficial owner.  
The insertion of the term and its linguistic variations 
has obscured the sense in which courts should interpret 
                                                                                            
Royalties Respectively, and of the Commentary thereon‖ FC/WP27 
(70)2, 4 November 1970, at 2. OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs 
―Commentary on Article 10 concerning the Taxation of Dividends‖ 
(OECD, Paris, 2010) in OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs Model Tax 
Convention on Income and on Capital (OECD, Paris, 2010) 187 at para 
12. OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Commentary on Article 11 
concerning the Taxation of Interest‖ (OECD, Paris, 2010) in OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital (OECD, Paris, 2010) 211 at para 9. OECD Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs ―Commentary on Article 12 concerning the Taxation of 
Royalties‖ (OECD, Paris, 2010) in OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs 
Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (OECD, Paris, 2010) 
220 at para 4. 
572
 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Note on the discussion of the 
first Report of Working Party no 27 of the Fiscal Committee on 
Interest and Royalties during the 31st Session of the Fiscal Committee 
Held from 10th to 13th June, 1969‖ DAF/FC/69.10, 4 July 1969, at 6 
<www.taxtreatieshistory.org>. 
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and apply the treaty provisions. They ask whether a 
recipient is the beneficial owner, rather than whether a 
person who receives treaty benefits ought to receive them. 
Although from a substantive point of view these questions 
are essentially similar, courts generally make them two 
separate questions. They begin by defining the term 
―beneficial owner‖. They interpret the term as if it were 
from a statute. That is, they tend to adopt a formal 
legalistic reasoning, which is also the underlying feature 
of surrogate tests. Most of the time, courts‘ conclusions do 
not follow their reasoning. The Hoge Raad adopted this 
approach in the Royal Dutch Shell case.
573
 This case 
concerned Article 10(2) of the Netherlands-United 
Kingdom double tax treaty of 7 November 1980,
574
 which 
used the term ―beneficially owned‖.  
As discussed in section 5.12, in Royal Dutch Shell, a 
holding company in Luxembourg sold dividend coupons 
of certain shares in Royal Dutch Shell to a stockbroker in 
the United Kingdom. The transaction occurred after Royal 
Dutch Shell declared dividends, but before it distributed 
them. The Luxembourg company designed the 
arrangement because it was covered by the 1929 holding 
company regime,
575
 which denied the company a 
withholding tax reduction under the Netherlands-
Luxembourg double tax treaty of 1968.
576
 The stockbroker 
                                               
573 Royal Dutch Shell (6 April 1994) Case no 28 638, BNB 1994/217 
(the Hoge Raad, the Netherlands). 
574 Convention for the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to 
Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, the Netherlands–United 
Kingdom (07 November 1980), art 10(2). 
575 Loi du juillet 1929 sue le regime fiscal des societies de 
participations financiers 1929 (Luxembourg). 
576 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and 
Fortune, the Netherlands–Luxembourg (8 May 1968, enter into force 
20 October 1969), art 10(2)(b). 
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company cashed the coupons and requested a partial 
refund of the Dutch withholding tax on the dividend 
payment.  
The Hoge Raad defined ―beneficial owner‖ in terms of 
the presence of dominion. It found the stockbroker had 
dominion over the dividend payment. It, therefore, 
regarded the stockbroker as the beneficial owner. The 
reasoning does not make sense because the court tested the 
stockbroker company against an attribute that the 
company had by definition. Moreover, the simple fact that 
a company has dominion over passive income does not 
necessarily show that its interposition does not contradict 
the purpose of a double tax treaty to limit tax benefits to 
residents of contracting states. The analysis in section 5.13 
shows that there are convincing reasons for considering 
the stockbroker company to be a conduit. 
In contrast to its reasoning in Y-group 1990,
577
 the 
Hoge Raad in Royal Dutch Shell did not interpret Article 
10 of the treaty in the manner of a general anti-avoidance 
rule or judicial anti-avoidance doctrines. It began by 
interpreting the term ―beneficially owned‖ in a strict 
linguistic sense and did not regard the term as a call for a 
substantive analysis. 
7.9. “Reasons for existence”: an alternative approach 
―Reasons for existence‖ seems to be a better approach for 
deciding conduit company cases than surrogate tests. Its 
adoption for applying the meaning of the word 
―beneficial‖ to conduit companies can be justified 
logically. Lord Denning‘s logic in adopting the predication 
                                               
577 Y-group 1990 (28 June 1989) Case no 25 451, BNB 1990/45 (the 
Hoge Raad, the Netherlands). 
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test
578
 supports this approach. An analogy can be drawn 
between the predication test and the ―reasons for 
existence‖ approach. 
The ―reasons for existence‖ approach involves an 
examination of an arrangement in its entirety with an 
objective of determining reasons for the existence of an 
interposed company in a specific corporate structure. This 
objective allows the approach to work both ways. That is, 
on one hand, courts can refuse treaty benefits if they find 
no practical reason for the existence of the interposed 
company in a corporate structure, other than to obtain 
source state withholding tax reduction. On the other hand, 
courts can reasonably allow treaty benefits, if they find 
significant reasons for its existence in a corporate structure 
other than to minimise the source state withholding tax.  
By contrast when applying the surrogate tests, courts 
examine a particular aspect of an arrangement. Although 
the surrogate tests address questions of fact, courts treat 
them as rules of law. The surrogate tests, therefore, tend to 
function as one-way tests and result in inconsistent 
decisions. For example, courts consider that a causal 
relationship exists between substantive business activity 
and beneficial ownership. The absence of business activity 
indicates that the interposition of a company lacked 
substance; the simple presence of business activity, 
however, does not necessarily show that a company was 
not interposed for improper use of a convention. 
The ideal solution is to replace the term ―beneficial 
owner‖ with another in the context of conduit company 
cases; however, until it is replaced, the deciding 
authorities may interpret and apply the word ―beneficial‖ 
                                               
578 L J Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1958) 98 CLR 1 
(Privy Council, Australia). 
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to conduit company cases by using the ―reasons for 
existence‖ approach. Some improvements in the official 
commentary on Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the OECD Model 
Convention may assist deciding authorities in adopting the 
approach. 
7.10. Beneficial ownership is not an additional 
requirement 
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that the purpose of 
the term ―beneficial owner‖ was to emphasise an existing 
policy. The debate surrounding the definition of 
―beneficial owner‖, however, does not take into account 
the policy of the OECD Model Convention. The debate is 
essentially legalistic. It tends to interpret the term as if the 
term were in a statute. A reason for misguided attempts to 
define ―beneficial owner‖ is that the language of the 
official commentary is confusing. 
According to the official commentary on Articles 10 
and 11 of the OECD Model Convention:
579
 
The requirement of beneficial ownership was 
introduced [to] paragraph 2 … to clarify the meaning of 
the words ―paid ... to a resident‖ as they are used in 
paragraph 1 of the Article. It makes plain that the State 
of source is not obliged to give up taxing rights over 
dividend income merely because that income was 
immediately received by a resident of a State with 
which the State of source had concluded a convention. 
The term ―beneficial owner‖ is not used in a narrow 
technical sense, rather, it should be understood in its 
context and in light of the object and purposes of the 
Convention, including avoiding double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion and avoidance. 
The commentary on Article 12 is similar:
580
 
                                               
579 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Commentary on Article 10 
concerning the Taxation of Dividends‖ (OECD, Paris, 2010) in OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital (OECD, Paris, 2010) 187 at para 12. OECD Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs ―Commentary on Article 11 concerning the Taxation of 
Interest‖ (OECD, Paris, 2010) in OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs 
Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (OECD, Paris, 2010) 
211 at para 9 (emphasis added). 
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The requirement of beneficial ownership was 
introduced [to] paragraph 1 of Article 12 to clarify how 
the Article applies in relation to payments made to 
intermediaries. It makes plain that the State of source is 
not obliged to give up taxing rights over royalty income 
merely because that income was immediately received 
by a resident of a State with which the State of source 
had concluded a convention. The term ―beneficial 
owner‖ is not used in a narrow technical sense, rather, it 
should be understood in its context and in light of the 
object and purposes of the Convention, including 
avoiding double taxation and the prevention of fiscal 
evasion and avoidance. 
The words ―it makes plain‖ in the second sentence of 
both extracts suggest that the term ―beneficial owner‖ 
embodies the object and purpose of the OECD Model 
Convention. Beneficial ownership is the same as 
substantive economic ownership. The third sentence 
implies that an enquiry into the meaning of the term 
should begin with a consideration of the purpose of 
limiting treaty benefits. 
The first sentence of each of these extracts, however, is 
confusing. Each states that the OECD Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs introduced the requirement of beneficial 
ownership to the provisions, and therefore, implies that 
―beneficial ownership‖ is an additional requirement, 
which did not exist before the insertion of the term. The 
phrase ―requirement of beneficial ownership was 
introduced‖ overshadows the effect of the words ―it makes 
plain‖. It is possible that, because of this linguistic 
confusion, the purpose of restricting treaty benefits to 
residents of contracting states is often not considered 
before determining the meaning of ―beneficial owner‖. 
The committee did not introduce the requirement of 
beneficial ownership, or of substantive economic 
                                                                                            
580 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Commentary on Article 12 
concerning the Taxation of Royalties‖ (OECD, Paris, 2010) in OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital (OECD, Paris, 2010) 220 at para 4 (emphasis added). 
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ownership. The requirement is inherent. That is, because 
contacting states enter into double taxation treaties 
intending to provide relief from double taxation only to 
their residents, decision-making authorities should 
interpret provisions concerning the reduction of source 
state‘s withholding tax regardless of whether those 
provisions use the term ―beneficial owner‖.581 In Re V 
SA,
582
 the Swiss Federal Commission of Appeal in Tax 
Matters clarified that the requirement beneficial ownership 
is implicit in double taxation conventions and does not 
require an express reference.
583
 Nevertheless, as discussed 
in section 2.8, the committee introduced the term 
―beneficial owner‖ probably because some courts tend to 
interpret tax treaties in a strict legalistic manner. It may 
help to replace the words ―the requirement of beneficial 
ownership‖584 with ―the term ‗beneficial owner‘‖. 
Further, the last sentence of both extracts suggests that 
the term ―beneficial owner‖ is not used in a narrow 
technical sense and that the term should be understood in 
its context and in th elight of the object and purposes of 
the Convention. While the sentence attempts to clarify that 
the term ‗beneficial owner‖ should not be interpreted in a 
strict linguistic sense, it does so implicitly. The OECD 
                                               
581 See Klaus Vogel Double Taxation Conventions: a Commentary to 
the OECD-, UN-, US-Model Conventions for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation of Income and Capital with particular reference to German 
Treaty Practice (Kluwer, Deventer, 1990) at 459. See David A Ward 
―Principles to be Applied in Interpreting Tax Treaties‖ (1977) 25 
Canadian Tax Journal 263 at 265. 
582 Re V SA 4 ITLR 191(The Federal Commission of Appeal in Tax 
Matters, Switzerland). 
583 Ibid, at 208. 
584 Commentary on Article 10, above n 579, at para 12. Commentary 
on Article 11, above n 579, at para 9. Commentary on Article 12, 
above n 580, at para 4. 
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Committee on Fiscal Affairs may consider adding the 
following words in order to make its intention explicit: 
The term ―beneficial owner‖ is intended to emphasise 
the policy of the convention, not to describe a relevant 
linguistic or legal concept. The term emphasises that it 
is not enough to be formally a resident of a Contracting 
State. In order to be entitled to a reduction in the source 
State withholding tax, the resident of the other 
Contracting State must own [dividends, interest or 
royalties] in an economic sense. The emphasis is on the 
ownership, not on the business activity of an immediate 
recipient of income. 
7.11. The “activity provision” 
As discussed in section 4.2, the Conduit Companies 
Report
585
 and the official commentary on Article 1 of the 
OECD Model Convention
586
 recommend safeguard 
provisions that limit treaty benefits to residents of the 
contracting states in conduit company cases. Most of these 
provisions apply the concept of ―substantial interest‖. 
Although they do not define the concept, they seem to use 
it in the sense of substantive economic ownership, a 
concept that the term ―beneficial ownership‖ also 
represents. Because these provisions have a broad scope, 
the Conduit Companies Report and the official 
commentary recommend that treaty negotiators should 
apply these provisions together with the bona fide 
provisions,
587
 in order to ensure that treaty benefits are 
granted only in bona fide cases. 
                                               
585 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Double Taxation Conventions 
and the Use of Conduit companies‖ in OECD Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs International Tax Avoidance and Evasion: Four Related 
Studies, Issues in international Taxation No 1 (OECD, Paris, 1987) 87, 
at para 42(ii). 
586 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Commentary on Article 1 
concerning the Persons Covered by the Convention‖ in OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital (OECD, Paris, 2010) 62, at para 13. 
587 Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD Model Convention, above n 
586, at para 18. 
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The ―activity provision‖, which is one of the bona fide 
provisions, uses the criterion of substantive business 
activity to differentiate bona fide cases from conduit 
company cases. It states:
588
 
[The safeguard provisions] shall not apply where the 
company is engaged in substantive business operations 
in the Contracting State of which it is a resident and the 
relief from taxation claimed from the other Contracting 
State is with respect to income that is connected with 
such operations. 
The language of the ―activity provision‖ suggests that 
an interposed company shall not be considered to be a 
conduit if that company is involved in substantive business 
activity. When the ―activity provision‖ operates in 
conjunction with the safeguard provisions that use the 
concept of substantive economic ownership, it implies that 
there exists a cause and effect relationship between 
substantive business activity and substantive economic 
ownership. 
Chapter 4 explained that substantive business activity 
was originally a test for deciding cases involving foreign 
base companies. A possible reason for its transposition 
from base company cases to conduit company cases is that 
the two types of cases appear to be similar in terms of 
company structures and income accrual to the taxpayer in 
the resident country. Notwithstanding the apparent 
similarities, certain crucial differences make it 
inappropriate to apply the substantive business activity test 
to conduit company cases. 
The function of a base company is to reduce income tax 
in the country of a taxpayer‘s residence by sheltering the 
taxpayer‘s foreign source income that would otherwise 
accrue directly to it. Courts apply general anti-avoidance 
                                               
588 Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD Model Convention, above 
n586, at para 19(b). 
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rules or judicial anti-avoidance doctrines to deal with base 
companies cases. Some countries have also enacted 
controlled foreign company legislation. Generally, courts 
and legislation attribute income of a base company to a 
taxpayer if they find that the company receives passive 
investment income that arises from capital that is readily 
movable from country to country. They do not attribute a 
base company‘s income to the taxpayer if they find that 
the company is pursuing actively and legitimately some 
income producing undertaking. That is, the decision in 
base company cases largely depends upon the distinction 
between active and passive income. Courts apply the 
substantive business activity test for determining the 
nature of a base company‘s income. 
It is inappropriate, however, to apply the substantive 
business activity test to conduit company cases relying 
upon the reasoning of base company cases. A conduit 
company case does not concern the nature of income. 
Articles 10, 11 and 12 involve passive income.  
The relevance of the substantive business activity 
criterion in conduit company cases cannot be completely 
ruled out. The fact that a recipient company is not engaged 
in a business activity shows that its interposition lacks 
substance. However, it should not be inferred that the 
simple presence of business activity necessarily makes a 
recipient company entitled to treaty benefits. An 
interposed company that is involved in a substantive 
business activity may still be a conduit. That is, unlike a 
base company case, a conduit company case cannot be 
decided on the basis of business activity. 
Nevertheless, the effect of the ―business activity‖ 
provision is as if business activity were a decisive test in 
conduit company cases. It may help if the ―activity 
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provision‖ is not included as a bona fide provision in the 
context of conduit companies. 
7.12. Reference to paragraph 14(b) of the Conduit 
Companies Report 
Chapter 5 explained that courts use dominion, an incident 
of ownership, for determining whether a person acts in the 
capacity of a ―nominee or agent‖. As discussed in section 
5.4, paragraph 14(b) of the Conduit Companies Report
589
 
applies the dominion test to conduit company cases on the 
basis of apparent similarities between the role of a 
―nominee or agent‖ and the function of a conduit 
company. 
Paragraph 14(b) refers to the commentary on Articles 
10, 11 and 12 of the OECD Model Convention of 1977, 
which used a ―nominee or agent‖ as an example for 
explaining the function of conduit companies. The 
commentary presented the example in a manner that 
implied that cases concerning nominees or agents involve 
a question of whether they can be allowed treaty benefits. 
Although the attribute of passing income on to a third 
party makes nominees or agents appear similar to conduit 
companies, there is a crucial difference. Unlike conduit 
companies, nominees or agents are obliged to pass on 
income as it accrues to a third party. 
When claiming a tax reduction in source state taxation, 
conduit companies tend to argue that they are under no 
obligation in property law to pass on passive income to a 
third party. That is, they tend to rely on the fact that they 
have, by definition, dominion over passive income. For 
                                               
589
 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Double Taxation Conventions 
and the Use of Conduit Companies‖ in OECD Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs International Tax Avoidance and Evasion: Four Related 
Studies, Issues in International Taxation No 1 (OECD, Paris, 1987) 87 
at para 14(b). 
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this reason, courts should examine the substance of such 
cases and determine whether the interposition of the 
recipient company is bona fide. Therefore, it makes sense 
to ask the question whether an interposed company can be 
allowed to use the limitation on the source state‘s right to 
tax in order to reduce the effect of the domestic tax law of 
the source state. By contrast, it is illogical to ask this 
question in cases in which the interposed entity acts as a 
―nominee or agent‖ because such an entity is under an 
obligation in property law to pass on passive income.  
The official commentary on Articles 10, 11 and 12, as 
it stands after 2003, appears to have overcome this 
shortcoming to a large extent. It states:
590
 
Where an item of income is received by a resident of a 
Contracting State acting in the capacity of agent or 
nominee it would be inconsistent with the object and 
purpose of the Convention for the State of source to 
grant relief or exemption merely on account of the 
status of the immediate recipient of the income as a 
resident of the other Contracting State. The immediate 
recipient of the income in this situation qualifies as a 
resident but no potential double taxation arises as a 
consequence of that status since the recipient is not 
treated as the owner of the income for tax purposes in 
the State of residence. It would be equally inconsistent 
with the object and purpose of the Convention for the 
State of source to grant relief or exemption where a 
resident of a Contracting State, otherwise than through 
an agency or nominee relationship, simply acts as a 
conduit for another person who in fact receives the 
benefit of the income concerned. For these reasons, the 
report from the Committee on Fiscal Affairs entitled 
―Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit 
Companies‖ concludes that a conduit company cannot 
normally be regarded as the beneficial owner if, though 
the formal owner, it has, as a practical matter, very 
                                               
590 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Commentary on Article 10 
concerning the Taxation of Dividends‖ (OECD, Paris, 2003) in OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs Model Tax Convention on Income and 
on Capital (OECD, Paris, 2003) 145 at para 12.1. OECD Committee on 
Fiscal Affairs ―Commentary on Article 11 concerning the Taxation of 
Interest‖ (OECD, Paris, 2003) in OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs 
Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (OECD, Paris, 2003) 
162 at para 8.1. OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs ―Commentary on 
Article 12 concerning the Taxation of Royalties‖ (OECD, Paris, 2003) 
in OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs Model Tax Convention on 
Income and on Capital (OECD, Paris, 2003) 173 at para 4.1. 
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narrow powers which render it, in relation to the income 
concerned, a mere fiduciary or administrator acting on 
account of the interested parties. 
 It is clear that the commentary does not consider 
nominees or agents to qualify for treaty benefits on any 
criterion. However, the problem is that it still refers to the 
conclusion that the Conduit Companies Report draws in 
paragraph 14(b). As discussed in section 5.4, paragraph 
14(b) in turn relies on the official commentary on Articles 
10, 11 and 12 of the OECD Model Convention of 1977. 
Because courts and commentators widely refer to 
paragraph 14(b) for determining the meaning of the term 
―beneficial owner‖, it is possible that courts may ignore 
the clarification with respect to nominees or agents. The 
approach adopted by the Tax Court of Canada in Prévost 
Car Inc v Her Majesty the Queen
591
 illustrates the point. 
As discussed in section 5.15, the court transposed the 
dominion test from cases involving nominees and agents 
to conduit company cases. It acknowledged that the 
commentary on Article 10(2) of the OECD Model 
Convention of 1977 was amended in 2003; but, the 
reference to the conclusion in paragraph 14(b) confused 
the court. That is, instead of differentiating the role of a 
―nominee or agent‖ from the function of a conduit 
company, the court compared them. As a result, the court 
effectively relied on the official commentary of Article 10 
of the OECD Model Convention of 1977.  
Because paragraph 14(b) of the Conduit Companies 
Report is based on the shortcomings of the official 
commentary on the OECD Model Convention of 1977, the 
amended official commentary would be more effective if 
it did not refer to paragraph 14(b). 
                                               
591 Prévost Car Inc v Her Majesty the Queen (2008) TCC 231, at para 
31. 
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7.13. The OECD’s discussion draft on the clarification 
of the meaning of the term “beneficial owner” 
In April 2011, the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs 
published a discussion draft on the clarification of the 
meaning of the term ―beneficial owner‖ in the OECD 
Model Convention.
592
 The draft proposed changes to the 
commentary on Articles 10, 11 and 12. It is encouraging 
that some of these changes are in line with the arguments 
that this thesis presents. 
For instance, the proposed paragraphs 12.6, 10.4 and 
4.5 to the commentary on Articles 10, 11 and 12 
respectively support the hypothesis that logically and in an 
economic sense the concept of beneficial ownership is not 
capable of being applied to companies. The paragraphs 
begin by referring to the term ―beneficial owner‖ as used 
by the 2001 OECD‘s report entitled ―Behind the Corporate 
Veil: Using Corporate Entities for Illicit Purposes‖, which 
considers a beneficial owner to be a ―natural person‖.593 
The report concerns issues arising out of the use of 
corporate entities for illicit purposes, such as money 
laundering, bribery, hiding and shielding assets from 
creditors, illicit tax practices, self-dealing, market fraud 
and circumvention of disclosure requirements. The draft 
considers the definition accorded by the report does not 
apply to the OECD Model Convention for two reasons. 
First, the report defines beneficial owner in the context of 
―anonymity-enhancing instruments‖,594 such as bearer 
shares, nominee shareholders, nominee directors, 
                                               
592 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs Clarification of the Meaning of 
“Beneficial Owner” in the OECD Model Tax Convention Discussion 
Draft (OECD, Paris, 2011). 
593 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs Behind the Corporate Veil 
Using Corporate Entities for Illicit Purposes (OECD, Paris, 2001) at 
14. 
594 Ibid at10. 
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―corporate‖ directors, flee clauses, and letters of wishes. 
Second, paragraphs 12.6 and 10.4 explain:
595
 
Indeed, that meaning, which refers to natural persons 
(i.e. individuals), cannot be reconciled with the express 
wording of subparagraph [2(a)], which refers to the 
situation where a company is the beneficial owner of a 
dividend. Since, in the context of Article 10, the term 
beneficial owner is intended to address difficulties 
arising from the use of the word ―paid‖ in relation to 
dividends, it would be inappropriate to consider a 
meaning developed in order to refer to the individuals 
who exercise ―ultimate effective control over a legal 
person or arrangement‖. 
Paragraph 4.5 is similar:
596
 
Indeed, that meaning, which refers to natural persons 
(i.e. individuals), cannot be reconciled with the express 
wording of subparagraph 2 a) of Article 10, which refers 
to the situation where a company is the beneficial owner 
of a dividend. Since the term beneficial owner was 
intended to address difficulties arising from the use of 
the word ―paid‖, which is found in paragraph 1 of 
Articles 10 and 11 and was similarly used in paragraph 
1 of Article 12 of the 1977 Model Double Taxation 
Convention, it would be inappropriate to consider a 
meaning developed in order to refer to the individuals 
who exercise ―ultimate effective control over a legal 
person or arrangement‖ 
The proposed commentary clearly supports the 
hypothesis of this thesis. Moreover, it clarifies that the 
OECD Committee intends to use the term to address 
difficulties arising from the use of the word ―paid‖. An 
apparent difficulty is that courts tend to interpret treaty 
provisions of double tax treaties in a strictly literal sense. 
The problem of interpreting the word ―paid‖ literally is 
that tax benefits will effectively be granted to persons to 
whom a double tax treaty is not intended to apply. Thus, 
the commentary supports the point that the term 
―beneficial owner‖ indicates that courts should adopt a 
substantive point of view. In other words, the term 
enforces the tax treaty policy of limiting treaty benefits. 
                                               
595 The discussion draft on the clarification of the meaning of 
―beneficial owner‖, above n 592, at 4 and 7. 
596 Ibid, at 9. 
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The foregoing paragraphs help to understand 
paragraphs 12.5, 10.3 and 4.4 of the proposed commentary 
on Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the OECD Model Convention 
respectively. Paragraph 12.5 state:
597
 
The fact that the recipient of royalties is considered to 
be the beneficial owner of these royalties does not 
mean, however, that the provisions of paragraph 2 must 
automatically be applied. These provisions should not 
be granted in cases of abuse ... As explained in the 
section on ―Improper use of the Convention‖ in the 
Commentary on Article 1, there are many ways of 
addressing [conduit companies] and, more generally, 
treaty shopping situations. These include specific treaty 
anti-abuse provisions, general anti-abuse rules and 
substance-over-form or economic substance approaches. 
Whilst the concept of ―beneficial owner‖ deals with 
some forms of tax avoidance (i.e. those involving the 
interposition of a recipient who is obliged to pass the 
royalties to someone else), it does not deal with other 
cases of treaty shopping and must not, therefore, be 
considered as restricting in any way the application of 
other approaches to addressing such cases. 
Paragraphs 10.3 and 4.4 of the proposed commentary 
are worded similarly.
598
 As with the Swiss Federal Court 
in A Holding ApS v Federal Tax Administration,
599
 the 
proposed commentary differentiates the meaning of 
beneficial ownership for legal purposes from that for the 
purposes of double tax treaties. It clarifies that for legal 
purposes a beneficial owner is not necessarily entitled to 
treaty benefits. In other words, beneficial ownership 
operates as an anti-avoidance test, not as a test of 
ownership. This thesis makes exactly the same point in 
section 7.7. 
The proposed commentary, however, does not consider 
certain shortcomings of the existing commentary, which 
this thesis highlights. For instance, paragraphs 12, 9 and 4 
                                               
597 The discussion draft on the clarification of the meaning of 
―beneficial owner‖, above n 592, at 4. 
598 Ibid, at 6 and 9. 
599 A Holding ApS v Federal Tax Administration (2005) 8 ITLR 536 
(The Federal Court, Switzerland) at 559. 
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of the commentary on Articles 10, 11 and 12 respectively 
still infers that the Conduit Companies Report draws on 
paragraph 14(b). As discussed in section 7.12, paragraph 
14(b) is based on the official commentary of 1977, which 
implied that cases concerning nominees or agents require 
determination of whether the intermediary is a beneficial 
owner. Paragraphs 12.4, 10.2 and 4.3 of the proposed 
commentary on the Articles 10, 11 and 12 respectively add 
to the confusion. They state:
600
 
In these various examples (agent, nominee, conduit 
company acting as a fiduciary or administrator), the 
recipient of the [passive income] is not the ―beneficial 
owner‖ because that recipient does not have the full 
right to use and enjoy the [income] that it receives and 
this [income] is not its own; the powers of that recipient 
over that [income] are indeed constrained in that the 
recipient is obliged (because of a contractual, fiduciary 
or other duty) to pass the payment received to another 
person.  
The extract appears to cite agents and nominees as 
examples of conduits. As discussed in section 5.11, 
presenting agents and nominees as conduits may imply 
that the absence of the obligation to pass on income 
necessarily means that an interposed company is entitled 
to treaty benefits. 
This thesis does not analyse the OECD discussion draft 
in further detail because the draft was published shortly 
before the submission of this thesis. Further analysis of the 
draft is currently in process. 
7.14. Future implications 
The objective of the thesis is to analyse the problem of 
interpreting the term ―beneficial owner‖ and applying it to 
conduit company cases. Several reasons have driven the 
thesis to analyse the problem. Scholars have debated the 
                                               
600 The discussion draft on the clarification of the meaning of 
―beneficial owner‖, above n 592, at 4, 6 and 8. 
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meaning of the term, since its introduction in the OECD 
Model Convention of 1977. Further, courts have 
interpreted and applied the term inconsistently to 
relatively similar sets of facts and reached different 
conclusions. The problem also has significant political 
implications. It affects national tax policies of several 
developed and developing countries. Moreover, the 
economic impact of the problem is evident from the 
amount of revenue at stake. 
 A consensus exists on the generic policy of double tax 
treaties, which is to limit tax benefits to residents of 
contracting states. However, it is difficult to apply the 
policy: the problem of dealing with conduit companies is 
not an example of bad policy, rather it is an example of 
confused execution. 
This thesis is an effort to help courts, tax authorities, 
and scholars understand the existing policy better. It 
clarifies confusion over the execution of existing policy. 
The thesis highlights subtle differences in the legal 
reasoning, which can affect the outcome of conduit 
company cases. It intends to make courts aware of 
ramifications of their reasoning.  
With the help of case analysis, the thesis has shown that 
courts can decide conduit company cases more 
convincingly if they apply the beneficial ownership test as 
if it were a general anti-avoidance rule. It is hoped that this 
approach would assist courts and tax authorities to 
interpret and apply the test in more logically and 
consistently. 
 Appendix 
Translations 
This thesis involves a comparative analysis of cases of 
different jurisdictions. Until recently, conducting such a 
study was extremely difficult not only for students, but 
also for university teachers. However, the availability of 
electronic translation services, such as Google translator 
have greatly helped the process of translating judgments in 
other languages. 
Although translations from Google translator are rough, 
it is possible to improve them by translating small groups 
of words rather than the entire text. For example, quoting 
the Bundesfinanzhof in the Group 2005 case, section 4.24 
argued that the court equated the presence of ―economic or 
other valid reasons‖ with ―business purpose‖. The original 
word that the Bundesfinanzhof used for the words 
―business purpose‖ was ―Unternehmenszwecke‖, which 
Google translator translates as ―corporate purposes‖. 
When translated alone, the word ―unternehmen‖ can mean 
―enterprise‖, ―business‖ and ―undertaking‖. In the context 
of base company cases and the substantive business 
activity test, ―Unternehmenszwecke‖ may reasonably be 
translated as ―business purpose‖. 
In order to ensure the accuracy of the translations the 
author consulted Dutch, French and German native 
speakers who helped to refine the translations further. The 
author is indebted to his supervisor, Professor Kevin 
Holmes, for his help and guidance as well as his good 
command of Dutch.  
In some cases, legal scholars have already translated 
certain paragraphs of important judgments. For instance, 
Stef van Weeghel translated certain paragraphs of W-
family 1 and W-family 2. His translations helped the 
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understanding of the reasoning adopted by lower courts 
and the Hoge Raad. In the light of these inferences, the 
author translated other paragraphs of the cases and found 
that the approach adopted by Dutch courts corresponded to 
the end result test adopted by the United States courts for 
implementing the step transaction doctrine. 
Google translator, contributions from colleagues and 
supervisors, and certain extracts translated by legal 
scholars were extremely helpful in capturing the essence 
of the foreign language cases. The kind of comparative 
analysis undertaken in this thesis would not have been 
possible otherwise. 
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